| name | auth-md |
| description | Generate, validate, and explain `auth.md` files — the open protocol that lets AI agents register for services on behalf of users. Use this skill whenever the user wants to make their app agent-ready by publishing an `auth.md`, generate Protected Resource Metadata (RFC 9728), validate an existing `auth.md` against the protocol specification, implement agent registration endpoints, understand how the auth.md protocol works, or configure authentication flows for agents. Trigger on mentions of "auth.md", "agent registration", "agent auth", "make my app agent-ready", "ID-JAG", "identity_assertion flow", "service_auth flow", "protected resource metadata", "claim ceremony", "agentic registration", "CIMD", "Client ID Metadata Document", "oauth-id-jag", "agent revocation", "agent credential", "agent discovery", "token exchange", "interaction_required", "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource", "/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server", "/agent/identity", "/oauth2/token", or any variation of AI agent authentication/registration in APIs.
|
| metadata | {"author":"https://ft.ia.br","version":"2.0","date":"2026-06-27T00:00:00.000Z","repository":"https://github.com/fabricioctelles/skills","license":"Apache 2.0","category":"library-and-api-reference"} |
auth-md
Generate, validate, and explain the auth.md protocol — the open standard that lets AI agents register for services on behalf of users, without signup forms.
Protocol Context
auth.md is a Markdown file published at a service's root (typically https://service.com/auth.md) that instructs agents on how to register. It works simultaneously as human-readable documentation and as a discoverable runtime artifact for agents.
The protocol extends RFC 9728 (OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata) with an agent_auth block in the Authorization Server metadata. Registration returns an identity_assertion (service-signed JWT) that the agent exchanges at /oauth2/token for an access_token. Three registration methods are supported:
| Flow | Mechanism | When to use |
|---|
| identity_assertion | Provider signs an ID-JAG (with auth_time) asserting user identity. Service verifies JWKS, returns identity_assertion. Agent exchanges at /oauth2/token. | Service does JIT provisioning from OIDC/SAML; wants zero-friction registration. |
| service_auth | Email hint + browser-based ceremony. Agent receives user_code + verification_uri; user signs in and types code. Agent polls /oauth2/token. | Agents on platforms that can't mint ID-JAGs; self-serve without trust list. |
| anonymous | No identity upfront. Immediate identity_assertion with pre-claim scopes. Optional deferred claim for scope upgrade. | Agent needs basic access immediately; human ownership binding deferred. |
Protocol Endpoints
| Endpoint | Purpose |
|---|
/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource | Discovery — resource metadata (RFC 9728) |
/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server | Discovery — AS metadata with agent_auth block |
POST /agent/identity | Registration — dispatches on type field |
POST /agent/identity/claim | Claim initiation (anonymous deferred, or re-initiate expired user_code) |
POST /oauth2/token | Token exchange (JWT-bearer grant) + claim polling (claim grant) |
POST /oauth2/revoke | Credential-layer revocation (RFC 7009) |
events_endpoint | Registration-layer revocation (receives SETs, RFC 8935) |
Token Lifecycle
Registration never returns an access_token directly. The flow is:
- Registration →
identity_assertion (service-signed JWT, reusable until expiry)
- Exchange →
POST /oauth2/token with grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer → access_token
- Refresh → re-exchange same
identity_assertion when access_token expires
- Expired assertion → restart at registration (Step 3)
Claim Ceremony (v2 — Browser-Based)
The claim ceremony uses RFC 8628-style device authorization:
- Registration returns
user_code + verification_uri in a claim block
- Agent surfaces both to the user
- User opens
verification_uri, signs in to the service, types the 6-digit code
- Agent polls
POST /oauth2/token with grant_type=urn:workos:agent-auth:grant-type:claim + claim_token
- On success: receives
access_token + fresh identity_assertion
Operation Modes
| Parameter | Default | Description |
|---|
mode | generate | generate = create auth.md + metadata; validate = check existing auth.md; explain = explain the protocol |
validation_level | basic | basic = structure + fields + consistency (offline); full = basic + live endpoint fetch |
flows | all | Which flows to include: identity_assertion, service_auth, anonymous, all |
role | app | Perspective: app = service accepting registrations; provider = platform minting ID-JAGs |
Workflow: Generate
1. Scan the codebase
Look for:
- Existing API routes and authentication patterns
- Defined scopes/permissions
- Framework (Express, Django, Rails, FastAPI, NestJS, etc.)
- Base URL and auth server URL configuration
- Existing authentication middleware
- User models and provisioning mechanisms
2. Ask the user only what cannot be inferred
- Which flows to support (identity_assertion, service_auth, anonymous, or combination)
- Pre-claim scopes vs post-claim scopes (if anonymous)
- Trusted agent providers and trust list policy (if identity_assertion)
- Whether the service already does JIT provisioning or requires manual onboarding
idJagMaxAuthAgeSeconds value (default: 3600)
- Desired rate limiting policy
3. Generate artifacts
Produce three artifacts:
a) auth.md — Markdown file following the protocol template (see references/protocol-template.md). Must contain:
- Title and intro addressed to the agent
- Step 1 — Discover (two hops: PRM → AS metadata)
- Step 2 — Pick a method (decision tree)
- Step 3 — Register (one subsection per supported method)
- Step 4 — Claim ceremony (if service_auth or anonymous with claim)
- Step 5 — Exchange the assertion (POST /oauth2/token with jwt-bearer grant)
- Step 6 — Use the access_token
- Errors (complete table with all applicable codes)
- Revocation (two layers)
b) oauth-protected-resource.json — JSON for /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource with resource_name and resource_logo_uri
c) oauth-authorization-server.json — JSON for /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server with:
issuer, token_endpoint, revocation_endpoint, grant_types_supported
- Complete
agent_auth block with identity_endpoint, claim_endpoint, events_endpoint
4. Generate implementation guidance
"Next Steps" section with:
- How to serve
auth.md at the domain root
- How to serve metadata at the well-known paths
- How to add
WWW-Authenticate header to 401 responses
- Endpoint implementation guidance (without generating framework-specific code unless requested)
- Token exchange implementation at
/oauth2/token
- Claim page hosting (verification_uri → login → code input → confirm)
- Recommended rate limiting configuration
- Recommended audit events
- Security considerations (token hashing, auth_time validation, replay protection, claim_token handling)
5. Generate Agent Provider guide (if role=provider)
When the user is an agent provider (not an app), generate:
- How to mint audience-specific ID-JAGs with
auth_time
- Token structure (header + payload with required and optional claims)
- How to publish JWKS
- Optionally: how to publish a CIMD (Client ID Metadata Document)
- How to implement revocation (POST SET to events_endpoint)
- How to present consent to the user before asserting identity (using
resource_name + resource_logo_uri)
Workflow: Validate
1. Load the auth.md
From a local file path or URL.
2. Run validation at the requested level
Basic (offline):
- All required headings present (Step 1–6, Errors, Revocation)
- At least one flow documented
- Valid JSON in fenced code blocks for request/response shapes
- AS metadata contains
identity_endpoint, token_endpoint, grant_types_supported
- Error table with standard error codes
- Consistency: flows in prose match
identity_types_supported in metadata JSON
- No unreplaced placeholders
Full (live):
- All basic checks, plus:
- Fetch
/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource from the declared base URL
- Verify
agent_auth block exists in AS metadata
- Fetch
/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server and verify consistency
- Check that
identity_endpoint, token_endpoint, revocation_endpoint respond (accept 400/401/422, reject 404/405)
- Verify API returns 401 with
WWW-Authenticate containing resource_metadata
3. Report results
Checklist with ✅/❌ per rule, grouped by category:
- Structure — headings and order
- Fields — required fields in JSONs
- Consistency — cross-references between prose and metadata
- Format — valid JSON, valid HTTP, no placeholders
- Endpoints (full only) — reachability and correct responses
Include severity: 🔴 Error (agents will fail), 🟡 Warning (degraded experience), 🟢 Info (suggestion).
See references/validation-rules.md for the complete ruleset.
Workflow: Explain
When the user wants to understand the protocol without generating or validating:
- Identify what the user wants to know (overview, specific flow, specific endpoint, security, etc.)
- Explain using the protocol context above and the references
- Use text-based sequence diagrams when helpful
- Point to official documentation when relevant
User Matching and JIT Provisioning
The identity_assertion flow needs to decide which service user a registration represents. Recommended resolution order:
- Delegation record match — if
(iss, sub) has a delegation on file, route to same user
- Verified email match — if a user exists with same verified email BUT no
(iss, sub) delegation → interaction_required (401) with claim block for user to confirm linking
- Verified phone match — same pattern
- No match → JIT — create a new user per provisioning policy, or refuse
Reject ID-JAGs with neither a verified email nor a verified phone — there's no basis for matching.
Rate Limiting
The /agent/identity endpoint is unauthenticated for anonymous registration. Implement two tiers:
- Per-IP (checked first) — prevents a single source from consuming the tenant's budget. Default: 5/hour anonymous, 60/hour identity_assertion.
- Per-tenant (checked second) — global cap across IPs. Default: 100/hour anonymous, 1000/hour identity_assertion.
Also rate-limit /oauth2/token polling — enforce interval from the claim block, reject with slow_down if too fast.
Recommended Audit Events
| Event | When | Data |
|---|
registration.created | Successful POST /agent/identity | registration_id, registration_type, iss, sub |
registration.interaction_required | 401 interaction_required | registration_id, iss, sub, matched_user_id |
registration.login_required | 401 login_required | iss, sub, auth_time, max_age |
claim.initiated | /agent/identity/claim called | registration_id, email |
claim.completed | User submitted correct user_code | registration_id, claimed_by_user_id |
claim.expired | user_code window or registration expired | registration_id |
token.exchanged | /oauth2/token jwt-bearer success | registration_id, access_token_id |
token.revoked | /oauth2/revoke called | access_token_id |
registration.revoked | SET processed at events_endpoint | registration_id, iss, sub |
Security Considerations
- auth_time validation —
auth_time is required in ID-JAGs. Service validates against idJagMaxAuthAgeSeconds. If too old, returns login_required (401) — agent must get user to re-authenticate at provider.
- claim_token handling — returned exactly once in the registration response. Agent holds in memory only for ceremony duration. Do not persist past Step 4.
- Token hashing —
claim_token is a bearer secret. Store only SHA-256 hash server-side.
- Consent UX — surface
resource_name and resource_logo_uri from PRM to the user before asserting identity. This is the user's only consent gate.
- Two revocation layers — credential layer (agent-callable,
/oauth2/revoke, kills one access_token) vs registration layer (provider-driven SETs at events_endpoint, kills identity_assertion + all derived tokens).
- Replay protection — cache
jti values with TTL of at least exp - iat + clock skew (typically 6 min).
- CIMD resolution — if
client_id is a URL, fetch as Client ID Metadata Document and verify jwks_uri.
- Bulk revocation — provide operator-facing mechanism to revoke all outstanding identity_assertions for a tenant.
Error Codes Reference
| Code | Where | Meaning |
|---|
anonymous_not_enabled | /agent/identity | Service doesn't accept anonymous |
service_auth_not_enabled | /agent/identity | service_auth disabled |
issuer_not_enabled | /agent/identity | Provider not on trust list |
invalid_request | /agent/identity | Body/claim/signature/jti/aud problems |
interaction_required (401) | /agent/identity | ID-JAG matched account, no delegation — claim needed |
login_required (401) | /agent/identity | auth_time too old — re-authenticate at provider |
invalid_claim_token | /agent/identity/claim | Token wrong or expired |
claimed_or_in_flight | /agent/identity/claim | Already claimed or wrong endpoint |
claim_expired | /agent/identity/claim | Registration expired |
invalid_grant | /oauth2/token | Assertion expired/revoked |
invalid_client | /oauth2/token | client_id not recognized |
unsupported_grant_type | /oauth2/token | Not jwt-bearer or claim grant |
authorization_pending | /oauth2/token (claim) | User hasn't completed ceremony |
expired_token | /oauth2/token (claim) | user_code window closed |
slow_down | /oauth2/token (claim) | Polling too fast |
rate_limited (429) | any | Back off and retry |
Agent Readiness Scanner Check
The isitagentready.com scanner validates auth.md as the authMd check. Pass criteria:
/auth.md served from site root with HTTP 200
- Content is Markdown with H1 heading containing "auth.md"
- Optionally validates OAuth Protected Resource Metadata at
/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
- Optionally validates Authorization Server metadata at
/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
To pass the check minimally:
# auth.md
This service accepts AI agent registrations.
## Authentication
Agents can register via POST /agent/identity with a valid ID-JAG.
See below for supported methods.
To pass with full marks (all metadata):
- Serve
/auth.md with proper heading
- Publish
/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource with resource, resource_name, resource_logo_uri, authorization_servers, scopes_supported, bearer_methods_supported: ["header"]
- Publish
/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server with issuer, token_endpoint, revocation_endpoint, grant_types_supported, and agent_auth block containing skill, identity_endpoint, claim_endpoint, events_endpoint, and registration methods
Scan command:
curl -s -X POST 'https://isitagentready.com/api/scan' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"url":"https://YOUR-DOMAIN/","enabledChecks":["authMd"]}' | jq '.checks.discovery.authMd'
Quality Checklist
Before delivering output, verify:
References
references/protocol-template.md — Complete auth.md template with all sections and placeholders
references/validation-rules.md — Full validation ruleset with error messages and severities
references/metadata-schema.md — JSON schema for PRM, AS metadata, ID-JAG, and identity_assertion
references/example-auth-md.md — Working example of a complete auth.md file (Acme Notes)
references/implementation-guide.md — Server-side implementation guide with token exchange, claim ceremony, revocation, and security
Updating Protocol Knowledge
This skill ships with a snapshot of the auth.md protocol specification (v2, June 2026). When possible, fetch the latest version from:
- Skill Home and Doc Hub:
https://auth-md.com
- Spec:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/workos/auth.md/refs/heads/main/AUTH.md
- Docs overview:
https://workos.com/auth-md/docs
- Apps guide:
https://workos.com/auth-md/docs/apps
- Agent providers guide:
https://workos.com/auth-md/docs/agent-providers
- File anatomy:
https://workos.com/auth-md/docs/auth-md
If fetch fails, use the bundled references/ as the source of truth.