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fix

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Mis à jour30 mai 2026 à 23:51

Generate and PoC⁺-validate a patch for each confirmed/proven finding. The fixer agent writes a minimal defensive unified diff plus functional and semantic checks; the host applies it to a SANDBOX COPY, re-runs the existing PoC harness, the functional check, and the semantic oracle check for supported CWEs. A patch is "validated" only if all required gates pass. The working tree is never touched until you explicitly approve the apply step. Requires confirmed/proven findings (run /verify and /poc first).

Installation

Installer avec Codex ou Claude Copiez ce prompt, collez-le dans Codex, Claude ou un autre assistant, puis laissez-le vérifier la page du skill et l'installer pour vous.

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Source

allsmog

allsmog/kuzushi-security-plugin

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Métiers associésSOC

Basé sur la classification professionnelle SOC

Analystes en sécurité de l'informationProfessions informatiques et mathématiques·SOC 15-1212

SKILL.md

readonly

name	fix
description	Generate and PoC⁺-validate a patch for each confirmed/proven finding. The fixer agent writes a minimal defensive unified diff plus functional and semantic checks; the host applies it to a SANDBOX COPY, re-runs the existing PoC harness, the functional check, and the semantic oracle check for supported CWEs. A patch is "validated" only if all required gates pass. The working tree is never touched until you explicitly approve the apply step. Requires confirmed/proven findings (run /verify and /poc first).
context	fork
agent	fixer
user-invocable	true

Patch generation + PoC⁺ validation

Turn the repo's confirmed/proven findings into validated fixes. Requires findings at confirmed/proven in .kuzushi/findings.json — run /verify (and /poc for empirical harnesses) first.

PoC⁺ moat: a patch is validated only when it stops the existing PoC harness, passes a functional/regression check, and passes the semantic oracle check for supported CWEs. Validation runs against a sandbox copy — your working tree is never modified until you explicitly approve the apply step.

Run node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/cmd/fix-prepare.mjs" --target "<repo root>" (optionally --input '{"maxCandidates":8}'). If there are no fixable findings, tell the user to run /verify and /poc first, and stop. Read the prep's prepPath.
For each candidate, root-cause the bug and write a minimal defensive unified diff + a functionalCheck, using each candidate's findingFingerprint verbatim. If the candidate has semanticOracle, also write a runnable semanticCheck that exercises its positive/negative controls; supported CWE fixes are not validated without that semantic check. Set harnessLinkage honestly. Write the { candidates: [...] } bundle to the prep's draftPath. Write only under the run dir — never edit application code here.
Run the assembleCommand (finalize). It applies each diff to a sandbox copy, re-runs the PoC (expecting NO crash), re-attacks the patch (re-runs the fuzz harness with the variant corpus you seeded, and replays every other finding's PoC that lives in the same function — any reproduced crash ⇒ exploit-still-fires, no status advance), runs the functional check, runs the semantic check for supported CWEs, and assigns the patch verdict. The re-attack executes code in the sandbox; add --trust-local only if the user consents to a local (non-Docker) run. Report the verdict per finding.
Apply step (explicit approval, one finding at a time). For each validated finding, ask the user with AskUserQuestion whether to apply it to the working tree ("Apply patch" / "Skip"). On approval, run exactly node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/cmd/fix-apply.mjs" --target "<root>" --fingerprint "<fp>" — the user will see a permission prompt; that is the consent gate. On success, report the applied files and the rollback command (git apply -R …). Never apply a verdict other than validated (the script refuses anyway).

When NOT to use

Before findings are confirmed/proven — run /verify and /poc first.
When you can't accept code execution — validation builds/runs harnesses in a sandbox.
To auto-fix en masse — each apply is individually approved.

Rationalizations to Reject

"The original PoC stops, so the patch is good." → That is one shape through one caller. Seed the variant corpus and let the re-attack (variants + same-function sibling replay) try to break it before you trust the validated verdict.
"A non-validated verdict is close enough to apply." → Only validated advances to patched, and fix-apply refuses anything else. Re-root-cause instead of forcing the apply.
"Skip the sandbox, the diff obviously holds." → The sanitizer/exit-signal in the sandbox is the verdict, not your reading of the diff. No run ⇒ no validated.

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2026-06-100

name	fix
description	Generate and PoC⁺-validate a patch for each confirmed/proven finding. The fixer agent writes a minimal defensive unified diff plus functional and semantic checks; the host applies it to a SANDBOX COPY, re-runs the existing PoC harness, the functional check, and the semantic oracle check for supported CWEs. A patch is "validated" only if all required gates pass. The working tree is never touched until you explicitly approve the apply step. Requires confirmed/proven findings (run /verify and /poc first).
context	fork
agent	fixer
user-invocable	true

Patch generation + PoC⁺ validation

Turn the repo's confirmed/proven findings into validated fixes. Requires findings at confirmed/proven in .kuzushi/findings.json — run /verify (and /poc for empirical harnesses) first.

Run node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/cmd/fix-prepare.mjs" --target "<repo root>" (optionally --input '{"maxCandidates":8}'). If there are no fixable findings, tell the user to run /verify and /poc first, and stop. Read the prep's prepPath.
For each candidate, root-cause the bug and write a minimal defensive unified diff + a functionalCheck, using each candidate's findingFingerprint verbatim. If the candidate has semanticOracle, also write a runnable semanticCheck that exercises its positive/negative controls; supported CWE fixes are not validated without that semantic check. Set harnessLinkage honestly. Write the { candidates: [...] } bundle to the prep's draftPath. Write only under the run dir — never edit application code here.
Run the assembleCommand (finalize). It applies each diff to a sandbox copy, re-runs the PoC (expecting NO crash), re-attacks the patch (re-runs the fuzz harness with the variant corpus you seeded, and replays every other finding's PoC that lives in the same function — any reproduced crash ⇒ exploit-still-fires, no status advance), runs the functional check, runs the semantic check for supported CWEs, and assigns the patch verdict. The re-attack executes code in the sandbox; add --trust-local only if the user consents to a local (non-Docker) run. Report the verdict per finding.
Apply step (explicit approval, one finding at a time). For each validated finding, ask the user with AskUserQuestion whether to apply it to the working tree ("Apply patch" / "Skip"). On approval, run exactly node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/cmd/fix-apply.mjs" --target "<root>" --fingerprint "<fp>" — the user will see a permission prompt; that is the consent gate. On success, report the applied files and the rollback command (git apply -R …). Never apply a verdict other than validated (the script refuses anyway).

When NOT to use

Before findings are confirmed/proven — run /verify and /poc first.
When you can't accept code execution — validation builds/runs harnesses in a sandbox.
To auto-fix en masse — each apply is individually approved.

Rationalizations to Reject

"The original PoC stops, so the patch is good." → That is one shape through one caller. Seed the variant corpus and let the re-attack (variants + same-function sibling replay) try to break it before you trust the validated verdict.
"A non-validated verdict is close enough to apply." → Only validated advances to patched, and fix-apply refuses anything else. Re-root-cause instead of forcing the apply.
"Skip the sandbox, the diff obviously holds." → The sanitizer/exit-signal in the sandbox is the verdict, not your reading of the diff. No run ⇒ no validated.