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chain

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Mis à jour29 mai 2026 à 02:51

Proactive attack-path engine. The chain-finder agent SEARCHES for ordered entry→…→asset attack paths where each step is enabled by a finding — composing even sub-threshold (candidate/lead) primitives into a critical chain — using the threat-model assets, attacker-reachable entry points, and the reachability graph. Records each path (ordered narrative + member fingerprints) in .kuzushi/chains.json and attaches a `chains` ref onto each member (status unchanged). Needs ≥2 live findings.

Installation

Installer avec Codex ou Claude Copiez ce prompt, collez-le dans Codex, Claude ou un autre assistant, puis laissez-le vérifier la page du skill et l'installer pour vous.

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Source

allsmog

allsmog/kuzushi-security-plugin

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Métiers associésSOC

Basé sur la classification professionnelle SOC

Analystes en sécurité de l'informationProfessions informatiques et mathématiques·SOC 15-1212

SKILL.md

readonly

name	chain
description	Proactive attack-path engine. The chain-finder agent SEARCHES for ordered entry→…→asset attack paths where each step is enabled by a finding — composing even sub-threshold (candidate/lead) primitives into a critical chain — using the threat-model assets, attacker-reachable entry points, and the reachability graph. Records each path (ordered narrative + member fingerprints) in .kuzushi/chains.json and attaches a `chains` ref onto each member (status unchanged). Needs ≥2 live findings.
context	fork
agent	chain-finder
user-invocable	false

Attack-path chaining

Findings are triaged independently; the highest-impact issues are often a path assembled from individually-unremarkable bugs (a low info-leak + a medium auth gap + a candidate SSRF ⇒ critical RCE). This searches for those paths — it doesn't just restate confirmed findings. Requires ≥2 live findings in .kuzushi/findings.json (run the hunts first); richer with a threat model + code-graph built (they supply the assets + reachability the search keys off).

Run node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/cmd/chain-prepare.mjs" --target "<repo root>". If there are fewer than 2 live findings, tell the user to run more hunts and stop. Read prepPath — it carries the findings (incl. sub-threshold leads), the crown-jewel context.assets, the attacker-reachable context.entryPoints, and a context.reachability summary.
Search entry→asset paths (forward from entry points, backward from assets, meet in the middle) where each step is enabled by a finding; compose sub-threshold primitives where the composition is what makes it critical. Order members, name the data/control link between steps, and use each fingerprint verbatim. Write { chains: [...] } (with kind/entryPoint/asset) to draftPath. If nothing genuinely composes, write { "chains": [] } — don't force a chain.
Run the assembleCommand (finalize). It validates each chain (≥2 real members, ordered narrative ≥120 chars), escalates severity to at least the max member's (composed impact is never under-reported), writes .kuzushi/chains.json, and attaches a chains ref onto each member (status unchanged). Report the paths highest-impact first; /report renders them.

When NOT to use

Before ≥2 live findings exist — run /sweep / /threat-hunt / /taint-analysis first.
To discover new bugs — chaining only connects existing findings; name missing links as gaps.

Rationalizations to Reject

"All low/candidate — not worth chaining." → Composing sub-threshold primitives into a critical is the whole point; severity-gating the links misses the chains that matter most.
"Same bug class, so they chain." → A link needs one finding's effect to satisfy the next's precondition — name that edge or drop it. Co-occurrence ≠ composition.

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name	chain
description	Proactive attack-path engine. The chain-finder agent SEARCHES for ordered entry→…→asset attack paths where each step is enabled by a finding — composing even sub-threshold (candidate/lead) primitives into a critical chain — using the threat-model assets, attacker-reachable entry points, and the reachability graph. Records each path (ordered narrative + member fingerprints) in .kuzushi/chains.json and attaches a `chains` ref onto each member (status unchanged). Needs ≥2 live findings.
context	fork
agent	chain-finder
user-invocable	false

Attack-path chaining

Run node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/cmd/chain-prepare.mjs" --target "<repo root>". If there are fewer than 2 live findings, tell the user to run more hunts and stop. Read prepPath — it carries the findings (incl. sub-threshold leads), the crown-jewel context.assets, the attacker-reachable context.entryPoints, and a context.reachability summary.
Search entry→asset paths (forward from entry points, backward from assets, meet in the middle) where each step is enabled by a finding; compose sub-threshold primitives where the composition is what makes it critical. Order members, name the data/control link between steps, and use each fingerprint verbatim. Write { chains: [...] } (with kind/entryPoint/asset) to draftPath. If nothing genuinely composes, write { "chains": [] } — don't force a chain.
Run the assembleCommand (finalize). It validates each chain (≥2 real members, ordered narrative ≥120 chars), escalates severity to at least the max member's (composed impact is never under-reported), writes .kuzushi/chains.json, and attaches a chains ref onto each member (status unchanged). Report the paths highest-impact first; /report renders them.

When NOT to use

Before ≥2 live findings exist — run /sweep / /threat-hunt / /taint-analysis first.
To discover new bugs — chaining only connects existing findings; name missing links as gaps.

Rationalizations to Reject

"All low/candidate — not worth chaining." → Composing sub-threshold primitives into a critical is the whole point; severity-gating the links misses the chains that matter most.
"Same bug class, so they chain." → A link needs one finding's effect to satisfy the next's precondition — name that edge or drop it. Co-occurrence ≠ composition.