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detect-api-anomaly-salesforce

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Actualizado6 de julio de 2026 a las 04:25

Detect Salesforce API activity by a user or integration outside an operator-maintained baseline of approved clients, source IPs, or event-volume limits. Reads OCSF 1.8 Application Activity (6002) or native records emitted by `ingest-salesforce-event-mon-ocsf`, groups API events by actor and time window, and emits OCSF Detection Finding (2004) tagged with MITRE ATT&CK T1078.004. Use when the user mentions Salesforce API anomaly, suspicious integration, connected app drift, API usage spike, or unexpected source IP. Do NOT use on raw Event Monitoring data before normalization, non-Salesforce logs, or as remediation.

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msaad00

msaad00/cloud-ai-security-skills

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SKILL.md

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name	detect-api-anomaly-salesforce
description	Detect Salesforce API activity by a user or integration outside an operator-maintained baseline of approved clients, source IPs, or event-volume limits. Reads OCSF 1.8 Application Activity (6002) or native records emitted by `ingest-salesforce-event-mon-ocsf`, groups API events by actor and time window, and emits OCSF Detection Finding (2004) tagged with MITRE ATT&CK T1078.004. Use when the user mentions Salesforce API anomaly, suspicious integration, connected app drift, API usage spike, or unexpected source IP. Do NOT use on raw Event Monitoring data before normalization, non-Salesforce logs, or as remediation.
purpose	Detect Salesforce API activity outside an operator baseline.
capability	detect
persistence	none
telemetry	stderr_jsonl
privilege_escalation	none
license	Apache-2.0
approval_model	none
execution_modes	jit, ci, mcp, persistent
side_effects	none
input_formats	ocsf
output_formats	native, ocsf
concurrency_safety	stateless
metadata	{"homepage":"https://github.com/msaad00/cloud-ai-security-skills","source":"https://github.com/msaad00/cloud-ai-security-skills/tree/main/skills/detection/detect-api-anomaly-salesforce","version":"0.1.0","frameworks":["OCSF 1.8","MITRE ATT&CK v14","OWASP Top 10"],"cloud":["salesforce"]}

detect-api-anomaly-salesforce

Use when

You normalized Salesforce Event Monitoring data with ingest-salesforce-event-mon-ocsf
You need to detect API activity from unexpected clients, source IPs, or event volume
You want a stateless detector for suspicious integrations and valid-account abuse

Do NOT use

On raw Event Monitoring CSV or JSON before ingestion
On generic web access logs or non-Salesforce SaaS audit events
As remediation; connected-app disablement and session kill need HITL-gated write skills

Detection logic

One pass over Salesforce Application Activity events:

Require producer ingest-salesforce-event-mon-ocsf.
Require unmapped.salesforce.event_family=api.
Group events by actor and SALESFORCE_API_ANOMALY_WINDOW_MINUTES. Default is 60.
Compare clients, source IPs, and event count with SALESFORCE_API_BASELINE_JSON.
When no actor baseline exists, fire if count reaches SALESFORCE_API_ANOMALY_EVENT_THRESHOLD. Default is 25.

Baseline example:

export SALESFORCE_API_BASELINE_JSON='{"005svc":{"client_names":["ApprovedClient"],"ips":["203.0.113.10"],"max_events":100}}'
export SALESFORCE_API_ALLOWED_CLIENTS="InternalGateway"

Output contract

Default output is OCSF Detection Finding (class 2004) with:

deterministic metadata.uid
finding_info.types[] = ["salesforce-api-anomaly", "OWASP-Top-10-A01"]
MITRE ATT&CK T1078.004
actor, reason, event count, clients, source IPs, operations, and raw event IDs in evidence

Severity is HIGH.

Usage

cat salesforce.ocsf.jsonl | python src/detect.py > salesforce-api-findings.ocsf.jsonl

Roadmap

Part of Salesforce vendor story issue #35.

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name	detect-api-anomaly-salesforce
description	Detect Salesforce API activity by a user or integration outside an operator-maintained baseline of approved clients, source IPs, or event-volume limits. Reads OCSF 1.8 Application Activity (6002) or native records emitted by `ingest-salesforce-event-mon-ocsf`, groups API events by actor and time window, and emits OCSF Detection Finding (2004) tagged with MITRE ATT&CK T1078.004. Use when the user mentions Salesforce API anomaly, suspicious integration, connected app drift, API usage spike, or unexpected source IP. Do NOT use on raw Event Monitoring data before normalization, non-Salesforce logs, or as remediation.
purpose	Detect Salesforce API activity outside an operator baseline.
capability	detect
persistence	none
telemetry	stderr_jsonl
privilege_escalation	none
license	Apache-2.0
approval_model	none
execution_modes	jit, ci, mcp, persistent
side_effects	none
input_formats	ocsf
output_formats	native, ocsf
concurrency_safety	stateless
metadata	{"homepage":"https://github.com/msaad00/cloud-ai-security-skills","source":"https://github.com/msaad00/cloud-ai-security-skills/tree/main/skills/detection/detect-api-anomaly-salesforce","version":"0.1.0","frameworks":["OCSF 1.8","MITRE ATT&CK v14","OWASP Top 10"],"cloud":["salesforce"]}

detect-api-anomaly-salesforce

Use when

You normalized Salesforce Event Monitoring data with ingest-salesforce-event-mon-ocsf
You need to detect API activity from unexpected clients, source IPs, or event volume
You want a stateless detector for suspicious integrations and valid-account abuse

Do NOT use

On raw Event Monitoring CSV or JSON before ingestion
On generic web access logs or non-Salesforce SaaS audit events
As remediation; connected-app disablement and session kill need HITL-gated write skills

Detection logic

One pass over Salesforce Application Activity events:

Require producer ingest-salesforce-event-mon-ocsf.
Require unmapped.salesforce.event_family=api.
Group events by actor and SALESFORCE_API_ANOMALY_WINDOW_MINUTES. Default is 60.
Compare clients, source IPs, and event count with SALESFORCE_API_BASELINE_JSON.
When no actor baseline exists, fire if count reaches SALESFORCE_API_ANOMALY_EVENT_THRESHOLD. Default is 25.

Baseline example:

export SALESFORCE_API_BASELINE_JSON='{"005svc":{"client_names":["ApprovedClient"],"ips":["203.0.113.10"],"max_events":100}}'
export SALESFORCE_API_ALLOWED_CLIENTS="InternalGateway"

Output contract

Default output is OCSF Detection Finding (class 2004) with:

deterministic metadata.uid
finding_info.types[] = ["salesforce-api-anomaly", "OWASP-Top-10-A01"]
MITRE ATT&CK T1078.004
actor, reason, event count, clients, source IPs, operations, and raw event IDs in evidence

Severity is HIGH.

Usage

cat salesforce.ocsf.jsonl | python src/detect.py > salesforce-api-findings.ocsf.jsonl

Roadmap

Part of Salesforce vendor story issue #35.