appsec-audit

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Actualizado27 de mayo de 2026 a las 17:06

Application security audit focused on URL and input trust boundaries, SSRF-style risks, redirects, metadata endpoints, allowlists, and evidence-backed findings.

Instalación

Instalar con Codex o Claude Copia este prompt, pégalo en Codex, Claude u otro asistente, y deja que revise la página de la skill y la instale por ti.

Fuente

infiquetra

infiquetra/infiquetra-claude-plugins

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Ocupaciones relacionadasSOC

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SKILL.md

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name	appsec-audit
description	Application security audit focused on URL and input trust boundaries, SSRF-style risks, redirects, metadata endpoints, allowlists, and evidence-backed findings.
when_to_use	Use when reviewing code that accepts URLs, fetches remote resources, follows redirects, proxies requests, imports external data, parses user-controlled input, or touches network egress controls.

AppSec Audit

Use this skill to audit application code for URL and input trust boundary risks. Focus on evidence-backed findings, not speculative concerns.

Scope

Review:

User-controlled URLs, hosts, paths, query strings, headers, and webhook destinations.
HTTP clients, redirect handling, proxy code, file importers, and fetch/download helpers.
SSRF-style paths to cloud metadata endpoint addresses and internal networks.
DNS rebinding, scheme confusion, localhost/private-network access, and open redirects.
Allowlist and blocklist enforcement.
Input parsing at trust boundaries.

Process

Map external inputs and trust boundaries.
Trace each input to network, file, shell, database, template, or redirect sinks.
Check validation order: parse, canonicalize, validate, then use.
Confirm allowlists are positive and exact enough for the risk.
Check redirects do not escape the approved destination set.
Check cloud metadata endpoint protections and private network restrictions.
Produce findings only when code evidence supports the risk.

SSRF Checklist

Reject non-HTTP schemes unless explicitly required.
Reject localhost, loopback, link-local, private, multicast, and unspecified addresses.
Protect metadata endpoints, including 169.254.169.254 and provider-specific hostnames.
Re-resolve DNS or pin validated IPs when redirects or retries occur.
Validate every redirect hop.
Enforce outbound allowlists at the URL/host layer and, where possible, network egress layer.
Set conservative timeouts and response size limits.

Finding Format

## AppSec Audit Finding

**Severity**: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
**Category**: [SSRF / redirect / input validation / allowlist / metadata endpoint / other]
**File**: [path:line]
**Evidence**: [Specific code behavior and data flow]
**Impact**: [What an attacker can do]
**Fix**: [Concrete remediation]
**Validation**: [How to prove the fix]

If no findings are found, state the files reviewed and any residual test gaps.

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AppSec Audit

Use this skill to audit application code for URL and input trust boundary risks. Focus on evidence-backed findings, not speculative concerns.

Scope

Review:

User-controlled URLs, hosts, paths, query strings, headers, and webhook destinations.

HTTP clients, redirect handling, proxy code, file importers, and fetch/download helpers.

SSRF-style paths to cloud metadata endpoint addresses and internal networks.

DNS rebinding, scheme confusion, localhost/private-network access, and open redirects.

Allowlist and blocklist enforcement.

Input parsing at trust boundaries.

Process

Map external inputs and trust boundaries.

Trace each input to network, file, shell, database, template, or redirect sinks.

Check validation order: parse, canonicalize, validate, then use.

Confirm allowlists are positive and exact enough for the risk.

Check redirects do not escape the approved destination set.

Check cloud metadata endpoint protections and private network restrictions.

Produce findings only when code evidence supports the risk.

SSRF Checklist

Reject non-HTTP schemes unless explicitly required.

Reject localhost, loopback, link-local, private, multicast, and unspecified addresses.

Protect metadata endpoints, including 169.254.169.254 and provider-specific hostnames.

Re-resolve DNS or pin validated IPs when redirects or retries occur.

Validate every redirect hop.

Enforce outbound allowlists at the URL/host layer and, where possible, network egress layer.

Set conservative timeouts and response size limits.

Finding Format

## AppSec Audit Finding **Severity**: [Critical/High/Medium/Low] **Category**: [SSRF / redirect / input validation / allowlist / metadata endpoint / other] **File**: [path:line] **Evidence**: [Specific code behavior and data flow] **Impact**: [What an attacker can do] **Fix**: [Concrete remediation] **Validation**: [How to prove the fix]

If no findings are found, state the files reviewed and any residual test gaps.