| name | maxtac-cloud-surface-triage |
| description | Use this skill when AWS, Azure, or GCP vulnerability research needs initial account, subscription, project, service, identity, data, runtime, network, or trust-boundary triage. |
MaxTAC Cloud Surface Triage
Use this skill as the first pass for authorized AWS, Azure, and GCP vulnerability research. The goal is a compact map of cloud actors, resources, identities, data assets, runtime boundaries, network paths, audit sources, and high-value hypotheses that can be handed to Cloud auditors or deeper domain packs.
Operating Rules
- Start from the authorized scope: cloud provider, organization/account/subscription/project, region, service family, tenant boundary, and allowed proof actions.
- Record durable identifiers: AWS account IDs, ARNs, regions, role session names, CloudTrail event IDs; Azure tenant IDs, subscription IDs, resource IDs, object IDs, correlation IDs; GCP organization/folder/project IDs, resource names, service accounts, audit log insert IDs.
- Separate control-plane authority, data-plane access, runtime identity, and network reachability. A finding is stronger when it crosses a named boundary.
- Prefer provider-native evidence, infrastructure-as-code, policy JSON, audit logs, and redacted CLI/API transcripts over console screenshots alone.
- Do not print or store live secrets, bearer tokens, session credentials, or private keys. Capture redacted claims, key IDs, role names, scopes, and timestamps.
- Use
maxtac-cloud-iam-boundary for IAM, RBAC, federation, impersonation, and delegated authority questions.
- Use
maxtac-cloud-data-exposure for storage, database, snapshot, backup, signed access, and key/data-plane exposure questions.
- Use
maxtac-cloud-runtime-boundary for compute, serverless, container, metadata service, managed Kubernetes, workload identity, and network boundary questions.
- Pair with Supply Chains when CI/CD OIDC, artifact promotion, registry, signing, or deployment authority is the root boundary.
- Pair with Web when SSRF, OAuth/OIDC, cloud consoles, SaaS workflows, webhooks, callbacks, or browser state are part of the proof.
Triage Workflow
- Define the target slice: provider, environment, account/subscription/project, region, service family, asset class, and program-approved proof limits.
- Inventory identities and boundaries: humans, roles, service principals, managed identities, service accounts, workload identities, groups, permission boundaries, deny policies, organization policies, tenant/project/account inheritance, and federation paths.
- Inventory protected assets: storage buckets, blobs, databases, snapshots, secrets, KMS keys, logs, queues, registries, workloads, clusters, functions, APIs, private endpoints, and management-plane resources.
- Map runtime surfaces: VMs, serverless functions, jobs, containers, managed Kubernetes, metadata services, execution roles, node identities, secret mounts, and egress paths.
- Map control evidence: AWS CloudTrail/Config/Access Analyzer/GuardDuty, Azure Activity Logs/Entra audit logs/Azure Policy/Defender, GCP Cloud Audit Logs/Policy Analyzer/Security Command Center, and relevant IaC.
- Rank hypotheses by boundary crossed, affected asset sensitivity, reproducibility, least-privilege delta, auditability, and proof safety.
- Route to the narrowest Cloud skill and auditor filter before expanding to Web, Source, Supply Chains, or Binary.
Cloud Surface Triage Packet
When a file packet is useful, store results under tmp/cloud/<case-id>/surface-triage.md:
## Cloud Surface Triage Packet
- Provider and target slice:
- Authorized scope and proof limits:
- Account/subscription/project/tenant/resource IDs:
- Region(s):
- Actor and starting credential:
- Target asset or trust boundary:
- Control-plane authority:
- Data-plane access:
- Runtime/workload identity:
- Network/perimeter state:
- Federation or delegation path:
- Relevant policies and deny controls:
- Audit/log sources:
- Controlled inputs:
- Security invariant:
- Suspect crossing or policy gap:
- Non-destructive proof plan:
- Evidence collected:
- Evidence still needed:
- Suggested skill: IAM Boundary / Data Exposure / Runtime Boundary / Web / Source / Supply Chains / Binary
- Suggested auditor filters:
- Candidate hypothesis:
- Confidence: low / medium / high
Provider Pivots
- AWS: account ID, organization/SCPs, IAM policies, resource policies, trust policies, STS sessions, permission boundaries, VPC endpoints, CloudTrail, Access Analyzer, Config, and service-linked roles.
- Azure: tenant, management group, subscription, resource group, RBAC assignments, custom roles, Entra applications, service principals, managed identities, Key Vault, private endpoints, Activity Logs, and Defender/Policy state.
- GCP: organization, folders, projects, IAM bindings, service accounts, workload identity federation, organization policy, VPC Service Controls, Cloud Audit Logs, Policy Analyzer, and Security Command Center.
Auditor Routing
Use the Cloud pack's auditor MCP tools when available. If those tools are not exposed in the current context, use Core's local fallback: python3 <maxtac-core-subagents-skill-dir>/scripts/audit-helper.py --catalog cloud --filter <term>. Good starting filters include iam, rbac, federation, data-exposure, storage, snapshot, runtime, metadata, serverless, kubernetes, network, secrets, kms, aws, azure, and gcp.
