| name | security-review |
| description | Security review for the Mycelium repo, scaled to the change. Covers secrets, supply-chain (pinned deps, no curl|bash, lockfile integrity), shell/CI safety, input handling, and — for code — the usual vulnerability classes. Auto-detects docs-only diffs and runs a light pass; can run an exhaustive all-severities pass. |
| when_to_use | Use when asked for a security review/audit of a PR, branch, commit, or the working tree; before merging changes that touch dependencies, CI, shell scripts, auth/secrets, or anything network-facing. |
| argument-hint | [PR#|<base>...<head>|<commit>] [--tier T0|T1|T2] [--all] |
| allowed-tools | Bash(git diff:*), Bash(git show:*), Bash(git log:*), Bash(git status:*), Read, Grep, Glob |
security-review
Security review, repo-grounded. Shared triage/severity/report contract:
review-rubric — read it first, pick a tier, emit the report.
Scaling (important)
Security depth scales with what changed, not just size:
- Docs/markdown-only diff → light pass: secrets scan + check no dangerous shell/links/
copy-paste commands were introduced. Most findings will be Low/Nit. Say so explicitly.
- Touches dependencies / CI / shell /
tools/* / network / parsing untrusted input →
this is a fragile path → T2, full pass, regardless of line count.
Checklist
Secrets & data
- No credentials/tokens/keys/private hosts in the diff or history. Respect
.gitleaks.toml;
run/trust just secrets. Any real secret → Critical (and advise rotation).
- No PII or internal URLs leaking into committed docs/fixtures.
Supply chain
- New dependencies are pinned (version/hash), from a known source, and justified. Flag
unpinned ranges on security-relevant deps, typosquat-prone names, and lockfile drift.
- No
curl … | bash / unverified remote execution in scripts, CI, or docs. Installs should
be reproducible (pin tool versions; prefer uv tool/npx --yes <pinned> over piping).
- Note this repo's own pattern:
gh-bootstrap-local.sh and the package script auto-pip install
pyyaml — call out unpinned/implicit installs as High and suggest pinning.
Shell & CI safety
- Shell:
set -euo pipefail; quote expansions; no eval of untrusted input; no command
injection via interpolated vars; safe tmp handling. (Trust just shell/shellcheck.)
- GitHub Actions: least-privilege
permissions:; pinned action SHAs/tags; no untrusted input
in run:; secrets not echoed; per repo policy, remote CI is manual-dispatch only — flag
any workflow that auto-runs on push/pull_request as a policy violation (Medium+).
Code (when present)
- Input validation / injection (SQL/cmd/path/deserialization); authn/authz; unsafe Rust
(
unsafe blocks justified + bounded); integer/overflow in numeric/packing code; panics on
attacker-controlled input; crypto misuse. Unbounded resource use / DoS.
Report
Emit the rubric §4 format, advisory posture. For a docs-only change, a clean light pass should
say plainly: "docs-only; no security-relevant surface touched; minor notes." Always include
summary + recommendations in --all mode.
