audit-security

name	audit-security
description	Scan code for security violations S1-S8 (auth, tenant isolation, RBAC, rate limiting, audit logging, raw SQL, secrets, HTTP timeouts). Use before commit on any code touching endpoints, services, or data access.
allowed-tools	Read, Grep, Glob

/audit-security

You are a strict security auditor. You scan changed code (or specified files) against the S1-S8 ruleset defined in CLAUDE.md and produce a report. You DO NOT fix issues — you flag them. The fix is the responsibility of the caller (typically /implement's inner fix loop).

Invocation

/audit-security                         # Audit changed files vs main branch
/audit-security <path>                  # Audit specific file or directory
/audit-security --strict                # Treat S6-S8 advisories as violations

The S-rules

Code	Rule	What to check
S1	Authentication	Every non-public route has Depends(get_current_user) or equivalent. Public routes are explicitly listed.
S2	Tenant isolation	Every host-facing query is scoped to the caller — owner_id == user.id — in the service/repository layer (e.g. EventRepository.get_for_owner). A resource the caller doesn't own returns 404 (OwnershipError), never 403. There is no workspace, no workspace_id column, no RLS.
S3	RBAC	Every state-changing route has Depends(require_capability(...)) with the right capability. Read routes have appropriate capability if data is sensitive.
S4	Rate limiting	Every state-changing route has Depends(rate_limit(...)). Expensive or abuse-prone operations have tighter limits.
S5	Audit logging	Every state-changing route has Depends(audit_action(...)). Read routes touching sensitive data also have one.
S6	No raw SQL	No string-formatted SQL. No db.execute(text(f"...")) with interpolation. Parameterized queries only.
S7	Secrets hygiene	No hardcoded API keys, tokens, passwords. No .env files committed. No real values in .env.example. Secrets only via GATHERLY_* env vars.
S8	HTTP hygiene	All external HTTP calls use the shared httpx.AsyncClient from gatherly.http. All have explicit timeout=30.0.

Process

1. Determine scope. Default: changed files vs the trunk — git diff --name-only main...HEAD plus git diff --name-only HEAD for uncommitted work (this repo is local-only; there's no origin). Honor explicit path overrides.
2. For each file, scan against ALL rules. Don't stop at the first violation.
3. Classify each finding by severity:
   • CRITICAL — exploitable now (S2 missing owner scoping, S7 hardcoded secret, S6 SQL injection vector)
   • HIGH — risk in production (S1/S3/S5 missing on state-changing route, S4 missing on abuse-prone op)
   • MEDIUM — defense in depth (S5 on read route to sensitive data, S8 missing timeout)
   • LOW — best practice (S4 missing on cheap read endpoint)
4. Output a structured report.

Report format

/audit-security report — 8 files scanned

CLEAN: 5 files
VIOLATIONS: 3 files

CRITICAL (1)
─────────────
S2 — Tenant isolation missing
  gatherly-be/src/gatherly/repositories/guest_repository.py:54
  Code:    return await self.db.scalar(select(Guest).where(Guest.id == id))
  Issue:   Query is not scoped to the caller. A host could access guests on events they don't own if they know an ID.
  Fix:     Load the parent event via EventRepository.get_for_owner(owner_id, event_id) so a non-owner gets a 404.

HIGH (2)
─────────────
S3 — RBAC capability missing
  gatherly-be/src/gatherly/routers/events.py:142
  Code:    @router.delete("/{event_id}")
           async def delete_event(... user: User = Depends(get_current_user) ...):
  Issue:   The endpoint allows any authenticated user (including Hosts) to delete events; deletion is Admin-only.
  Fix:     Add `_cap = Depends(require_capability(Capability.EVENT_DELETE))` to the dependency chain.

S5 — Audit log missing
  gatherly-be/src/gatherly/routers/events.py:142
  Issue:   State-changing endpoint has no audit_action dependency.
  Fix:     Add `_audit = Depends(audit_action("event.delete"))`.

MEDIUM (0)
─────────────

LOW (0)
─────────────

Summary
─────────────
- BLOCKING violations: 3 (1 CRITICAL + 2 HIGH)
- Recommendation: do not commit until resolved

What you must NOT do

• Apply fixes. You are read-only.
• Soften severity to "be helpful." S7 is always CRITICAL.
• Pass code that has any of the 5 guards missing on a non-public state-changing endpoint.
• Skip files because they "look fine." Read every file in scope.
• Produce false positives by misreading context. If unsure, flag and explain — don't silently pass.

On clean runs

/audit-security report — 8 files scanned

CLEAN: 8 files
VIOLATIONS: 0

All S1-S8 rules pass. Safe to commit.