attack-mob-t1430-location-tracking

name	attack-mob-t1430-location-tracking
description	Analyze MITRE ATT&CK T1430 Location Tracking in the mobile matrix. Use for TTP triage, detection engineering, hunting, defensive emulation planning, mitigations, incident response mapping, ATT&CK coverage, or questions mentioning T1430, Location Tracking, or mobile ATT&CK. Adversaries may track a device’s physical location through use of standard operating system APIs via malicious or exploited applications on the compromised device.
license	MITRE ATT&CK Terms of Use apply to ATT&CK-derived content. See https://attack.mitre.org/resources/terms-of-use/
metadata	{"source":"mitre-attack/attack-stix-data","domain":"mobile","attack_id":"T1430","attack_stix_id":"attack-pattern--99e6295e-741b-4857-b6e5-64989eb039b4","attack_version":"1.2","attack_modified":"2025-10-24T17:49:08.214Z"}

MITRE ATT&CK T1430: Location Tracking

When to use this skill

Use this skill when the task involves T1430, Location Tracking, mobile ATT&CK, TTP mapping, detection engineering, hunting, incident-response enrichment, control validation, or authorized adversary-emulation planning. Treat it as a defensive analysis aid: keep outputs focused on understanding, detecting, mitigating, and safely validating this ATT&CK technique.

Technique context

• ATT&CK domain: mobile
• ATT&CK ID: T1430
• Technique name: Location Tracking
• Type: technique
• ATT&CK URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1430
• Tactics: collection, discovery
• Platforms: Android, iOS
• Required permissions: Not specified
• Effective permissions: Not specified
• Defenses bypassed: Not specified

ATT&CK description

Adversaries may track a device’s physical location through use of standard operating system APIs via malicious or exploited applications on the compromised device.

On Android, applications holding the ACCESS_COAURSE_LOCATION or ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permissions provide access to the device’s physical location. On Android 10 and up, declaration of the ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION permission in an application’s manifest will allow applications to request location access even when the application is running in the background.(Citation: Android Request Location Permissions) Some adversaries have utilized integration of Baidu map services to retrieve geographical location once the location access permissions had been obtained.(Citation: PaloAlto-SpyDealer)(Citation: Palo Alto HenBox)

On iOS, applications must include the NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription, NSLocationAlwaysAndWhenInUseUsageDescription, and/or NSLocationAlwaysUsageDescription keys in their Info.plist file depending on the extent of requested access to location information.(Citation: Apple Requesting Authorization for Location Services) On iOS 8.0 and up, applications call requestWhenInUseAuthorization() to request access to location information when the application is in use or requestAlwaysAuthorization() to request access to location information regardless of whether the application is in use. With elevated privileges, an adversary may be able to access location data without explicit user consent with the com.apple.locationd.preauthorized entitlement key.(Citation: Google Project Zero Insomnia)

Agent workflow

1. Clarify scope: identify the system, asset class, log sources, cloud or endpoint platform, and whether the user wants triage, detection, coverage assessment, or safe emulation planning.
2. Load bundled resources as needed: use references/technique-profile.json for structured metadata, references/detection-and-mitigation.md for triage and telemetry guidance, references/known-threat-context.md for ATT&CK relationship context, and templates/ for repeatable outputs.
3. Map observations to ATT&CK: compare the user's evidence to the ATT&CK description, tactics, platforms, and known procedure patterns before asserting a match.
4. Produce defensive outputs: prioritize hypotheses, telemetry requirements, detection logic ideas, validation steps, containment guidance, and mitigations.
5. Preserve uncertainty: distinguish confirmed evidence, plausible indicators, assumptions, and gaps. Recommend what to collect next.
6. Stay safe: do not provide malware, credential theft, persistence, evasion, destructive automation, or unauthorized exploitation instructions. For adversary emulation, keep steps bounded to approved lab or control-validation contexts and omit operational abuse details.

Bundled resources

• references/technique-profile.json: machine-readable ATT&CK metadata for this technique.
• references/detection-and-mitigation.md: detection notes, telemetry checklist, triage questions, mitigation candidates, and false-positive considerations.
• references/known-threat-context.md: ATT&CK relationship context with attribution cautions.
• templates/detection-brief.md: detection engineering brief template.
• templates/hunt-plan.md: threat hunt plan template.
• templates/incident-response-note.md: incident response note template.
• templates/coverage-assessment.md: ATT&CK coverage assessment template.
• scripts/render_brief.py: local helper that renders a Markdown defensive brief from technique-profile.json.
• assets/output-schema.json: JSON schema for structured technique analysis outputs.

To generate a quick brief, run python scripts/render_brief.py --output brief.md from inside this skill directory, or adapt the templates directly.

Detection guidance

No ATT&CK detection guidance was present in the source STIX object.

Useful telemetry and data sources

• Not specified in the STIX object.

Mitigations to consider

• Enterprise Policy
• Interconnection Filtering
• Use Recent OS Version
• User Guidance

Known threat context

Use these examples only as contextual leads, not as proof that an observed event is this technique:

• AbstractEmu (malware)
• Adups (malware)
• AhRat (malware)
• AndroRAT (malware)
• Android/Chuli.A (malware)
• Anubis (malware)
• BOULDSPY (malware)
• BRATA (malware)
• BusyGasper (malware)
• C0033 (campaign)
• CHEMISTGAMES (malware)
• CarbonSteal (malware)
• Cerberus (malware)
• Chameleon (malware)
• Charger (malware)
• Corona Updates (malware)
• DCHSpy (malware)
• Desert Scorpion (malware)
• DocSwap (malware)
• Escobar (malware)

Recommended output pattern

When responding with this skill, structure the answer as:

• Assessment: whether the evidence supports this ATT&CK mapping and why.
• Evidence: specific indicators, logs, behaviors, and assumptions.
• Detection: telemetry sources, analytic logic, and tuning considerations.
• Response: containment, eradication, recovery, and validation actions.
• Coverage gaps: missing logs, sensors, controls, or environmental details.
• References: include the ATT&CK URL and any user-provided evidence references.