lazarus

name	lazarus
description	Lazarus Group (Hidden Cobra, DPRK RGB) adversary-emulation playbook — financially-motivated crypto/DeFi theft and supply-chain intrusion: fake-job social engineering, trojanized apps, wallet/key theft, and on-chain DeFi/bridge exploitation (testnet/fork only). Use when emulating DPRK financial actors against a crypto/exchange/DeFi target. Triggers on: 'emulate Lazarus', 'Hidden Cobra', 'DPRK crypto', 'AppleJeus', '3CX supply chain', 'DeFi bridge attack', 'crypto theft'.
allowed-tools	Read Write Edit
metadata	{"subdomain":"planning","when_to_use":"emulate Lazarus, Hidden Cobra, ZINC, Diamond Sleet, DPRK, cryptocurrency theft, DeFi protocol attack, bridge exploit, AppleJeus, 3CX supply chain, fake job social engineering, wallet key theft, exchange compromise","tags":"adversary-emulation, lazarus, dprk, cryptocurrency, defi, supply-chain","mitre_attack":"T1566.003, T1195.002, T1574.002, T1555, T1657, T1071.001"}

Lazarus Group — Adversary Emulation Playbook

Tier-3 DPRK (RGB) actor whose modern mission is revenue generation — North Korea-linked actors have stolen well over $3B in crypto. Two converging tracks: (a) enterprise intrusion via fake-job social engineering, trojanized trading apps (AppleJeus), and software supply-chain (3CX); (b) on-chain DeFi/bridge exploitation to drain protocols. Authorized red-team emulation only; on-chain steps run on testnet or a mainnet fork — never real funds.

When to emulate Lazarus

• Target is a cryptocurrency exchange, DeFi protocol, cross-chain bridge, wallet provider, or a fintech/blockchain firm and the client wants the full DPRK money-theft kill chain tested.
• The engagement spans both the enterprise estate (devs, build pipeline, cloud) and the smart-contract surface — Decepticon's contract-audit lane is what makes this actor a good fit (see ../../references/apt-groups.md).

ThreatProfile seed (plan/threat-profile.json)

{
  "engagement_name": "<fill>",
  "actor_name": "Lazarus-like (Hidden Cobra)",
  "actor_aliases": ["Hidden Cobra", "ZINC", "Diamond Sleet", "Labyrinth Chollima", "NICKEL ACADEMY"],
  "group_id": "G0032",
  "tier": "tier-3",
  "sophistication": "nation-state",
  "motivation": "financial",
  "initial_access": ["T1566.003", "T1195.002", "T1199", "T1204.002"],
  "key_ttps": ["T1574.002", "T1027",      
      
     
   
   

Kill-chain emulation

#	Phase	MITRE	Emulated action	Executing agent → skill
1	Recon	T1591 / T1589	Profile devs, the DeFi protocol, and the bridge/contract surface	recon → /skills/standard/recon/osint/SKILL.md, /skills/standard/osint/SKILL.md
2	Initial Access	T1566.003	Fake-job / DeFi-collab social engineering with a lure doc	phisher → /skills/standard/phisher/SKILL.md
3	Initial Access (alt)	T1195.002 / T1199	Trojanized dependency or build-step (3CX pattern)	exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/supplychain/dep-confusion/SKILL.md; /skills/standard/supply-chain/SKILL.md
4	Execution	T1204.002 / T1574.002	Trojanized app + DLL side-load into a trusted process	post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/c2-sliver/SKILL.md
5	Credential / Key theft	T1555 / T1552.001	Steal wallet keys, seed phrases, cloud creds, signing keys	post-exploit → /skills/standard/post-exploit/credential-access/SKILL.md
6	Web/API (exchange)	T1190	Exchange web/API abuse (authz, IDOR, JWT)	exploit → /skills/standard/exploit/web/SKILL.md (route to idor / jwt / api)
7	On-chain (bridge)	— (DeFi)	Drain a cross-chain bridge via logic/validator flaw (fork)	contracts → /skills/standard/contracts/bridge-exploit/SKILL.md
8	On-chain (sig)	— (DeFi)	Signature replay / ecrecover abuse on the protocol (fork)	contracts → /skills/standard/contracts/signature-replay/SKILL.md
9	On-chain (authz)	— (DeFi)	Missing-modifier / wrong-owner privileged call (fork)	contracts → /skills/standard/contracts/access-control/SKILL.md
10	C2	T1071.001	Sliver HTTPS beacon for the enterprise foothold

CONOPS kill_chain (copy into conops.json)

1. recon — devs + protocol + bridge/contract surface (1).
2. initial-access — fake-job social engineering / trojanized supply chain (2-3).
3. post-exploit — trojan execution, wallet-key/cred theft, exchange web/API abuse, on-chain DeFi exploitation on a fork (4-9).
4. c2 — Sliver (10).
5. exfiltration — simulated theft to canary address on testnet/fork (11).

OPSEC & signature fidelity

• Patient grooming. Operation Dream Job runs for weeks — the social-engineering relationship is built slowly with benign files first.
• Obfuscated, side-loaded execution into trusted processes (mirror the DLL side-load chain).
• On-chain moves are irreversible on mainnet — fidelity comes from a working PoC on a forked mainnet, not from touching production funds.

RoE / safety gates

• On-chain exploitation MUST run on testnet or a forked-mainnet (Anvil) RPC. Never sign a real mainnet transaction. Add an EMERGENCY abort: "a transaction signed against a production/mainnet RPC or a real wallet key used."
• Developer-targeted social engineering requires authorization + lure-deconfliction (/skills/standard/phisher/lure-deconfliction/SKILL.md).
• Key/seed theft is simulated against canary wallets seeded for the exercise.

Deconfliction

• Record fork/testnet RPC URLs, canary wallet addresses, and the trojanized-app hash in deconfliction.json + cleanup.json.
• Mark the recruiter persona and lure documents so they can be distinguished from a real Dream Job approach.

Fidelity notes (deviations)

• No real AppleJeus/3CX samples — emulate the trojanized-app + supply-chain delivery pattern with an engagement-owned dropper + Sliver.
• DeFi exploitation reproduces the real bug classes (bridge validator bypass, signature replay, access-control) with Foundry PoCs on a fork; the proof is a drained canary balance on the fork, never a real protocol.
• Theft is demonstrated as a fund move to a canary address on testnet/fork; the deliverable distinguishes "drained on fork" from "production funds" (never the latter).