| name | cis-bind-v100-3-2 |
| description | Restrict Recursive Queries (Automated) |
| category | cis-bind |
| version | 1.0 |
| author | cyberstrike-official |
| tags | ["cis","bind","dns","isc-bind","bind9","restricting-queries"] |
| cis_id | 3.2 |
| cis_benchmark | CIS ISC BIND DNS Server 9.11 Benchmark v1.0.0 |
| tech_stack | ["bind","isc-bind","dns","linux"] |
| cwe_ids | [] |
| chains_with | [] |
| prerequisites | [] |
| severity_boost | {} |
CIS 3.2 — Restrict Recursive Queries
Profile Applicability
- Authoritative Name Server Level 1
- Caching Only Name Server Level 1
Description
A recursive DNS query is your typical DNS query from a client to a caching DNS server. It places the burden of finding the answer on the caching DNS server which will recursively query other DNS servers authoritative for the domains, until it gets the answer which is then returned to the client. The DNS server will then cache the answer to the query until its time-to-live expires in order to provide a quick answer to future queries for the same name. BIND can be configured to restrict fulfillment of recursive lookups to only authorized network segments and hosts. This is made possible by the allow-recursion option. Caching non-authoritative name servers should only allow recursive queries from clients on their own authorized networks. Authoritative name servers should not allow recursive queries, except to the local host.
Rationale
Recursive DNS queries are commonly used in malicious attacks, including DNS amplification attacks and DNS cache poisoning attacks. A DNS amplification attack is a form of a reflected distributed denial-of-service attack, where multiple publicly accessible servers are sent recursive queries with the source IP address spoofed to be that of the victim. A high volume of relatively large DNS responses then flood the victim. For a DNS cache poisoning attack, the attacker may perform a query, and then provide a bogus response for the server to store in the cache. The bogus response may redirect clients to a different IP address which is provided by the attacker. Once the cache is poisoned, then clients visiting websites, connecting to mail servers or VPNs may be connected with a malicious server configured to attack the client or steal credentials.
Limiting recursive queries to trusted networks does not prevent all of the DNS attacks possible, but it does make the attacks much more difficult and dramatically limits the scope of possible attacks so that detection and response are manageable.
Impact
Not specified in the PDF.
Audit Procedure
From the command prompt on Windows or Linux, send a recursive DNS request for a domain name for which the server is not authoritative, and from a client that is not permitted to perform recursive queries:
$ nslookup www.cisecurity.com 10.10.3.53
. . .
** server can't find www.cisecurity.com: REFUSED
The expected result is for the query to be refused. If the query times out due to network blocking the request, then examine the configuration files and verify that an allow-recursion statement is present and has only the appropriate network and hosts IP addresses listed. Something like one of the two statements below: