Assesses organizational readiness for post-quantum cryptography migration per NIST FIPS 203/204/205 standards. Performs cryptographic inventory scanning to identify quantum-vulnerable algorithms (RSA, ECDH, ECDSA), evaluates hybrid TLS configurations with X25519MLKEM768, and validates CRYSTALS-Kyber (ML-KEM) and CRYSTALS-Dilithium (ML-DSA) readiness. Implements crypto-agility assessment using oqs-provider for OpenSSL. Use when planning or executing the transition from classical to post-quantum cryptographic algorithms across enterprise infrastructure.
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Assesses organizational readiness for post-quantum cryptography migration per NIST FIPS 203/204/205 standards. Performs cryptographic inventory scanning to identify quantum-vulnerable algorithms (RSA, ECDH, ECDSA), evaluates hybrid TLS configurations with X25519MLKEM768, and validates CRYSTALS-Kyber (ML-KEM) and CRYSTALS-Dilithium (ML-DSA) readiness. Implements crypto-agility assessment using oqs-provider for OpenSSL. Use when planning or executing the transition from classical to post-quantum cryptographic algorithms across enterprise infrastructure.
When assessing organizational readiness for the NIST post-quantum cryptography transition
When building a cryptographic inventory to identify quantum-vulnerable algorithms across infrastructure
When evaluating hybrid TLS 1.3 configurations using X25519MLKEM768 key exchange
When testing CRYSTALS-Kyber (ML-KEM) and CRYSTALS-Dilithium (ML-DSA) algorithm support
When implementing crypto-agility to support both classical and post-quantum algorithms
When preparing migration roadmaps aligned with NIST IR 8547 deprecation timelines
When configuring oqs-provider with OpenSSL 3.x for post-quantum algorithm support
Prerequisites
Python 3.8+ with cryptography, requests, pyOpenSSL libraries
OpenSSL 3.0+ (3.5+ recommended for native ML-KEM/ML-DSA support)
oqs-provider for OpenSSL (for hybrid TLS testing with older OpenSSL)
Network access to target servers for TLS assessment
Administrative access for infrastructure scanning
Familiarity with PKI, TLS, and cryptographic protocols
Core Concepts
NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards
NIST published three finalized PQC standards on August 13, 2024:
Standard
Algorithm
Renamed To
Purpose
Based On
FIPS 203
CRYSTALS-Kyber
ML-KEM
Key Encapsulation Mechanism
Module lattice
FIPS 204
CRYSTALS-Dilithium
ML-DSA
Digital Signatures
Module lattice
FIPS 205
SPHINCS+
SLH-DSA
Digital Signatures (backup)
Stateless hash
ML-KEM (FIPS 203) -- Primary standard for key exchange and encryption. Replaces
RSA and ECDH for key establishment. Three security levels: ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768,
ML-KEM-1024.
ML-DSA (FIPS 204) -- Primary standard for digital signatures. Replaces RSA and
ECDSA for signing. Three security levels: ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, ML-DSA-87.
SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) -- Backup signature standard using hash-based approach. Intended
as fallback if lattice-based ML-DSA is found vulnerable. Larger signatures but
conservative security assumptions.
Quantum-Vulnerable Algorithms
These classical algorithms are vulnerable to quantum attack via Shor's algorithm:
Algorithm
Usage
Quantum Threat
Migration Priority
RSA-2048/4096
Key exchange, signatures, encryption
Shor's algorithm breaks factoring
Critical
ECDH (P-256, P-384)
TLS key exchange
Shor's algorithm breaks ECDLP
Critical
ECDSA
Code signing, TLS certificates
Shor's algorithm breaks ECDLP
Critical
DSA
Legacy signatures
Shor's algorithm breaks DLP
Critical
DH (Diffie-Hellman)
Key exchange
Shor's algorithm breaks DLP
Critical
AES-128
Symmetric encryption
Grover's halves key strength
Medium (upgrade to AES-256)
SHA-256
Hashing
Grover's reduces to 128-bit
Low (still adequate)
NIST Migration Timeline (IR 8547)
2024: Standards published, migration planning should begin
2030: Deprecation of quantum-vulnerable algorithms for most federal systems
2035: Complete removal of quantum-vulnerable algorithms from NIST standards
Now: "Harvest now, decrypt later" attacks make early migration essential for
long-lived secrets and data requiring long-term confidentiality
Hybrid TLS Key Exchange
During the transition period, hybrid key exchange combines a classical algorithm with
a post-quantum algorithm. If either algorithm is secure, the connection remains protected.
The first step in PQC migration is discovering all cryptographic algorithm usage
across the enterprise. This includes TLS configurations, certificates, code libraries,
key stores, and protocol configurations.
