detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory

name	detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory
description	Detect DCSync attacks where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes by monitoring for non-domain-controller accounts requesting directory replication via DsGetNCChanges.
domain	cybersecurity
subdomain	threat-hunting
tags	["threat-hunting","active-directory","dcsync","credential-theft","mitre-t1003-006","mimikatz","kerberos"]
version	1.0
author	mahipal
license	Apache-2.0

Detecting DCSync Attack in Active Directory

When to Use

• When hunting for credential theft in Active Directory environments
• After compromise of accounts with Replicating Directory Changes permissions
• When investigating suspected use of Mimikatz or Impacket secretsdump
• During incident response involving lateral movement with domain admin credentials
• When auditing AD replication permissions as part of security hardening

Prerequisites

• Windows Security Event Logs with Event ID 4662 (Object Access) enabled
• Advanced Audit Policy: Audit Directory Service Access enabled
• Domain Controller event forwarding to SIEM
• Knowledge of legitimate domain controller hostnames and IPs
• Directory Service Access auditing with SACL on domain object

Workflow

1. Identify Legitimate Replication Sources: Document all domain controllers in the environment by hostname, IP, and computer account. Only these should perform directory replication.
2. Enable Required Auditing: Configure Advanced Audit Policy to capture Event ID 4662 on domain controllers with specific GUID monitoring for replication rights.
3. Monitor Replication Rights Access: Track access to three critical GUIDs -- DS-Replication-Get-Changes (1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set (89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c).
4. Detect Non-DC Replication Requests: Alert when any account NOT associated with a domain controller requests replication rights.
5. Correlate with Network Traffic: DCSync generates replication traffic (MS-DRSR/RPC) from the attacker's machine to the DC. Monitor for DrsGetNCChanges RPC calls from non-DC IP addresses.
6. Investigate Source Context: Examine the process, user account, and machine originating the replication request.
7. Check for Credential Abuse: After DCSync detection, audit for subsequent use of extracted hashes (pass-the-hash, golden ticket creation).

Key Concepts

Concept	Description
T1003.006	OS Credential Dumping: DCSync
DCSync	Mimicking domain controller replication to extract credentials
DsGetNCChanges	RPC function used to request AD replication data
DS-Replication-Get-Changes	AD permission required (GUID: 1131f6aa-...)
DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All	Permission including confidential attributes (GUID: 1131f6ad-...)
MS-DRSR	Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol
KRBTGT Hash	Key target of DCSync enabling Golden Ticket attacks
Event ID 4662	Directory service object access audit event

Tools & Systems

Tool	Purpose
Mimikatz (lsadump::dcsync)	Primary DCSync attack tool
Impacket secretsdump.py	Python-based DCSync implementation
DSInternals	PowerShell module for AD replication
BloodHound	Map accounts with replication rights
Splunk / Elastic	SIEM correlation of 4662 events
Microsoft Defender for Identity	Native DCSync detection
CrowdStrike Falcon	EDR-based DCSync detection

Detection Queries

Splunk -- DCSync Detection via Event 4662

index=wineventlog EventCode=4662
| where Properties IN ("*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*",
    "*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*",
    "*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*")
| where NOT match(SubjectUserName, ".*\\$$")
| where NOT SubjectUserName IN ("known_svc_account1", "known_svc_account2")
| stats count values(Properties) as ReplicationRights by SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer
| where count > 0
| table SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer count ReplicationRights

KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel DCSync Detection

SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4662
| where Properties has "1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"
    or Properties has "1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"
| where SubjectUserName !endswith "$"
| where SubjectUserName !in ("AzureADConnect", "MSOL_*")
| project TimeGenerated, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, Computer, Properties
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

Sigma Rule -- DCSync Activity

title: DCSync Activity Detected - Non-DC Replication Request
status: stable
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4662
        Properties|contains:
            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
    filter_dc:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not filter_dc
level: critical
tags:
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1003.006

Common Scenarios

1. Mimikatz DCSync: Attacker with Domain Admin privileges runs lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt to extract KRBTGT hash for Golden Ticket creation.
2. Impacket secretsdump: Remote DCSync via secretsdump.py domain/user:password@dc-ip extracting all domain hashes.
3. Delegated Replication Rights: Attacker grants themselves Replicating Directory Changes rights via ACL modification before performing DCSync.
4. Azure AD Connect Abuse: Compromising the Azure AD Connect service account which has legitimate replication rights.
5. DSInternals PowerShell: Using Get-ADReplAccount cmdlet to replicate specific account credentials.

Output Format

Hunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Alert Severity: Critical
Source Account: [Account requesting replication]
Source Machine: [Hostname/IP of requestor]
Target DC: [Domain controller receiving request]
Replication Rights: [GUIDs accessed]
Timestamp: [Event time]
Legitimate DC: [Yes/No]
Known Service Account: [Yes/No]
Risk Assessment: [Critical - non-DC replication detected]