| context | fork |
| disable-model-invocation | true |
| name | tool-approval |
| description | Dynamic tool approval predicates and the bash command allowlist. Use when the user asks about HITL approvals or tightening the pre-bash gate. Triggers: tool approval, approval predicate, bash allowlist, pre-bash, permission gate, HITL. |
| lang | ["en"] |
| level | 2 |
| triggers | ["tool approval","approval predicate","bash allowlist","pre-bash","permission gate","hitl"] |
| agents | ["security-reviewer","backend-developer"] |
| tokens | ~2K |
| category | safety |
| platforms | ["claude-code","gemini-cli","codex-cli","cursor"] |
| whenNotToUse | ["Read-only utilities that do not touch the filesystem or network","Cases already covered by the existing `pre-write-guard` hook","Hot-path tools where every call must be pre-approved offline"] |
Tool Approval
Overview
Two complementary surfaces protect risky tool calls:
- Bash allowlist (
lib/security/cmd-allowlist.js): static list of safe binaries; isAllowedCommand(cmd) returns true only for the leading binary in the allowlist
- Dynamic approval predicate (AD-11): a per-tool
(args, ctx) => Promise<{approved, reason}> registered alongside the tool spec, evaluated at call time
When to Use
- Wiring a new shell command surface that must reject non-allowlist binaries
- Adding HITL approval for tools that mutate state (file write, git push, deploy)
- Migrating an existing always-allow tool to a context-aware approval
When NOT to Use
- The tool is read-only and idempotent (no approval value)
- An equivalent guardrail already covers the case (use
tool-guardrails.js instead)
- The check requires external network (DATA POLICY violation — keep approvals local)
Process
| Step | Action |
|---|
| 1 | Classify the tool: read-only, mutating, or sensitive |
| 2 | For mutating: register an approval predicate at run setup |
| 3 | For shell: ensure the command's leading binary is in the allowlist |
| 4 | When approval is required, surface a clear refusal message including reason |
| 5 | Test with at least one allowed and one denied case |
Allowlist (default)
ls find stat cat less head tail du grep rg wc sort cut cp tee echo mkdir rm
Override per-call via the second argument to isAllowedCommand(cmd, customAllowlist). Never expand the default list without security review.
Common Rationalizations
| Excuse | Rebuttal |
|---|
| "it's just a one-off command" | one-offs are how exfiltration starts; allowlist is cheap |
| "I trust the LLM" | trust is unverifiable; the allowlist is verifiable |
| "we'll add the approval later" | post-launch approvals are blocked by reverse-engineering the call surface |
| "the command is harmless" | parse parseLeadingBinary() first; "harmless" pipelines often start with bash -c |
Red Flags
- An approval predicate that always returns
{approved: true} (rubber-stamp)
- Shell commands that bypass the allowlist via
bash -c "..." (parse must reject bash unless explicitly allowed)
- An approval predicate that issues an HTTP call (DATA POLICY breach)
- Allowlist diverges between hook gate and runtime check
Verification
- Local:
isAllowedCommand("rm -rf /tmp/x") returns true (binary rm is allowed); isAllowedCommand("curl http://example.com") returns false
- Unit tests:
tests/lib/orchestration/guardrails.test.js covers the registry shape
- Security review: AD-09 entry in adoption ledger must remain
Y for G-DATA
