Trigger machine account authentication with PetitPotam (MS-EFSR) and Coercer (MS-RPRN, MS-DFSNM, MS-FSRVP, MS-EVEN) via Coercer's scan/coerce/fuzz modes, feeding the coerced NTLM auth into a relay against AD CS Web Enrollment (ESC8), LDAP (RBCD), or SMB. Use in authorized engagements to complete a coercion-relay chain against a Domain Controller, or to validate coercion detections and signing/EPA mitigations.
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Trigger machine account authentication with PetitPotam (MS-EFSR) and Coercer (MS-RPRN, MS-DFSNM, MS-FSRVP, MS-EVEN) via Coercer's scan/coerce/fuzz modes, feeding the coerced NTLM auth into a relay against AD CS Web Enrollment (ESC8), LDAP (RBCD), or SMB. Use in authorized engagements to complete a coercion-relay chain against a Domain Controller, or to validate coercion detections and signing/EPA mitigations.
Coercing Authentication with Coercer and PetitPotam
Legal Notice: This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Authentication coercion combined with NTLM relay can yield domain compromise. Use only against systems you own or have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized use is illegal.
Overview
Many Windows RPC interfaces expose methods that take a UNC path and cause the receiving server to authenticate to that path using its machine account. An attacker who can reach these interfaces can force a target (commonly a Domain Controller) to authenticate to an attacker-controlled host. On its own this is "Forced Authentication"; combined with an NTLM relay, the coerced machine credential is relayed to a service that does not enforce signing/EPA, most famously AD CS Web Enrollment (ESC8), yielding a certificate for the Domain Controller and ultimately domain compromise.
PetitPotam (Gilles Lionel / topotam) abuses the MS-EFSR (Encrypting File System Remote Protocol) EfsRpcOpenFileRaw / EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv methods. Coercer (p0dalirius) generalizes the technique: it is a Python tool that automatically coerces a Windows server to authenticate to an arbitrary machine through 12 methods spanning multiple protocols — MS-EFSR (PetitPotam), MS-RPRN (PrinterBug/SpoolSample), MS-DFSNM (DFSCoerce), MS-FSRVP (ShadowCoerce), MS-EVEN, and more. Coercer operates in three modes: scan (probe which RPC methods are reachable/coercible), coerce (trigger authentication), and fuzz (research path variations). Sources: p0dalirius/Coercer, topotam/PetitPotam, The Hacker Recipes — Forced Authentications.
When to Use
To complete an ESC8/ESC11 chain by forcing a DC to authenticate to a relay
To trigger machine authentication for NTLM relay to LDAP (RBCD) or SMB
When a relay target is identified but no inbound authentication is occurring naturally
During detection engineering to generate coercion telemetry for blue-team tuning
To validate that DCs/servers are patched and that relay mitigations (signing/EPA) hold
Prerequisites
Authorized scope including coercion and NTLM relay techniques
Valid (often low-privileged) domain credentials; some methods work unauthenticated against unpatched hosts
A relay listener (Certipy relay or Impacket ) on a reachable host
ntlmrelayx
Network reachability to the target's RPC endpoints (135 + dynamic, 445)
Linux attack host with Python 3.8+; install the tools:
Identify which RPC coercion methods a target exposes (scan mode)
Stand up an NTLM relay pointed at a vulnerable service (e.g., AD CS web enrollment)
Coerce the target machine account to authenticate to the relay
Obtain a relayed artifact (DC certificate via ESC8, RBCD write via LDAP)
Document coercible methods and recommend patching/mitigations
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
ID
Technique
Application in this skill
T1187
Forced Authentication
Using MS-EFSR/MS-RPRN/MS-DFSNM/MS-FSRVP RPC methods to force a target machine account to authenticate to an attacker-controlled host
Chained techniques: T1557.001 (LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB/NTLM Relay) and T1649 (Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates) when relayed into AD CS.
Workflow
Step 1: Scan the target for coercible methods
Use Coercer's scan mode to enumerate which RPC methods on the target can be leveraged. This identifies the best coercion vector without firing a full attack.
For ESC8, the relay writes a DC certificate (dc.pfx). Authenticate as the DC and DCSync.
certipy auth -pfx 'dc$.pfx' -dc-ip 10.0.0.100
# Then DCSync with the recovered DC credential
impacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass 'corp.local/dc$@dc.corp.local' -just-dc
Step 6: Relay to LDAP for RBCD (alternative chain)
If ESC8 is unavailable, relay coerced auth to LDAP to configure Resource-Based Constrained Delegation.
# Relay to LDAP and delegate to attacker-controlled computer account
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://dc.corp.local --delegate-access \
--escalate-user 'attacker$' -smb2support
# Then coerce as in Step 3
Step 7: Fuzz mode for unpatched-path discovery (research)
