full-security-audit

name	full-security-audit
description	Use when preparing for a release, a SOC2/PCI audit window, or any "sweep everything" security request. Chains secret-scanner, dependency-audit, security-audit, container-scan (if applicable), and pentest-report end-to-end and produces a single dated pentest report.
safety	writes-local
produces	security/reports/pentest-report-<date>.md
consumes	["security/findings/secrets.json","security/findings/dependencies.json","security/findings/audit.json","security/findings/container.json"]
chains	["secret-scanner","dependency-audit","security-audit","container-scan","pentest-report"]

When to use

• Preparing for a release cut, external pentest, customer security questionnaire, or audit window (SOC2, ISO 27001, PCI).
• User says "run the full security sweep", "pre-release security check", "give me the pentest report", or "what's our security posture".
• Onboarding a new repository and establishing a baseline.
• Post-incident hardening where the team wants confirmation that no related findings remain.

Do not use this for a single-file review (use code-review) or for runtime incident triage (use incident-response). Do not use this as a substitute for a third-party pentest — this orchestrator produces internal evidence, not an attestation.

Chained skills

1. secret-scanner — runs a deep sweep of the working tree and full git history for leaked credentials, writes findings to security/findings/secrets.json.
2. dependency-audit — enumerates every manifest (package-lock.json, poetry.lock, Gemfile.lock, go.sum, Cargo.lock, requirements.txt) and produces CVE findings in security/findings/dependencies.json.
3. security-audit — combined SAST + DAST + SCA pass, writes findings to security/findings/audit.json.
4. container-scan — scans built images and their base layers; only runs if a Dockerfile (or Containerfile) is present. Writes security/findings/container.json.
5. pentest-report — consumes all four JSON artifacts and produces a formal, dated report suitable for leadership or an external auditor.

Inputs

• Repository root (the working directory; default cwd).
• Optional: a released/candidate image reference (ghcr.io/acme/api:1.4.0) to scan instead of building from Dockerfile.
• Optional: a target environment URL if DAST should hit a staging deploy (https://staging.acme.example).
• Optional: a severity floor for the final report (defaults to medium; findings below are listed but not counted toward overall risk).

Outputs

• security/findings/secrets.json — raw secret-scanner output.
• security/findings/dependencies.json — raw dependency-audit output.
• security/findings/audit.json — raw security-audit output.
• security/findings/container.json — raw container-scan output (only if Dockerfile present).
• security/reports/pentest-report-<YYYY-MM-DD>.md — consolidated report with Executive Summary, Scope, Methodology, Findings (grouped by severity), Remediation Plan, and Appendices linking each raw JSON.

Tool dependencies

• Bash.
• gitleaks (secret-scanner) — gitleaks detect --source . --redact --report-format json --report-path security/findings/secrets.json --log-opts="--all".
• osv-scanner or npm audit / pip-audit / bundle audit / govulncheck / cargo audit (dependency-audit).
• semgrep (SAST) — semgrep ci --json --output security/findings/audit.json.
• zap-cli or nuclei (DAST, optional; only if a target URL is provided).
• trivy (container-scan) — trivy image --format json --output security/findings/container.json <image>.
• jq for merging the JSON artifacts before invoking pentest-report.

Procedure

1. Ensure output directories exist: mkdir -p security/findings security/reports.
2. Run secret-scanner. Shell: gitleaks detect --source . --redact --report-format json --report-path security/findings/secrets.json --log-opts="--all". Parse the JSON and count entries with Severity == "HIGH" (or equivalent provider classification).
3. Halt gate. If secret-scanner reports any unresolved HIGH finding (e.g. live AWS key, Stripe live key, GitHub PAT), stop immediately. Do not run the other scans. Write a truncated security/reports/pentest-report-<date>.md containing only the Executive Summary with Overall Risk: Critical and a remediation block that tells the user to rotate the credential first, then purge with git filter-repo or bfg, then re-run. Rationale: scanning further while a live key is exposed wastes time and can leak the key into more artifacts.
4. Run dependency-audit. Detect the package manager(s) and run the appropriate command(s) in parallel:
   • Node: npx osv-scanner --lockfile=package-lock.json --format json > security/findings/dependencies.json.
   • Python: pip-audit -r requirements.txt -f json -o security/findings/dependencies.json.
   • Go: govulncheck -json ./... > security/findings/dependencies.json.
   • Ruby: bundle audit check --update --format json > security/findings/dependencies.json.
   • Rust: cargo audit --json > security/findings/dependencies.json. If multiple managers exist, run each and merge with jq -s 'add' a.json b.json > security/findings/dependencies.json.
5. Run security-audit. Shell: semgrep ci --json --output security/findings/audit.json --config p/owasp-top-ten --config p/security-audit. If a staging URL was provided, append a DAST pass via nuclei -u <url> -severity medium,high,critical -json -o /tmp/nuclei.json and merge into audit.json.
6. Detect a Dockerfile: test -f Dockerfile || test -f Containerfile. If present, run container-scan:
   • Build or pull the image: docker build -t sdas-scan:latest . (or use the user-supplied reference).
   • trivy image --severity MEDIUM,HIGH,CRITICAL --format json --output security/findings/container.json sdas-scan:latest. If no Dockerfile and no image reference, skip this step and record container-scan: skipped (no Dockerfile) in the report's Scope section.
7. Invoke pentest-report. Pass all four (or three) JSON paths. It must write to security/reports/pentest-report-$(date +%Y-%m-%d).md.
8. Verify the report exists, is non-empty, and references each raw JSON artifact by path in its Appendix.

Examples

Example 1 — clean sweep (Node.js/Express API)

Repo: acme-api (Express + TypeScript, Dockerfile present, staging at https://staging.acme.example).

Step 2 — secret-scanner:

$ gitleaks detect --source . --redact --report-format json --report-path security/findings/secrets.json --log-opts="--all"
INFO 12 commits scanned, 0 leaks found

security/findings/secrets.json:

[]

No HIGH findings — proceed.

Step 4 — dependency-audit finds 2 medium CVEs:

[
  {"id": "GHSA-8jfx-rwrr-rqjc", "package": "express", "severity": "MEDIUM", "fixed": "4.19.2"},
  {"id": "GHSA-h6ch-v84p-w6p9", "package": "semver",  "severity": "MEDIUM", "fixed": "7.5.4"}
]

Step 5 — security-audit (semgrep) finds 1 medium SAST finding:

[
  {"rule": "javascript.express.security.audit.missing-rate-limit",
   "severity": "MEDIUM", "path": "src/routes/login.ts", "line": 22,
   "message": "POST /login has no rate limit"}
]

Step 6 — trivy reports 0 high/critical OS-package CVEs in the image.

Step 7 — pentest-report writes security/reports/pentest-report-2026-04-19.md (excerpt):

# Pentest Report — acme-api — 2026-04-19

## Executive Summary
Overall Risk: Medium
Scope: 1 repository, 1 container image, 1 staging URL.
Findings: 3 (0 critical, 0 high, 3 medium, 0 low).
Posture: safe to release after the 3 medium items are scheduled.

## Findings
### Medium
1. GHSA-8jfx-rwrr-rqjc — express < 4.19.2 — upgrade to 4.19.2.
2. GHSA-h6ch-v84p-w6p9 — semver < 7.5.4  — upgrade to 7.5.4.
3. Missing rate limit on POST /login (src/routes/login.ts:22) — add express-rate-limit with 10 req/min per IP.

## Appendix
- security/findings/secrets.json
- security/findings/dependencies.json
- security/findings/audit.json
- security/findings/container.json

Example 2 — halt path (leaked AWS key)

Repo: acme-payments (Python/FastAPI).

Step 2 — secret-scanner:

$ gitleaks detect --source . --redact --report-format json --report-path security/findings/secrets.json --log-opts="--all"
WARN leaks found: 1

security/findings/secrets.json:

[
  {
    "RuleID": "aws-access-token",
    "Severity": "HIGH",
    "File": "scripts/bootstrap.sh",
    "Commit": "9f2c1ab",
    "Author": "[e-mail]",
    "Date": "2025-11-03T14:12:55Z",
    "Match": "AKIA****************",
    "Entropy": 4.2
  }
]

Step 3 — halt. Orchestrator does NOT run dependency-audit, security-audit, or container-scan. It writes a truncated security/reports/pentest-report-2026-04-19.md:

# Pentest Report — acme-payments — 2026-04-19

## Executive Summary
Overall Risk: Critical — scan halted at step 1.

A live AWS access token was found in git history:
  File:   scripts/bootstrap.sh
  Commit: 9f2c1ab ([e-mail], 2025-11-03)
  Prefix: AKIA****************

## Required Remediation (in order)
1. Rotate the key in the AWS console NOW. Assume it is compromised.
2. Confirm rotation by checking CloudTrail for unexpected `AssumeRole` / `GetCallerIdentity` calls since 2025-11-03.
3. Purge from history:
     git filter-repo --path scripts/bootstrap.sh --invert-paths
     git push --force-with-lease origin main
4. Notify all clones to re-fetch. Revoke any long-lived branches.
5. Re-run `full-security-audit`. Subsequent steps (dependency-audit, security-audit, container-scan, pentest-report) will execute once secrets.json is clean.

## Appendix
- security/findings/secrets.json

No other JSON artifacts exist yet; the remaining chained skills are not invoked.

Constraints

• Do not skip the halt gate after secret-scanner. A live credential is a stop-the-world event; continuing the sweep can exfiltrate the key into CI logs, artifact stores, or a SaaS scanner.
• Do not skip a step on failure. If semgrep exits non-zero for reasons other than findings (e.g. config error), surface the error and halt — do not substitute a partial result.
• Do not modify source code. This orchestrator is read-only on the repo tree; it writes only into security/findings/ and security/reports/.
• Do not upload findings anywhere. All artifacts stay local.
• Do not redact severities in the final report. Raw severity labels from each tool are preserved verbatim.
• Do not run container-scan if no Dockerfile and no image reference are available — record the skip explicitly instead of fabricating a result.
• Do not overwrite a prior dated report. If security/reports/pentest-report-<date>.md already exists, append a suffix (-2, -3) so historical reports are preserved.
• Do not invoke pentest-report until every preceding JSON artifact exists and parses as valid JSON (jq . <file> > /dev/null).

Quality checks

• Every referenced JSON file exists, is valid JSON, and is non-empty (empty array [] is valid and means "no findings").
• security/reports/pentest-report-<date>.md exists, is > 1 KB for a clean sweep, and contains the five required sections: Executive Summary, Scope, Methodology, Findings, Appendix.
• Each finding in the final report maps back to a specific entry in one of the raw JSON files (verify by jq id lookup).
• When the halt gate fires, only secrets.json exists under security/findings/ and the report's Executive Summary contains the string Overall Risk: Critical.
• Overall Risk in the Executive Summary is computed consistently: Critical if any critical finding; else High if any high; else Medium if any medium; else Low.
• Container-scan is either present with a valid container.json or explicitly marked skipped (no Dockerfile) in the Scope section — never silently missing.
• Re-running the orchestrator on the same tree produces a new dated report (or suffixed variant) without mutating prior reports.