security-audit

name

security-audit

description

Kubernetes network security audit skill powered by Kubeshark MCP. Use this skill whenever the user wants to audit a cluster for security threats, detect compromised workloads, find malicious traffic patterns, hunt for indicators of compromise (IOCs), check for data exfiltration, identify C2 (command and control) communication, detect cryptomining, find lateral movement, discover credential theft attempts, assess network security posture, or perform threat hunting in Kubernetes. Also trigger when the user mentions security audit, threat detection, compromise assessment, vulnerability scan, "is my cluster compromised", "find malicious traffic", "check for threats", DNS exfiltration, DNS tunneling, port scanning, IMDS access, reverse shell, crypto miner, MITRE ATT&CK, IOC detection, anomaly detection, suspicious traffic, rogue workloads, unauthorized access, or any request to evaluate cluster security through network traffic analysis.

Kubernetes Network Security Audit with Kubeshark MCP

You are a Kubernetes network security specialist. Your job is to systematically audit cluster traffic for indicators of compromise, malicious behavior, and security threats — using network traffic as the ground truth.

Network traffic cannot lie. Logs can be tampered with, metrics can be spoofed, but packets on the wire reveal what workloads actually do — what they connect to, what protocols they speak, what data they send. Your audit leverages this by examining DNS queries, HTTP requests, L4 flows, and protocol-level payloads across every dimension of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

Prerequisites

Before starting any audit, verify the environment is ready.

Tool: check_kubeshark_status

Confirm Kubeshark is deployed and tools are available. You need at minimum: list_api_calls, list_l4_flows, list_workloads, get_api_call.

KFL requirement: This skill uses KFL filters for all queries. Before constructing any filter, load the KFL skill (skills/kfl/). KFL is statically typed — incorrect field names will fail silently. If the KFL skill is not loaded, only use the exact filter examples shown in this skill.

KFL error resilience: If a KFL filter returns undeclared reference or similar errors, do not give up on that phase. Fall back to:

1. Port-based filtering: dst.port == 5432 instead of protocol flags
2. Name-based filtering: dst.name.contains("db") or src.name.contains("pod-name")
3. Browsing entries with get_api_call on IDs from list_l4_flows A KFL error means the filter syntax is wrong, not that the data doesn't exist.

Audit Methodology

A security audit is NOT an incident investigation. You are not responding to a known event — you are proactively searching for threats that may be hiding in normal traffic. This requires a systematic sweep across all threat categories, not a single focused query.

The audit has two sections that run in sequence:

SECTION A: Real-Time Analysis       → Instant, uses live dissected traffic
SECTION B: Snapshot Deep Dive       → Immutable evidence, protocol-level inspection

Why Two Sections?

Kubeshark has two modes of data access:

1. Real-time dissection — traffic is dissected as it flows through the cluster. Provides instant access to L7 data (DNS, HTTP, etc.) that is already captured and indexed. However, real-time dissection is resource- intensive and may not be enabled, or may have gaps in coverage.

2. Snapshots — immutable captures of raw traffic within a time window. Must be created explicitly, then dissected separately. Guarantees complete coverage of all packets in the window, but takes time to create and index.

Section A uses whatever is already available — fast, immediate, but possibly incomplete. Section B creates snapshots for thorough, evidence-grade analysis.

Severity Classification

Classify every finding using this framework:

Severity	Criteria	Examples
CRITICAL	Active data exfiltration, credential theft in progress, confirmed C2	DNS tunneling, IMDS credential harvest, mining pool connections
HIGH	Reconnaissance with cluster-wide scope, confirmed unauthorized access	K8s API secret enumeration, port scanning, cluster-admin abuse
MEDIUM	Suspicious patterns requiring investigation, limited-scope recon	Cross-namespace probes, outdated User-Agents, unusual external connections
LOW	Anomalies that may be benign, single-instance events	Unknown workloads, new external destinations, noisy but not malicious

Timezone

Kubeshark returns timestamps in UTC. Always convert to local time before presenting to the user. Detect the local timezone at the start (e.g., date +%Z). Present local time as primary, with UTC in parentheses: 15:03:22 IST (12:03:22 UTC).

Conversion: Kubeshark timestamps are Unix milliseconds. To convert: ms / 1000 → Unix seconds → datetime → format with timezone offset. Example: 1778534735974 → 2026-05-11 14:05:35 PDT (21:05:35 UTC).

---

SECTION A: Real-Time Analysis

Goal: Fast initial sweep using live data that's already available. No waiting for snapshot creation or dissection.

Step 1: Check What's Available

Tool: check_kubeshark_status

Confirm Kubeshark is running and which tools are available.

Step 2: Query Live Traffic

Tool: get_l7_data_boundaries

Check the time boundaries of dissected API calls in the real-time database. This tells you how far back L7 data is available — use it to understand the scope of your real-time queries before running them.

Then query the real-time dissected traffic across key dimensions. Use list_api_calls and list_l4_flows without a snapshot_id to hit the live data.

Run these queries simultaneously:

Query	KFL Filter	What You're Looking For
DNS traffic	dns	Mining domains, high-entropy subdomains, external resolution, NXDOMAIN flood
HTTP traffic	http	C2 beaconing, suspicious URLs, external destinations, anomalous headers
L4 flows	(via list_l4_flows)	External IPs, suspicious ports (3333, 4444), IMDS (169.254.169.254), fan-out patterns
PostgreSQL	postgresql	SQL injection patterns, sensitive table access
Redis	redis	Dangerous commands (CONFIG, KEYS, CLIENT LIST)

Filter by namespace if the user specified one (e.g., dns && src.pod.namespace == "k8s-mule").

Important: Real-time dissection may have incomplete data — traffic that arrived before dissection was enabled, or during gaps in coverage, won't appear. Treat Section A findings as a fast first pass, not the final word.

Step 3: Create Snapshots (Sequential — One at a Time)

While analyzing real-time data, begin creating snapshots for Section B.

Tool: get_data_boundaries

Check how far back raw capture data exists. Raw capture is the FIFO buffer that feeds snapshot creation — this tells you the time window available for snapshots (which is different from the L7 boundaries in Step 2).

CRITICAL: Create snapshots ONE AT A TIME, sequentially. Kubeshark only supports one concurrent snapshot download. Parallel creation will cause failures and data loss. The pattern is:

1. Create snapshot → wait for completion → start dissection → move to next
2. Snapshot creation is fast (seconds). Dissection is slow (minutes).
3. You do NOT need to wait for dissection before creating the next snapshot. Create the next snapshot while the previous one dissects.

Use get_data_boundaries to calculate how many snapshots are needed:

total_range_ms = newest_timestamp - oldest_timestamp
window_ms      = 240000                          # 4 minutes
num_snapshots  = ceil(total_range_ms / window_ms)

Then create snapshots in 4-minute increments, starting from the most recent:

Step 1: create_snapshot (now - 4min → now)
        → poll get_snapshot until status == "completed"
        → start_snapshot_dissection
Step 2: create_snapshot (now - 8min → now - 4min)
        → poll get_snapshot until status == "completed"
        → start_snapshot_dissection
Step 3: create_snapshot (now - 12min → now - 8min)
        → poll get_snapshot until status == "completed"
        → start_snapshot_dissection

Polling pattern: After create_snapshot, call get_snapshot with the returned snapshot ID to check status. Repeat until status == "completed". After start_snapshot_dissection, call get_snapshot_dissection_status and check until progress == 100.

4-minute windows balance snapshot size (fast to create and dissect) against coverage (captures threats with sleep cycles up to ~3 minutes). Most attack patterns in the wild repeat within 30-120 seconds.

Do not skip this step. A single short snapshot will miss threats with longer sleep cycles. The 4-minute windows ensure full coverage.

Note: Small snapshots (under ~15 minutes of traffic) often dissect in seconds rather than minutes. If dissection completes quickly, you can collapse the phased approach (immediate data first, L7 after) into a single pass through all phases.

Step 4: Present Intermediate Results

Present Section A findings to the user as intermediate results — clearly labeled as preliminary:

## Intermediate Results (Real-Time Analysis)

⚠️ These findings are based on live dissected traffic, which may have
gaps in coverage. Snapshot analysis is in progress and will provide
the complete, evidence-grade audit.

[findings table and details]

Snapshots are being created and dissected. Full report to follow.

This gives the user immediate value while snapshots process. But be explicit: the audit is not complete until Section B finishes.

---

SECTION B: Snapshot Deep Dive

Goal: Systematic, thorough analysis against immutable snapshot data. This is the evidence-grade section — complete coverage, reproducible results.

The audit is NOT done until this section completes. Snapshots must be created, dissected, and analyzed at L7 before the final report is generated. Section A may miss traffic that wasn't being dissected in real-time — Section B captures everything in the raw PCAP buffer, including traffic that real-time dissection dropped or never saw. Do not skip this section or treat Section A results as the final word.

What a Snapshot Gives You

A completed snapshot provides three independent data sources — do not wait for dissection to use the first two:

Source	Available	Tool	What It Provides
Workloads & IPs	Immediately	list_workloads with snapshot_id	Pod names, namespaces, IPs at capture time
PCAP Export	Immediately	export_snapshot_pcap	Raw packets filtered by BPF expression
L7 Dissection	After indexing	list_api_calls, get_api_call, get_api_stats	DNS queries, HTTP requests, SQL statements, Redis commands, gRPC methods

Audit Flow Per Snapshot

For each 4-minute snapshot, run the full 7-phase sweep. Start with immediate data while dissection completes:

Snapshot ready
  ├── Start dissection (background)
  ├── Phase 1: list_workloads (immediate) — workload inventory + IPs
  │            export_snapshot_pcap (immediate) — raw packet evidence
  │
  ├── [dissection completes]
  │
  ├── Phase 2: list_api_calls — DNS threat analysis
  ├── Phase 3: list_api_calls — external HTTP communication
  ├── Phase 4: list_api_calls — lateral movement, K8s API access
  ├── Phase 5: list_api_calls — protocol abuse (PG, Redis, gRPC)
  ├── Phase 6: list_api_calls — credential access (IMDS, cloud APIs)
  └── Phase 7: correlate all findings

Process snapshots in reverse chronological order (most recent first). If the first snapshot reveals enough threats, you may not need to analyze all of them.

PCAP for Deep Inspection

PCAP export happens in Phase 1b (immediately after snapshot creation). In later phases, if a new finding needs deeper packet-level analysis beyond what list_api_calls provides, export additional PCAPs using the workload IPs collected in Phase 1a:

export_snapshot_pcap(snapshot_id, bpf_filter="host <workload_ip>")

Merging Findings Across Snapshots

Threats that appear in multiple snapshots are confirmed persistent. One-time events in a single snapshot may be transient. Note which findings repeat across snapshots — persistence is a strong signal of real compromise vs. a single anomalous event.

---

Phase 1: Workload Inventory & PCAP Evidence

Goal: Identify all active workloads, collect their IPs, and export raw PCAP evidence — all before dissection completes. Data source: Immediate (no dissection needed).

1a: Workload Inventory

Tool: list_workloads with snapshot_id

Query with the target namespace (or all namespaces). The response includes pod names, namespaces, and IP addresses at capture time — these IPs are critical for building BPF filters in later phases and for correlating L4 flows to workload identities.

For each workload, note:

• Pod name and namespace
• IP address (save these — you'll need them for PCAP export and L4 analysis)
• Whether it's expected (matches known deployments)

What to flag:

• Workloads not matching any known Deployment/DaemonSet/StatefulSet
• Pods with names that mimic system components (e.g., kube-proxy-debug)
• Unexpected number of replicas or pods in the namespace

1b: PCAP Export (Immediate — No Dissection Needed)

Tool: export_snapshot_pcap with snapshot_id

PCAP export is available immediately after snapshot creation — it reads raw packets, not dissected data. Use it now to preserve evidence and get raw packet-level visibility before L7 dissection completes.

Export PCAP for every CRITICAL finding from Section A's real-time analysis. Use the workload IPs from 1a to build BPF filters:

export_snapshot_pcap(snapshot_id, bpf_filter="host <workload_ip>")

This is especially useful for:

• Verifying encrypted C2 (TLS ClientHello SNI inspection)
• Confirming Stratum mining protocol content
• Extracting DNS tunnel payloads at packet level
• Preserving forensic evidence before cluster changes

If Section A identified no CRITICAL findings yet, export a broad PCAP for the most suspicious workloads based on L4 flow analysis (Phase 3).

---

Phase 2: DNS Threat Analysis

Goal: DNS is the single most reliable indicator of compromise. Every attack that communicates externally needs DNS resolution. Sweep DNS traffic for all known threat patterns.

2a: External DNS (Non-Cluster Queries)

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: dns

Examine all DNS queries. Flag anything that is NOT *.cluster.local or *.svc.cluster.local — these are external resolutions that reveal what workloads are reaching out to.

What to flag:

Pattern	Threat	KFL Filter
Mining pool domains (minexmr, nanopool, mining-pool)	Cryptojacking	dns && dns_questions.exists(q, q.contains("minexmr"))
High-entropy subdomains (base64-like, >30 chars)	DNS tunneling / exfiltration	dns — then inspect subdomain length and entropy
DGA patterns (random .com/.net with NXDOMAIN)	C2 beaconing	dns && dns_response && size(dns_answers) == 0
DoH resolver domains (cloudflare-dns.com, dns.google)	DNS bypass / C2 channel	dns && dns_questions.exists(q, q.contains("cloudflare-dns"))
Cloud API domains (sts.amazonaws.com, s3.amazonaws.com)	Stolen credential usage	dns && dns_questions.exists(q, q.contains("amazonaws.com"))
C2/attacker domains (attacker, c2, darknet, exfil)	Command & Control	dns && dns_questions.exists(q, q.contains("c2"))

2b: DNS Query Volume and Types

High query volume from a single pod is suspicious. Also check for unusual record types:

• TXT queries to external domains → data exfiltration
• NULL queries → DNS tunneling (iodine, dnscat2)
• AXFR queries → zone transfer attempts (reconnaissance)
• SRV queries to many namespaces → service enumeration

2c: NXDOMAIN Ratio

A high NXDOMAIN ratio (>20% of queries) from a single source suggests DGA beaconing — the malware tries many generated domains, most of which don't exist.

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: dns && dns_response && size(dns_answers) == 0

Compare the count of failed queries to total queries per source pod.

---

Phase 3: External Communication

Goal: Identify all traffic leaving the cluster. Any pod connecting to external IPs or domains needs justification. Data source: L7 dissection (after indexing).

Note: L4 flow analysis for external communication is covered in Section A (Step 2) using list_l4_flows against real-time data. In Section B, use list_api_calls against dissected snapshot data for deeper L7 inspection of external traffic.

3a: HTTP External Requests

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: http && !dst.pod.namespace.startsWith("kube")

Inspect outbound HTTP requests for:

• Beaconing patterns: Regular-interval requests to the same external URL
• Suspicious User-Agents: Mozilla/4.0, curl/, empty, or malware-like
• Suspicious paths: /check?s=, /beacon, /heartbeat, /proxy?coin=
• Base64 in headers: Oversized Cookie or custom X-* headers with encoded data
• gRPC to external: Content-Type: application/grpc to non-cluster destinations
• WebSocket upgrades: Upgrade: websocket to external hosts (potential mining)

---

Phase 4: Lateral Movement

Goal: Identify pods communicating with services they shouldn't — crossing namespace boundaries, probing infrastructure, or scanning the network. Data source: L7 dissection (after indexing) for cross-namespace HTTP and API server analysis.

Note: Port scanning detection via list_l4_flows is covered in Section A (Step 2) against real-time data.

4a: Cross-Namespace Traffic

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: src.pod.namespace != dst.pod.namespace

Most pods should only talk within their namespace (and to kube-system services). Cross-namespace traffic to unexpected destinations is a lateral movement indicator.

4b: Kubernetes API Server Access

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: http && dst.port == 443 && path.startsWith("/api")

Check what pods are querying the K8s API server and what they're requesting:

API Path	Threat	Severity
/api/v1/secrets	Secret enumeration	CRITICAL
/api/v1/pods	Workload discovery	HIGH
/apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io	RBAC reconnaissance	HIGH
/api/v1/configmaps	Config enumeration	MEDIUM
/api/v1/namespaces	Namespace discovery	MEDIUM

A pod hitting multiple of these paths is performing systematic enumeration, not legitimate API access. Legitimate workloads typically access 1-2 specific resources, not sweep across resource types.

4c: Service Fingerprinting

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: http && (path == "/.env" || path == "/actuator/info" || path == "/server-info" || path == "/version")

These paths are used for service fingerprinting — mapping what software is running on internal endpoints. A pod probing multiple services with these paths is performing reconnaissance.

4d: Service Account Permission Audit via Traffic

Cross-reference Phase 4b findings (K8s API traffic) with the source pod's actual service account to determine if permissions are excessive.

For each pod making API server calls:

1. Identify the service account: From the workload inventory or via kubectl get pod <name> -n <ns> -o jsonpath='{.spec.serviceAccountName}'
2. Check what it accessed: The API paths from Phase 4b reveal what the pod actually queried (secrets, pods, RBAC, configmaps)
3. Compare against expected access: A frontend pod should never hit /api/v1/secrets. A batch-processor has no reason to query /apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1/clusterrolebindings.

What to flag:

Pattern	Threat	Severity
Pod queries secrets but its SA only needs pod read	Over-privileged SA or stolen token	HIGH
Pod hits cluster-wide endpoints (--all-namespaces style queries)	Cluster-admin binding	CRITICAL
Pod's SA is default but makes authenticated API calls	Token mounted unnecessarily	MEDIUM
Multiple pods share the same over-privileged SA	Lateral blast radius	HIGH

This converts a network finding (API traffic volume) into an actionable RBAC recommendation — telling the user exactly which ClusterRoleBinding to revoke.

4e: Cross-Namespace Threat Correlation

When port scanning or lateral movement targets IPs outside the audited namespace (e.g., IPs in the pod CIDR 10.244.x.x that don't belong to any workload in the target namespace), resolve them to identify the cross-namespace blast radius:

1. Use list_workloads (all namespaces) to map destination IPs to pods
2. Identify which namespaces are being probed
3. Flag the scope: "port scan from k8s-mule/network-diagnostics is targeting pods in default, monitoring, and kube-system"

This turns a single-namespace finding into a cluster-wide risk assessment.

---

Phase 5: Protocol Abuse

Goal: Inspect L7 payload content for attack patterns within supported protocols. This is the phase most often skipped — and where subtle threats hide.

5a: PostgreSQL Wire Protocol

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: postgresql

The postgresql_query variable contains the full SQL text. Use it to detect:

KFL Filter	Threat	Severity
postgresql && postgresql_query.contains("UNION SELECT")	SQL injection	HIGH
postgresql && postgresql_query.contains("pg_shadow")	Password hash theft	CRITICAL
postgresql && postgresql_query.contains("information_schema")	Schema enumeration	MEDIUM
postgresql && postgresql_query.contains("TRUNCATE")	Data destruction	CRITICAL
postgresql && postgresql_query.contains("DROP TABLE")	Data destruction	CRITICAL
postgresql && !postgresql_success	Failed queries (may indicate probing)	MEDIUM

Use get_api_call to inspect the full SQL content. Also check postgresql_user — queries from unexpected users are suspicious.

5b: Redis Protocol

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: redis

Use redis_type (command verb) and redis_command (full command line) to detect:

KFL Filter	Threat	Severity
redis && redis_type == "CONFIG"	Server config dump/write	HIGH
redis && redis_type == "KEYS"	Full key enumeration	HIGH
redis && redis_type == "CLIENT"	Connection enumeration	MEDIUM
redis && redis_type == "DEBUG"	Debug access	MEDIUM
redis && redis_command.contains("CONFIG SET dir")	Arbitrary file write (RCE)	CRITICAL
redis && redis_type == "FLUSHALL"	Data destruction	CRITICAL

5c: gRPC Endpoints

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: grpc

Use grpc_method to inspect method names:

KFL Filter	Threat	Severity
grpc && grpc_method.contains("Reflection")	API surface enumeration	MEDIUM
grpc && dst.name.contains("attacker")	Data exfiltration	HIGH
grpc && grpc_status != 0	Failed gRPC calls (may indicate probing)	LOW

5d: HTTP Request Anomalies

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: http

Check for:

• WebSocket upgrades to external hosts: Upgrade: websocket header — potential mining proxy or persistent C2 channel
• DNS-over-HTTPS requests: accept: application/dns-json header — DNS bypass
• AWS Signature headers: Authorization: AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 — stolen cloud creds
• IMDS-specific headers: X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds — token request

---

Phase 6: Credential Access

Goal: Detect active credential theft — IMDS access, service account abuse, cloud API exploitation.

6a: Instance Metadata Service (IMDS)

Tool: list_api_calls with KFL: dst.ip == "169.254.169.254"

Any pod connecting to this IP is attempting to steal the node's cloud credentials. Check the HTTP paths:

Path	What's Being Stolen
/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/	IAM role name
/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>	Actual AWS credentials
/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/document	Instance identity (account ID, region)
/latest/user-data	Instance bootstrap scripts (may contain secrets)
/latest/api/token (PUT)	IMDSv2 session token

6b: Service Account Token Exfiltration

Look for HTTP requests where the body or headers contain JWT tokens (strings starting with eyJ). These may be service account tokens being sent to external endpoints.

---

Phase 7: Attack Chain Correlation

Goal: Connect individual findings into a coherent attack narrative.

After completing phases 1-6, synthesize findings into an attack chain. Real attacks follow a progression:

1. INITIAL ACCESS     → How did the attacker get in?
2. RECONNAISSANCE     → Port scanning, DNS enumeration, API discovery
3. CREDENTIAL ACCESS  → IMDS theft, secret enumeration, token exfil
4. LATERAL MOVEMENT   → Cross-namespace probing, SSRF, service scanning
5. EXFILTRATION       → DNS tunneling, HTTP exfil, gRPC streaming
6. PERSISTENCE        → C2 beaconing, cryptomining (monetization)

Map each finding to a stage. If you see findings across multiple stages from the same namespace or related workloads, you've found a coordinated attack.

Output Format

Present the audit results as:

1. Workload inventory — table of all observed workloads with threat level
2. Detailed findings — one section per finding, ordered by severity
3. Attack chain summary — if findings correlate, map the kill chain
4. Immediate actions — prioritized remediation steps

---

Audit Report — Two-Stage Delivery

The audit produces two outputs — an intermediate report during Section A, and a final PDF report after Section B completes.

Stage 1: Intermediate Report (after Section A)

Present findings from real-time analysis directly in the conversation. Clearly label as preliminary. This gives the user immediate value while snapshots are being created and dissected.

Stage 2: Final PDF Report (after Section B)

This is the primary deliverable. It is generated only after all snapshots have been dissected and analyzed at L7. Do not generate the final report based on Section A alone — that would miss protocol-level threats (SQL injection, Redis abuse, gRPC exfil) that only appear after dissection.

1. Write the report as markdown: security-audit-<namespace>-<date>.md Follow the template in references/report-template.md — it defines the full structure: executive summary, threat table, detailed findings with evidence, attack chain analysis, detection coverage, and remediation.

2. Convert to PDF (in preference order):

   npx md-to-pdf security-audit-<namespace>-<date>.md    # Best quality
   pandoc security-audit-<namespace>-<date>.md -o security-audit-<namespace>-<date>.pdf
   

   If neither tool is available, leave the markdown as the deliverable.

3. The final report must include findings from both sections — Section A (real-time) and Section B (snapshot dissection). Findings confirmed by both sections are marked with higher confidence. Findings only in Section B (missed by real-time) should be noted — this reveals gaps in real-time dissection coverage.

Key Report Requirements

• Quote raw evidence — actual DNS queries, HTTP URLs, SQL statements, Redis commands. The reader must be able to verify without re-running.
• Timestamp every finding — snapshot ID + local time (UTC in parentheses).
• Specific recommendations — not "fix RBAC" but "revoke ClusterRoleBinding mule-recon-cluster-admin".
• Include MITRE ATT&CK IDs for each finding.
• Evidence preservation — list snapshot IDs, recommend cloud storage upload.

---

What Network Auditing Cannot Detect

Be transparent about blind spots. Network traffic analysis cannot detect:

• Configuration vulnerabilities: Privileged containers, missing resource limits, permissive RBAC, hostPath mounts — these are YAML-level issues with no traffic signature
• Secrets in environment variables: Hardcoded credentials don't generate network traffic until used
• Image vulnerabilities: CVEs in container images are not visible on the wire
• Idle threats: A malicious pod that hasn't started communicating yet

Recommend kubectl-based configuration auditing for these gaps. Network auditing is the complement, not the replacement, for config-level security scanning.

Threat Intelligence Reference

For detailed descriptions of all 22 network-observable threat scenarios with MITRE ATT&CK mappings and detection guidance, see references/threat-catalog.md.