threat-model-generator

name	threat-model-generator
description	Generate feature-grounded threat scenarios and executable security test cases with prioritized risk rationale.

Threat Model Generator

Purpose

Translate architecture and feature behavior into an actionable security test backlog.

Inputs

• system_description
• feature_inventory
• data_flows
• roles_permissions
• deployment_context (optional)

Modeling Workflow

Phase 1: Asset and Boundary Mapping

1. Identify sensitive assets and trust boundaries.
2. Map data ingress, processing, and egress points.
3. Identify privileged operations and administrative paths.

Phase 2: Threat Enumeration

1. Enumerate attacker objectives per feature.
2. Enumerate abuse primitives per parameter and state transition.
3. Enumerate systemic risks from shared components.

Phase 3: Scenario Construction

1. Build concrete scenario with attacker preconditions.
2. Define target operation and exploit mechanism.
3. Define success signal and defensive expectation.

Phase 4: Prioritization

1. Score by likelihood, impact, and detectability.
2. Tag fast-win vs deep-investigation cases.
3. Highlight assumptions and missing architecture details.

Mandatory Coverage Areas

• authentication and session handling
• authorization and object access
• injection and parser abuse
• workflow/state manipulation
• file and data handling
• configuration and deployment weaknesses

Output Contract

{
  "threat_scenarios": [],
  "test_cases": [],
  "risk_priorities": [],
  "assumptions": [],
  "unknowns": []
}

Constraints

• Ground scenarios in provided architecture.
• Flag unsupported assumptions explicitly.

Quality Checklist

• Each scenario maps to a real asset.
• Test cases are executable.
• Prioritization rationale is clear.

Detailed Operator Notes

Consistency Rules

• Normalize terminology before scoring or chaining.
• Separate prerequisite uncertainty from exploit uncertainty.
• Treat environmental blockers independently from mitigation strength.

Risk Scoring Inputs

• attacker starting privilege
• required chain length
• probability of reliable execution
• blast radius if successful

Prioritization Output

• immediate: low-effort high-impact chains/findings.
• next: moderate effort with clear payoff.
• watch: plausible but currently low confidence.

Reporting Rules

• Include one-line executive summary per chain/finding.
• Include exact blocker needed to move an inconclusive item forward.
• Include confidence rationale in plain technical language.

Quick Scenarios

Scenario A: Access Check Placement

• Trace data fetch point.
• Trace policy check point.
• Determine whether check occurs before use.
• Identify alternate path without check.

Scenario B: Sanitization Mismatch

• Map sink execution context.
• Map sanitizer type and location.
• Validate context compatibility.
• Find branch that bypasses sanitizer.

Scenario C: Adjacent Pattern Sweep

• Identify sibling handlers/sinks.
• Compare guard and validation parity.
• Flag inconsistent control patterns.
• Prioritize high-impact siblings.

Conditional Decision Matrix

Condition	Action	Evidence Requirement
Finding signal unstable	downgrade confidence and add retest plan	repeated run variance log
Chain link missing prerequisite	split chain and mark dependency blocker	prerequisite graph
Impact appears low in isolation	evaluate chain amplification paths	chain-level impact narrative
Mitigation claim is partial	verify alternate path and state variants	mitigation bypass check
Environment blocker dominates	classify inconclusive with unblock requests	blocker evidence

Advanced Coverage Extensions

1. Add attack-path branching for multiple privilege starting points.
2. Add defender-detection assumptions and likely monitoring signals.
3. Add rollback/cleanup verification after proof steps.
4. Add business-impact mapping to concrete assets and workflows.
5. Add reproducibility score based on run-to-run consistency.