local-first-legal-workspace

name	local-first-legal-workspace
description	Use when users say "is this legal AI app local-first", "what leaves the machine", "BYOK privacy", "audit network calls", "where are documents stored", or need a legal AI workspace reviewed for local storage, credentials, model-provider calls, conversion, and privacy boundaries.
author	AnonLQ
version	0.1.0
last_reviewed	2026-05
jurisdiction	AG
tags	["local-first","privacy","legal-ai","document-management","byok","security"]

local-first-legal-workspace

When to Use

• A lawyer wants to use AI with confidential documents without adopting a hosted matter platform.
• A desktop or local web app stores legal documents and generated work product.
• The user needs to reason about BYOK model calls, local storage, workspace backups, or privacy boundaries.
• A workflow must explain exactly what leaves the machine.

This skill is a design and audit checklist. It is not a claim that local-first equals risk-free.

Audience and Work Shape

Audience: legal-technology counsel, privacy/security-aware lawyers, and legal engineers reviewing a legal AI workspace with technical input where needed.

Work shape: pattern-matched audit when evidence exists; accretive design review when the user is designing a workflow. Keep those paths separate in the output.

Legal Failure Modes

• Legal support, not legal advice: the skill maps data flows and uncertainty so a lawyer can assess risk; it does not certify privacy, security, privilege, or regulatory compliance.
• Privilege/confidentiality: model calls, document conversion, logs, and external lookups can affect privilege/work-product treatment. Include privilege/work-product implications in the disclosure note when legal matter data is involved.
• Accountability: the responsible lawyer, DPO, security lead, or system owner decides whether the workspace is acceptable for a matter or client.

Access Modes

This skill works in three modes:

1. Code/runtime evidence mode - inspect repository code, configuration, dependencies, logs, network observations, or runtime behavior.
2. User-supplied architecture mode - use diagrams, README files, screenshots, settings exports, or descriptions supplied by the user.
3. No-evidence mode - produce an audit plan and questions only. Do not assert what stays local or what leaves the machine.

If code, runtime evidence, or provider documentation is unavailable, mark claims unknown or not_observed_not_excluded. Do not treat a product's privacy statement as verified architecture.

How It Works

1. Define the workspace boundary

Identify where local data lives:

• Documents.
• Database or index.
• Generated files.
• Chat history.
• Settings.
• Logs.
• API keys or credential references.

Prefer one user-chosen workspace folder so backup, deletion, and migration are understandable.

2. Map all network paths

List every possible external call:

• Model providers.
• Citation or registry lookups.
• OCR or document conversion services.
• Telemetry, analytics, crash reporting, fonts, CDNs, update checks.

For each call, record:

Field	Meaning
destination	host or service
trigger	what user action causes it
payload	what data is sent
credential	whose key or token is used
retention	known retention posture
opt-out	whether user can disable it
evidence	code path, config file, package, provider documentation, policy URL, or runtime observation supporting the row
retrieval_date	date external provider terms or documentation were checked

Do not assert that there are no hidden network paths unless code, dependency, configuration, and runtime evidence has been checked. If a path is not observed but not exhaustively verified, mark not_observed_not_excluded; if unknown, mark unknown.

3. Confirm user control

Check:

• Workspace can be selected by the user.
• User can back up by copying the workspace.
• User can delete local state.
• API keys are BYOK or clearly scoped.
• Sensitive file paths are guarded against traversal.
• Generated exports are written where the user expects.

4. Prepare a disclosure note

For legal users, produce a short note:

• What stays local.
• What is sent out.
• What is optional.
• What logs exist.
• What the tool cannot guarantee.

Plain English matters. A lawyer should be able to explain the risk to a client, judge, supervisor, or DPO.

Output as:

1. local_state_map table: data type, path/location, sensitivity, deletion method, backup implication.
2. external_calls table using the fields above.
3. credential_handling summary.
4. user_disclosure_note in plain English.
5. unknowns_and_verification_needed.

Add an overall confidence band to user_disclosure_note:

• High: code, config, runtime, and provider evidence reviewed; material unknowns are closed.
• Medium: architecture or documentation reviewed but runtime or provider evidence is incomplete.
• Low: no-evidence or user-reported-only mode; output is an audit plan, not a conclusion.

Confidence Bands

Apply the same High/Medium/Low band to the overall disclosure note and separately preserve row-level evidence states (observed, user_reported, provider_documentation, unknown, not_observed_not_excluded).

5. Review failure modes

Flag:

• Cloud auth or storage reintroduced by dependency.
• Remote document conversion.
• Model prompts containing entire confidential bundles when only excerpts are needed.
• API keys stored in plaintext files.
• Unbounded logs containing document text.
• Local app exposing services beyond localhost.

Escalation

Stop and route to privacy counsel, a security engineer, or the system owner when plaintext credentials are found, marketing/privacy claims contradict code or runtime evidence, unexpected outbound destinations appear, provider retention terms are missing for client data, or the user wants a client-facing assurance without runtime evidence.

Example

Audit this legal AI app's privacy boundary. Tell me what stays local, what leaves the machine, and what the user must understand before processing confidential documents.

For a compact output pattern, see examples/output.md. For workspace boundary, BYOK, network inventory, and conversion-risk conventions, see references/local-first-model.md.

Limitations

• Local-first does not mean local-model-only.
• BYOK model providers may still retain or process submitted context under their terms.
• Malware, endpoint compromise, backups, and user sharing are outside the skill's control.
• This is not a formal security audit.