| name | security |
| description | Rails/Grape security review: authz, injection, output sanitization, SSRF. Triggers: "is this vulnerable", "SQL injection", "XSS", "Brakeman warning". Do NOT use for: secret scans. |
| user-invocable | false |
| effort | medium |
Security
Iron Laws
- Authorization must be explicit at every boundary.
- Never interpolate untrusted input into SQL.
- Never mark untrusted content as HTML safe.
- Secrets come from environment or secure credentials, not source files.
- Security-sensitive Sidekiq work must honor transaction boundaries.
Secret Detection
Use /rb:secrets to scan for leaked credentials with betterleaks:
/rb:secrets — Scan current directory/rb:secrets --git — Scan git history/rb:secrets --validate — Validate secrets against live APIs
Install betterleaks: brew install betterleaks
See references/betterleaks-integration.md for detailed configuration.
Evidence Mode
Every finding MUST carry evidence_mode:
| Mode | Use when |
|---|
static-signal | Grep / pattern match. Lowest trust. |
runtime-confirmed | Reproduced via existing test OR read-only Tidewave introspection. |
configuration-risk | Config-only issue (yml, env, initializer). |
requires-human-validation | Threat-model / business-context input needed. |
Prefer runtime-confirmed. Refuse to emit findings without evidence_mode.
runtime-confirmed is read-only
NEVER synthesize destructive code (DELETE/UPDATE/DROP/TRUNCATE/rm/mv,
new tests that mutate shared state, live network calls to non-mock
endpoints, config edits) to prove a finding. Allowed: existing tests,
read-only Tidewave queries, log inspection. If non-destructive
reproduction impossible → downgrade to static-signal or
requires-human-validation.
Defense in depth: CC sandbox network denylist
For infra-layer egress restriction (cloud metadata endpoints, known
exfiltration targets), use CC 2.1.113+ sandbox.network.deniedDomains. Runs
beneath plugin permission rules; applies to all Bash tool calls. See
/rb:permissions → "Network egress restriction" for the settings.json shape.
Gotchas
- Brakeman false-positive flood. Default Brakeman config flags many
false positives. Triage by
evidence_mode: static-signal Brakeman
hits are LOWER priority than runtime-confirmed SQL injection in
failing test.
evidence_mode missing. Every finding MUST carry evidence_mode
enum (defined in § Evidence Mode above). Refuse to emit findings without it.- Pundit policy-scope omission. Authorize EVERY controller action
(Iron Law 13).
before_action :authorize alone is insufficient —
verify per-action policy_scope or per-action authorize call.
html_safe / raw on user input. Iron Law 14 violation. Search
\.html_safe|raw\( in changed files; flag any with non-trusted source.
References
| Need | Reference |
|---|
| betterleaks CLI integration + git-history scan | ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/betterleaks-integration.md |
| Pundit/CanCanCan policies, password hashing, session auth | ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/authentication.md |
| explicit authorization patterns + multi-tenant scopes | ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/authorization.md |
| input validation, file-upload magic bytes, path traversal, XSS sanitization, SQL safety, command-injection prevention | ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/input-validation.md |
| OAuth identity resolution + token refresh + multi-provider | ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/oauth-linking.md |
| Rack::Attack rate limiting + composite keys + Redis limiter | ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/rate-limiting.md |
| CSP, CSRF, HSTS, security headers, Brakeman + bundle-audit CI wiring | ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/security-headers.md |
| SSRF, secrets management, supply chain, CORS, safe deserialization, file-upload content-type | ${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/references/advanced-patterns.md |
