eurocrypt

name	eurocrypt
description	Writing and formatting guidance for EUROCRYPT (International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques) papers. Use when drafting, formatting, or submitting to EUROCRYPT 2026. Covers Springer LNCS llncs.cls format with splncs04 bibliography style, double-blind anonymity, 30-page limit (LNCS standard), formal security proofs, and camera-ready preparation.

EUROCRYPT 2026 Conference Writing Skill

CCF-A | Security | Publisher: Springer Conference: https://eurocrypt.iacr.org/2026 Template: EUROCRYPT/llncs.cls (Springer LNCS format)

Document Setup

Preamble Structure

\documentclass[runningheads]{llncs}

% Required packages
\usepackage{graphicx}
\usepackage{amsmath}
\usepackage{amssymb}
\usepackage{url}
\usepackage{hyperref}

Required Packages

\documentclass[runningheads]{llncs}
\usepackage{graphicx}           % Figures
\usepackage{amsmath}            % Math
\usepackage{amssymb}            % Symbols
\usepackage{url}                % URLs in references
\usepackage{hyperref}           % Clickable links

Page Limits

Section	Limit
Main paper	30 pages (LNCS standard)
References	Included in page count
Appendix	Typically included

EUROCRYPT follows LNCS guidelines with approximately 30 pages (including references). Check the specific Call for Papers for the current year's limit.

Anonymity Requirements

EUROCRYPT uses double-blind review:

1. No author names or affiliations in submission
2. Use third person for self-citations: "Smith et al. showed..." not "we showed..."
3. Anonymize all URLs (e.g., ePrint links with author names)
4. Clear PDF metadata
5. Remove acknowledgments from submission

Camera-Ready Differences

After acceptance:

1. Add complete author information with affiliations
2. Include acknowledgments
3. Add footnote for contact author
4. Ensure PDF/A compliance for Springer publication

Section Organization

EUROCRYPT papers follow the cryptographic research structure:

1. Introduction — Problem, contributions (enumerate contributions)
2. Technical Overview — High-level summary of the approach
3. Preliminaries — Definitions, notation, hardness assumptions
4. Main Construction / Protocol — Core cryptographic contribution
5. Security Analysis — Proofs, reductions, formal security definitions
6. Performance / Comparison (if applicable) — Efficiency analysis
7. Related Work — Positioning against prior cryptographic constructions
8. Conclusion — Summary
9. References

Cryptographic Conventions

EUROCRYPT papers emphasize formal security proofs:

Security Definitions

\section{Preliminaries}

\subsection{Cryptographic Primitives}
A \textbf{public-key encryption scheme} $\Pi = (\Gen, \Enc, \Dec)$
consists of three algorithms:

\begin{itemize}
  \item $\Gen(1^\lambda) \to (\pk, \sk)$: Key generation
  \item $\Enc(\pk, m) \to c$: Encryption
  \item $\Dec(\sk, c) \to m$: Decryption
\end{itemize}

\subsection{Security Definitions}
We define IND-CPA security:

\begin{definition}[IND-CPA Security]
A PKE scheme $\Pi$ is IND-CPA secure if for all PPT
adversaries $\mathcal{A}$:
\begin{align}
  \Adv{\text{IND-CPA}}{\Pi}(\lambda) = 
  \Pr[\Exp{\text{IND-CPA-0}}{\Pi}(\mathcal{A}) = 1] \\
  - \Pr[\Exp{\text{IND-CPA-1}}{\Pi}(\mathcal{A}) = 1] 
  \leq \negl(\lambda)
\end{align}
where the experiments are defined as follows...
\end{definition}

Proof Structure

\section{Security Analysis}

\subsection{Theorem (IND-CPA Security)}
\textbf{Scheme $\Pi$ achieves IND-CPA security under the DDH assumption.}

\begin{Proof}
We prove this by a sequence of games:

\medskip
\noindent\textbf{Game 0.} This is the original IND-CPA experiment
with challenge bit $b$.

\medskip
\noindent\textbf{Game 1.} We modify Game 0 by replacing the
DH challenge tuple $(g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab})$ with
$(g, g^a, g^b, g^c)$ where $c \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_p$.
By the DDH assumption, this change is indistinguishable.

\medskip
\noindent\textbf{Analysis.} In Game 1, the challenge ciphertext
is independent of the challenge bit $b$, so the adversary's
advantage is exactly 0.

\medskip
\noindent\textbf{Conclusion.} The reduction from DDH shows that
$\Adv{\text{IND-CPA}}{\Pi} \leq \Adv{\text{DDH}}{\mathcal{B}}$,
which is negligible.
\end{Proof}

Performance Analysis

\section{Efficiency}

\subsection{Concrete Parameters}
We instantiate our scheme with the following parameters:
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lcc}
  \toprule
  Operation & Time & Size \\
  \midrule
  KeyGen & 2.3 ms & 256 bits \\
  Enc & 4.1 ms & 1.2 KB \\
  Dec & 3.8 ms & -- \\
  \bottomrule
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
Our scheme is $2.1\times$ faster than the state-of-the-art
while achieving stronger security guarantees.

Figures and Tables

• Use vector formats (.pdf) for all figures
• Ensure readability at LNCS margins
• Include protocol diagrams and reduction graphs

\begin{figure}[t]
  \centering
  \includegraphics[width=0.85\linewidth]{figs/protocol}
  \caption{Overview of our PAKE protocol. The client and server
    exchange messages in three rounds to establish a shared
    session key. Our protocol achieves UC-security against
    passive adversaries.}
  \label{fig:protocol}
\end{figure}

References (Springer LNCS)

\bibliographystyle{splncs04}
\bibliography{references}

% Citations:
\cite{doe2025}          % [1]

Formatting Rules

• Format: Springer LNCS (single-column, typeset)
• Paper size: A4
• Body font: 10pt typical
• Margins: Per LNCS guidelines
• References: Numbered, square brackets

Submission Checklist

• Page count within LNCS guidelines
• All author identification removed
• Third-person self-citations only
• Formal security definitions included
• Proofs are complete and rigorous
• Anonymized all URLs
• PDF metadata cleared
• References in LNCS format

Camera-Ready Checklist

• Add author information and affiliations
• Add acknowledgments
• Verify PDF/A compliance
• Check figure quality