code-review-recon
Build an exhaustive map of attack entry points, trust boundaries, and dangerous sinks before exploit-focused code analysis.
Codex または Claude でインストール この Prompt をコピーして Codex、Claude、または他のアシスタントに貼り付けると、Skill ページを確認してインストールできます。
メニュー
Build an exhaustive map of attack entry points, trust boundaries, and dangerous sinks before exploit-focused code analysis.
Codex または Claude でインストール この Prompt をコピーして Codex、Claude、または他のアシスタントに貼り付けると、Skill ページを確認してインストールできます。
SOC 職業分類に基づく
Elite AI/LLM exploitation specialist - prompt injection, jailbreaking, agent exploitation, RAG poisoning, multi-modal attacks, model extraction, and system prompt leakage for CTF and red team engagements
Build a full API inventory, trust-boundary map, and prioritized test matrix from specification and observed behavior.
Convert API vulnerability leads into confirmed impact or cleanly disproven outcomes with reproducible evidence.
Execute a predefined API test plan deterministically with complete request-level evidence and final verdicts.
Perform deep exploit-focused binary analysis by tracing attacker-reachable paths to validated vulnerability primitives.
Execute systematic static and dynamic binary analysis to uncover exploitable vulnerability primitives.
| name | code-review-recon |
| description | Build an exhaustive map of attack entry points, trust boundaries, and dangerous sinks before exploit-focused code analysis. |
Prevent blind spots by mapping how untrusted data enters and moves through the codebase.
code_pathlanguage_frameworkdeployment_notes (optional)| Target | Minimum Expectation |
|---|---|
| Entry points | all major ingestion vectors mapped |
| Auth boundaries | per-route enforcement identified |
| Sink categories | full inventory with owner file/function |
| Prioritized paths | top attacker-value paths ranked |
{
"entry_points": [],
"auth_boundary_map": [],
"sink_inventory": [],
"priority_trace_paths": [],
"unknowns": []
}
| Condition | Action | Evidence Requirement |
|---|---|---|
| Source passes through helper wrappers | inline helper logic into trace | wrapper-expanded path |
| Policy check exists after data fetch | test prefetch exposure and side-effects | order-of-operations trace |
| Sanitizer exists but context mismatch | craft context-correct exploit hypothesis | sink-context mismatch proof |
| Async boundary carries tainted data | trace serialization and consumer validation | producer-consumer trace |
| Sibling route has weaker guards | run parity scan across sibling handlers | guard parity matrix |