gate-security

name	gate-security
description	Detects leaked secrets, injection patterns, and sensitive data exposure across changed files. Uses real tooling when configured, LLM judgment for analysis. Internal gate — invoked by verify.
allowed-tools	["Read","Bash","Glob","Grep","Write"]

Gate: Security

Goal

Ensure the codebase doesn't leak secrets, introduce injection vulnerabilities, or expose sensitive data. Use real security tooling when available. Use LLM judgment for analysis that tools can't do.

Inputs

• {projectArtifactsRoot}/config.json -- commands.lint, SAST tool config if available
• {repoStateRoot}/work/{selectedWork.id}/workflow.json -- selected work unit
• Changed files (detected via git diff)

Outputs

• Evidence file at {workDir}/evidence/security-report.md
• Gate status in the selected work's workflow.json
• Findings shown inline with severity, location, and remediation

Constraints

Scope (MEDIUM freedom):

• Focus on changed files. Use git diff --name-only against main branch.
• If no changed files detected, check all files in work scope.

Phase 1 — Detection (LOW freedom, BLOCK severity):

• Scan for secrets: API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys in source files.
• Scan for .env files, credential files, or key files staged for commit.
• Check .gitignore covers sensitive patterns.
• If a configured SAST tool exists (e.g., semgrep, eslint-plugin-security), run it.
• Any secret or credential found = BLOCK finding.

Phase 2 — Analysis (HIGH freedom, WARN severity):

• Review changed code for injection patterns (SQL, command, XSS, path traversal).
• Check that external data is treated as untrusted (per Constitution security practices).
• Check that authentication/authorization patterns aren't weakened (per Constitution auth/authz practices).
• Findings are WARN unless clearly exploitable (then BLOCK).

Phase 3 — Logical security (HIGH freedom, WARN severity):

• Missing authentication (CWE-306): mutation-capable handler functions (HTTP routes, gRPC handlers, GraphQL resolvers) performing state-changing operations without any visible auth check. Only flag when auth is completely absent. Skip if no mutation-capable handler patterns detected in changed files.
• For code-level error handling analysis (CWE-636, CWE-209), defer to gate-semantic which owns those categories with tiered tooling.
• All Phase 3 findings are WARN. Never BLOCK.
• Phase 3 focuses on logical control-flow; defer to Phase 2 when a finding is already captured as an injection pattern.

Verdict (LOW freedom):

• Follow protocols/evidence.md#verdict-rendering.
• Any BLOCK finding = gate FAIL.
• WARN-only findings = gate WARN (passes but flagged).
• Cite relevant Constitution practices where applicable.

Protocol References

• protocols/evidence.md#verdict-rendering -- verdict rendering
• protocols/evidence.md -- evidence storage
• protocols/state.md -- gate status updates

Failure Modes

Condition	Action
No SAST tool configured	Skip tool-based detection, rely on LLM analysis
No changed files detected	Scan all project source files
SAST tool not installed	WARN finding, suggest installation, continue with LLM