t1136-003-cloud-account

name	T1136.003_cloud-account
description	Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems.
category	configuration
version	18.1
author	cyberstrike-official
tags	["mitre-attack","enterprise","t1136.003","persistence","iaas","saas","office-suite","identity-provider","sub-technique"]
technique_id	T1136.003
tactic	persistence
all_tactics	["persistence"]
platforms	["IaaS","SaaS","Office Suite","Identity Provider"]
mitre_url	https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003
tech_stack	["cloud","saas","office","identity"]
cwe_ids	["CWE-276"]
chains_with	["T1136","T1136.001","T1136.002"]
prerequisites	["T1136"]
severity_boost	{"T1136":"Chain with T1136 for deeper attack path","T1136.001":"Chain with T1136.001 for deeper attack path","T1136.002":"Chain with T1136.002 for deeper attack path"}

T1136.003 Cloud Account

Sub-technique of: T1136

High-Level Description

Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.

In addition to user accounts, cloud accounts may be associated with services. Cloud providers handle the concept of service accounts in different ways. In Azure, service accounts include service principals and managed identities, which can be linked to various resources such as OAuth applications, serverless functions, and virtual machines in order to grant those resources permissions to perform various activities in the environment. In GCP, service accounts can also be linked to specific resources, as well as be impersonated by other accounts for Temporary Elevated Cloud Access. While AWS has no specific concept of service accounts, resources can be directly granted permission to assume roles.

Adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services, which can reduce the chance of detection.

Once an adversary has created a cloud account, they can then manipulate that account to ensure persistence and allow access to additional resources - for example, by adding Additional Cloud Credentials or assigning Additional Cloud Roles.

Kill Chain Phase

• Persistence (TA0003)

Platforms: IaaS, SaaS, Office Suite, Identity Provider

What to Check

• Identify if Cloud Account technique is applicable to target environment
• Check IaaS systems for indicators of Cloud Account
• Check SaaS systems for indicators of Cloud Account
• Check Office Suite systems for indicators of Cloud Account
• Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (3 known mitigations)
• Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

How to Test

Manual Testing

1. Identify Attack Surface: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Cloud Account by examining the target platforms (IaaS, SaaS, Office Suite).

2. Assess Existing Defenses: Review whether mitigations for T1136.003 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.