Detects unsafe deserialization, unverified software updates, and tampered CI artifacts. Use when writing deserialization code, processing pickled or marshalled data, implementing software update mechanisms, consuming CI/CD artifact downloads, or handling data from untrusted sources that gets reconstructed into objects.
Installation
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Detects unsafe deserialization, unverified software updates, and tampered CI artifacts. Use when writing deserialization code, processing pickled or marshalled data, implementing software update mechanisms, consuming CI/CD artifact downloads, or handling data from untrusted sources that gets reconstructed into objects.
Software and Data Integrity Failures Security Check (A08:2025)
What this checks
Protects against arbitrary code execution and tampered artifacts. Deserializing
untrusted data with code-executing formats gives attackers remote code execution;
unsigned software updates allow supply-chain compromise.
Vulnerable patterns
Code-executing deserializer (Python pickle/marshal/shelve, Java ObjectInputStream, Ruby Marshal.load, PHP unserialize, .NET BinaryFormatter, unsafe YAML loader) called on attacker-reachable bytes
Deserialized object whose fields are read by business logic with no schema validation of names, types, or allowed values
Software update, plugin, or CI artifact downloaded and executed without signature or digest verification
Trusting reduce/wakeup-style reconstruction hooks invoked on user-controlled serialized blobs
Verification key or pinned hash hardcoded as a string literal in source rather than loaded from a trusted external source
Fix immediately
Flag the vulnerable code and explain the risk. Translate the principles below to the
audited file's language and serialization library — use that stack's documented
safe-loader, schema-validation, and signature-verification APIs.
For each finding, establish these properties:
No code-executing deserializer touches untrusted input. Replace it with a
data-only format — JSON, safe-mode YAML, protobuf, CBOR without tags — so
parsing alone cannot trigger constructor or callback execution.
Every deserialized object from untrusted input is validated against an
explicit schema — field names, types, allowed values — before any field is
read by business logic. Applies to JSON, YAML, XML, form bodies, message-queue
payloads, and binary formats alike; format doesn't matter.
Artifacts are signature- or digest-verified before trust. Software updates,
plugin loads, CI-artifact downloads: check a cryptographic signature against a
trusted public key, or a digest against a pinned hash, before executing or
loading.
Keys and pinned hashes come from outside the source tree — environment
variable, secrets manager, OS keystore, or a build-time constant baked into
the binary. A value received as a function parameter with no visible origin
does not demonstrate this.
Verification
Confirm these properties hold for every relevant pattern present:
No code-executing deserializer (pickle, marshal, shelve, ObjectInputStream.readObject, Marshal.load, unserialize, BinaryFormatter, unsafe yaml.load) receives attacker-reachable bytes. Safe formats (JSON, safe-mode YAML, protobuf) may accept untrusted input if the next criterion is met.
Every deserialized object produced from untrusted input is validated against an explicit schema — field names, types, allowed values — before any field reaches business logic
For every software-update, plugin-load, or CI-artifact download, the artifact's signature or digest is verified before it is executed, loaded, or written to a trusted path
Verification keys and pinned hashes are read from an environment variable, secrets manager, OS keystore, or build-time constant — not hardcoded literals in source, and not opaque function parameters
