agent-guardrails

name	agent-guardrails
description	Installs agentic guardrails into a Python repo — Claude Code hooks, a Stop gate that signs off only what pre-commit accepts, vetted public skills — and troubleshoots hooks that don't fire or block. Use for 'add Claude Code hooks', 'write an AGENTS.md', 'make this repo agent-ready', 'agent keeps bypassing checks', 'agent says done but pre-commit fails'. Not for authoring the pre-commit config.
license	MIT

agent-guardrails

Install the agent-facing enforcement layer of a Python repo: Claude Code hooks that give a coding agent instant, deterministic feedback (and hard-block the few things it must never do), the settings wiring that ships them, a concise rules file, and vetted public skills. The failure this skill fixes is advisory-only guardrails — rules the model forgets under context pressure, hooks that silently never fire, and exit 1 "blocks" that block nothing.

When NOT to use

• Git hooks — .pre-commit-config.yaml, commit-msg/pre-push stages. The python-precommit skill, if installed, owns the commit-time layer.
• CI workflows, required checks, branch rulesets — the python-ci skill. CI is the authoritative gate this skill's layers feed into, not what it installs.
• Validating LLM output data — Pydantic/Instructor schema validation, retry-with-error-context, SQL safety validators. That is runtime data validation in your application, not repo guardrails; this skill does not cover it.
• Tuning what the checks themselves do — ruff rules (python-lint), type checker config (python-typing), test infra (python-testing). This skill wires when checks run against agent actions, not their contents.
• Generic prompt engineering or system-prompt writing.

The layer model (read this first)

Guardrails only work layered; each layer catches what the previous cannot (convention, not an official spec — but it is strong cross-source consensus):

Layer	Runs	Catches	Bypassable?
Rules file (AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md)	read at session start	conventions, commands	yes — advice the model can forget
Claude Code hooks	at the moment of each agent action	bad writes/commands before or as they happen	yes — local, user-controlled
pre-commit	at commit	whole-diff issues	yes — --no-verify
CI + rulesets	at merge	everything, on infra the agent doesn't control	no — the only real gate

Two consequences to state to the user every time: anything that must always happen belongs in a hook, not prose (rules files are wishes; hooks are contracts the harness executes), and hooks are never the security boundary — a determined agent can be dispatched around them (subagents, bash instead of Edit), so CI and server-side rules stay authoritative. Hooks' one unique power: PreToolUse denial happens before the file ever exists on disk — the only layer that can do prevention rather than cleanup.

Workflow

1. Audit what exists

python3 "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/check_guardrails.py" --root .

Read-only: reports settings files and scopes, wired hooks and their matchers, rules files and their length, obvious defects (lowercase matchers, exit 1 used as a block, missing script files, unguarded Stop hooks). Also check claude --version — hook behavior has version drift; the current docs are the source of truth: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/hooks

2. Rules file — context, not enforcement

Write (or trim) AGENTS.md at the repo root, with CLAUDE.md containing only @AGENTS.md so every agent reads one canonical file. Start from assets/AGENTS.md.template. Rules that earn their place in a Python repo:

• exact commands, not prose — uv sync, uv run pytest, uv run ruff check --fix, uv run mypy src/
• "Use uv, never pip or poetry" (the single most-reported agent failure: defaulting to global pip installs)
• "Run lint + typecheck + tests before calling a task done"
• "Never weaken a gate to pass it — no lowering coverage, skipping tests, or || true" (agents under pressure take the cheapest path to green)
• blast-radius lines: "flag changes to auth, dependencies, or lockfiles for human review"

Keep it under ~200 lines and hand-curated: auto-generated context files have measurably hurt agent success in evaluations — write what is specific to this repo, not a generic overview. Recurring PR-review corrections are the best source of new lines.

3. Hooks — the deterministic layer

Copy the three hook scripts from assets/hooks/ into .claude/hooks/, make them executable, then wire assets/settings.json.template into .claude/settings.json. The architecture is thin JSON, heavy script: the settings file only routes events; logic lives in versioned scripts.

Goal	Event + matcher	Script
Block dangerous bash (--no-verify, force-push main, bare pip)	PreToolUse on Bash	guard-bash.sh
Instant lint/format feedback on the file just edited	PostToolUse on Edit|Write	lint-edited-file.sh
Sign off only what the commit gate would accept	Stop	stop-verify.sh

The parity rule. The Stop gate never re-implements checks: when the repo has .pre-commit-config.yaml, stop-verify.sh runs pre-commit itself over the changed + untracked files — the identical gate git commit will run (pre-commit run --files checks the worktree as-is; no stashing). Auto-fixing hooks (prettier, ruff --fix, whitespace fixers) exit non-zero after repairing the tree, so the gate runs twice and a clean second run passes. A hand-rolled subset (ruff check . alone) drifts from the config and produces the classic failure: agent says done, the owner's commit fails on prettier. Repos without pre-commit keep the single fast VERIFY_CMD fallback.

The exit-code contract — the part everyone gets wrong:

• exit 0 — proceed (stdout may carry JSON decisions).
• exit 2 — the ONLY blocking exit code. Reason goes to stderr (stdout is discarded on exit 2). What "block" means is event-dependent: PreToolUse prevents the call; PostToolUse cannot undo — stderr is feedback only; Stop prevents stopping and forces the agent to keep working.
• exit 1 (or any other code) — non-blocking. Logged, ignored, the action proceeds. This single fact breaks a large share of hook setups.

Rules for hooks that survive contact with a team:

• Scope PostToolUse to the single edited file and keep it sub-second — it runs synchronously on every matching call. Anything slower (mypy, tests) belongs in the Stop hook, pre-commit, or CI.
• Stop hooks MUST honor stop_hook_active in the stdin JSON — the template re-verifies once, then releases (exit 0) instead of blocking again — or they loop; the harness force-overrides after 8 consecutive blocks.
• Give the Stop gate a generous explicit timeout (the template wires 300 s) and pre-build hook environments at setup (uv run pre-commit install --install-hooks): a hook that hits its timeout is non-blocking, so a cold first-run env build silently skips verification.
• Matchers are case-sensitive exact names or regex: bash never matches Bash; Edit.* also catches NotebookEdit — use Edit|Write.
• Edit|Write misses shell-driven edits (sed -i, heredocs). Cover the gap with the Stop-hook verification pass, which sees the whole worktree.
• Hard-deny (exit 2) only deterministic, unambiguous violations; prefer non-blocking feedback for style-level issues — an over-eager PreToolUse block can stall the agent entirely instead of guiding it.
• Roll out observe → warn → enforce: log-only first, then narrow denies for patterns that caused real damage.

Full mechanics (per-event exit-2 semantics, matcher and if-field rules, JSON decision channels, scopes, known version-drift issues): references/hooks-reference.md. Which check belongs at which layer: references/layer-assignment.md.

4. Settings scopes and permissions

• .claude/settings.json — committed, applies to every contributor. This is the team contract; changes to it deserve PR-level scrutiny (see security below).
• .claude/settings.local.json — gitignored, personal experiments.
• ~/.claude/settings.json — user-global. All scopes merge additively; a project file cannot switch off a user hook, only add.
• Hooks tighten policy but do not replace the permission system: a hook exit 0 does not approve anything, and the if filter is best-effort and fails open on ambiguous commands. Hard allow/deny of tools belongs in permissions rules; hooks add checks the permission grammar cannot express.

5. Install and vet public skills

Recommend established public skills instead of rebuilding them — but treat every third-party skill, plugin, and MCP server as an unreviewed dependency with full user permissions. Minimum vet before install: read the plugin manifest (an mcpServers entry means network access), every hook it ships and the commands they run, and each full SKILL.md body; check requested permissions are proportional to the stated function; pin versions and review updates like dependency bumps. Curated starting points and the full checklist: references/vetting-skills-and-plugins.md.

6. Verify by tripping every wire

A guardrail that has never fired is unverified. Test each one deliberately:

# 1. Scripts standalone, with realistic stdin — check exit code + stderr
echo '{"tool_input":{"command":"git commit --no-verify -m x"}}' \
  | .claude/hooks/guard-bash.sh; echo "exit=$?"        # expect exit=2
echo '{"tool_input":{"command":"git status"}}' \
  | .claude/hooks/guard-bash.sh; echo "exit=$?"        # expect exit=0
# 2. Audit passes
python3 "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/check_guardrails.py" --root .

Then, in a live session: ask the agent to do a blocked action (expect a blocked call with the reason), edit a file with a deliberate lint error (expect hook feedback), and end a turn with a failing check (expect the Stop gate to push back). In a repo with pre-commit, also end a turn with an unformatted YAML/Markdown file in the tree — the Stop gate must run the commit gate and auto-fix or block, never sign it off. If a hook doesn't fire: matcher case, settings nesting, jq present on the machine, and script executable bit — in that order.

Output spec

Done means:

• AGENTS.md (≲200 lines, repo-specific) with CLAUDE.md importing it.
• .claude/settings.json wiring PreToolUse guard, PostToolUse single-file check, and a Stop gate that runs the repo's own commit gate (pre-commit over the change set) or a single fast verify command; scripts in .claude/hooks/, executable, blocking only via exit 2 + stderr, Stop guarded by stop_hook_active.
• Every hook demonstrated to fire and to block (step 6 transcript).
• scripts/check_guardrails.py exits 0.
• The user told, in one sentence each: hooks are convenience, CI is the gate; and committed hooks execute on every contributor's machine.

Failure modes & gotchas

Symptom	Cause / fix
Hook "blocks" but the action proceeds	exit 1 — only exit 2 blocks; everything else is logged and ignored
Block reason never shown to the agent	reason printed to stdout — on exit 2 stdout is discarded; use stderr
Hook never fires	case-sensitive matcher (bash≠Bash), wrong settings nesting, missing jq, unexpanded $HOME, or script not executable — all fail silently
Stop hook loops forever	missing stop_hook_active guard; harness caps at 8 blocks but fix the guard
Agent "done" but the owner's git commit fails (prettier reformats, whitespace fixers fire)	Stop gate re-implements a subset instead of running the repo's pre-commit — wire stop-verify.sh's parity path (pre-commit run --files over the change set)
First Stop in a fresh clone hangs or times out	cold hook-env build; pre-build at setup (pre-commit install --install-hooks) and keep the generous timeout — a timed-out hook is non-blocking, i.e. a silent pass
Agent edits files but the format hook is silent	edit made via Bash (sed -i, cat >) — Edit|Write never fires; rely on the Stop-hook worktree pass
Formatter hook fights the agent	post-edit rewrite trips the agent's stale-file check on its next edit; format on save/commit instead, or accept the re-read cost
PreToolUse exit-2 stalls the agent instead of correcting it	known behavior in some versions — keep hard denies rare and actionable; put style feedback in non-blocking channels
Hooks treated as security	they are local and user-controlled; subagent dispatch and alternate tool paths route around them — CI + rulesets are the boundary
Committed hook = code execution on every clone	.claude/ changes are code: CODEOWNERS them, review in the web UI before checking out PR branches (real CVEs exist here)
Plugin/skill turns out malicious	vet before install (step 5), pin versions, prefer official/curated sources
Hook advice from tutorials doesn't match behavior	the event surface and blocking semantics drift across versions — trust https://code.claude.com/docs/en/hooks over any static list, including this skill's

Files

• scripts/check_guardrails.py — read-only audit of settings, hooks, matchers and rules files; non-zero exit on defects.
• assets/settings.json.template — hook wiring for the three-script setup.
• assets/hooks/guard-bash.sh — PreToolUse deny: --no-verify, SKIP= hook skips, force-push to main, bare pip/python outside uv.
• assets/hooks/lint-edited-file.sh — PostToolUse single-file ruff check+format.
• assets/hooks/stop-verify.sh — Stop gate with the stop_hook_active guard: runs the repo's pre-commit over changed + untracked files (twice, so auto-fix hooks converge; uv run fallback for uv-managed installs), or one marked VERIFY_CMD line in repos without pre-commit.
• assets/AGENTS.md.template — starting rules file.
• references/hooks-reference.md — full hook mechanics + known issues.
• references/layer-assignment.md — which check runs at which layer.
• references/vetting-skills-and-plugins.md — vetting checklist + curated skills.