| name | convergence-security |
| description | Three-layer security audit: access controls, audit trail, and code scanning. Use before shipping anything that touches auth, payments, user data, or external integrations. Combines OWASP Top 10, STRIDE threat modeling, and secrets archaeology. |
Security Audit
Think carefully and step-by-step before responding — missed vulnerabilities are harder to find than to exploit, so reason deeply at each layer.
Three-layer security check: what can the agent access, what did it do, and is the output secure.
The Rule
IF YOU WOULDN'T GIVE IT TO AN INTERN, DON'T GIVE IT TO YOUR AGENT.
When to Use
- Before shipping features touching auth, payments, or user data
- When adding new endpoints, webhooks, or external integrations
- Periodic audit (monthly recommended)
- When reviewing third-party dependencies or MCP server configs
Layer 1 — Access Controls
Check that credentials and permissions are scoped to minimum needed.
- Token scoping — Are API tokens scoped to specific repos/resources, or using personal/org-wide tokens?
- MCP server configs — Are secrets in plain text? Are they rotated? Check
.claude/settings.json and any MCP configs
- Env var exposure — Block dangerous env vars from agent access:
NODE_OPTIONS, LD_PRELOAD, DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
- File access — Is the agent's file access restricted to the project directory?
Layer 2 — Audit Trail
Verify that agent actions are logged and reviewable.
- Session logging — Are session transcripts saved? (Claude Code:
~/.claude/projects/)
- Hook-based logging — Are hooks configured to log shell commands with timestamps?
- Git trail — Are changes committed with clear messages attributable to agent vs human?
Layer 3 — Code Scanning
Scan the codebase for vulnerabilities.
OWASP Top 10
| Category | What to Check |
|---|
| A01: Broken Access Control | Missing auth checks on endpoints, IDOR (accessing other users' resources by changing IDs) |
| A02: Cryptographic Failures | Hardcoded secrets, weak hashing, missing encryption for sensitive data |
| A03: Injection | SQL injection (raw SQL, string interpolation), command injection (unsanitized shell args), template injection |
| A04: Insecure Design | Missing rate limiting, no abuse prevention, overly broad APIs |
| A05: Security Misconfiguration | Debug mode in production, default credentials, verbose error messages |
| A06: Vulnerable Components | Dependencies with known CVEs. Run npm audit, bundle audit, or equivalent |
| A07: Auth Failures | Weak password policy, missing MFA, session fixation |
| A08: Data Integrity | Missing input validation, unsigned data, unverified downloads |
| A09: Logging Failures | Security events not logged, no alerting on suspicious activity |
| A10: SSRF | User-supplied URLs fetched server-side without validation |
Secrets Archaeology
Search git history for leaked credentials:
git log -p --all | grep -iE "(api_key|secret|password|token|AKIA|sk-|ghp_|xoxb-)" | head -50
Check for:
.env files tracked by git (should be in .gitignore)- CI configs with inline secrets (should use secret stores)
- Hardcoded database URLs with credentials
STRIDE Threat Model
For new attack surfaces introduced by the change:
| Threat | Question |
|---|
| Spoofing | Can someone fake an identity to access this? |
| Tampering | Can data be modified in transit or at rest? |
| Repudiation | Can someone deny they performed an action? |
| Information Disclosure | Can sensitive data leak through this path? |
| Denial of Service | Can this be used to crash or exhaust resources? |
| Elevation of Privilege | Can this bypass authorization? |
Dependency Supply Chain
- Run package manager audit
- Check for
postinstall scripts in production dependencies
- Verify lockfiles exist and are tracked by git
Output
Write findings to docs/convergence/security/YYYY-MM-DD-audit.md.
Categorize findings:
- Critical — blocks ship. Leaked secrets, exploitable injection, auth bypass
- High — must fix soon. Missing TLS, unprotected webhooks, known CVEs
- Medium — should fix. Missing rate limiting, verbose errors, logging gaps
- Low — minor. Configuration inconsistencies, cosmetic security headers
Each finding must include: file path, line number (if applicable), description, and specific remediation steps.
Anti-Patterns
| Bad | Why | Do Instead |
|---|
| "It's an internal tool" | Internal tools get compromised too | Audit everything |
| Skipping git history search | Leaked secrets persist in history even after deletion | Always search history |
| "Dependencies are fine" | Supply chain attacks are real | Run audit, check install scripts |
| Scanning only new files | Changed files may have introduced vulnerabilities | Scan the full diff |
| "We'll add auth later" | Auth is not a feature, it's a requirement | Add auth first |
