| name | infra-security |
| description | Infrastructure security discipline — identity, encryption, secrets, audit. Perimeter/platform counterpart to security-hardening (app-side). |
Skill: Infrastructure Security
Platform-side security. App-side lives in security-hardening (ops/sec); the security gate reviews both. Vendor mechanisms from memory-long §stack.
Identity is the perimeter
- Least privilege as a process, not an event: start narrow, widen with justification — never start with
* "to fix later" (later never comes; the hook-protected configs philosophy applies to IAM too).
- Roles/identities over long-lived users and keys · short-lived credentials (OIDC/workload identity) wherever supported · human access via SSO+MFA, break-glass documented and alarmed.
- Service identities are per-service, never shared — shared identity = unattributable audit trail.
Encryption
At rest and in transit are defaults, not features — a resource created without encryption fails review · customer-managed keys where compliance requires (key rotation documented) · TLS termination point is a deliberate, documented choice.
Secrets in infrastructure
Secret manager references in IaC, never literal values (secret-scan hook is the last line) · state files contain secrets — state access is secret access, scope it accordingly (see state-discipline) · rotation is automated or scheduled, never "when we remember".
Audit & detection
Audit logging on, centralized, immutable (write-once storage or separate account) · logs of the security tooling itself are protected from the identities they watch · config drift on security resources = incident, not chore (alert, don't batch).
Escalation triggers (never fast-path)
IAM policy changes · network exposure · encryption/key changes · audit logging changes — full loop + security gate regardless of diff size (mirrors infra instructions rule 5).