subagent-response-protocol

name	subagent-response-protocol
description	Protocol for subagent → parent responses: single fenced YAML envelope, strict caveman-ultra for compressed fields, verbatim for paths/errors/code. Applies to every `Task` invocation. Use when spawning subagents or parsing their output.

Subagent Response Protocol (thin skill — pointers only)

All subagent → parent traffic is a single fenced ```yaml block matching the canonical schema. Only the envelope is emitted; nothing else belongs in the response body. Envelope MUST be the last non-whitespace content (D6).

Sources of truth (do NOT inline elsewhere)

• Schema: ~/.config/opencode/templates/subagent-response.yml.tmpl
• Contract: ~/.config/opencode/contracts/subagent-contract-block.md (parent-injected)
• Rule: ~/.config/opencode/rules/subagent-response-protocol.md (alwaysApply: true)
• Hooks: ~/.config/opencode/hooks/subagent-protocol-{inject,lint}.sh (inject = pre-hook contract injection; lint = pre-commit drift check)
• Runbook: <project>/.opencode/docs/runbooks/subagent-protocol.md (author here; optional org template ~/.config/opencode/docs/runbooks/subagent-protocol.md when stowed)

The pre-commit lint blocks drift on distinctive schema and contract phrases — the skill, rule, and agent files must xref by path instead of copy-pasting.

Compression classes (see template for field list)

• Verbatim (never compressed): paths, line numbers, error strings, code, fix snippets, status enum, _marker, schema_version, reported_by[].
• Caveman-ultra (mandatory): summary, non-security findings[].note, next_actions[], open_questions[].
• Security-autoclarity (forced normal): findings whose category matches the security regex in the rule body §5.2, OR severity >= high, OR status ∈ {blocked, error} with security-adjacent agent. Negations stay literal.

Forbidden in compressed fields (D5, D7, D11)

• Raw secrets (use <REDACTED:TYPE> or <REF:artifacts[i]#L42> placeholders).
• Triple backticks inside string values. HTML tags (script, iframe, img with on*, style, object, embed, link, svg with on*, math).
• YAML doc separators (--- on its own line) inside multiline scalars.
• javascript: / data: URL schemes.
• Content copied verbatim from WebFetch / Shell / MCP tool output — must live in artifacts[] as file references.

Pre-emission redaction checklist

1. Before writing any string value, scan for raw secret patterns (AWS, Slack, Anthropic, OpenAI, Stripe, GitHub, GitLab, npm, Figma, Twilio, SendGrid, Google, JWT, URL userinfo, Bearer headers, private keys).
2. Replace matches with <REDACTED:TYPE> or a reference into artifacts[i].
3. Prefer file references for large or sensitive blobs over inlined text.
4. Never echo tool output verbatim into summary/findings[].note.

Post-compression fuzzy redaction (parent-side, rule-driven)

Parents MUST scan every string value of an incoming envelope with whitespace-and-separator-insensitive regex for the secret patterns listed above, plus a Shannon-entropy ≥ 4.0 heuristic (with UUID v4 and hex-40 SHA allowlist). On match: (a) quarantine the raw response to ~/ai-brain/projects/<name>/explore-dumps/<task-id>.md when that root exists, overflow path is ~/ai-brain/projects/<name>/explore-dumps/<task-id>.md only; (b) rewrite the envelope to status: malformed with degraded_reason: "suspected_secret_in_output", and (c) record the incident in the runbook. Treat the raw match as already leaked for incident-response purposes and rotate the credential.

Anti-duplication refs

• Entries in artifacts[] must encode large blobs as ASCII tokens: <REF:path#sha256:<64 hex>#size:<bytes>> — see templates/subagent-response.yml.tmpl.
• Parent Task briefs obey templates/agent-task-spec-v1.yml.tmpl + hooks/subagent-task-antidup-preflight.sh when orchestration-policies toggle strict mode (configurations/orchestration-policies/anti-dup.yml).

Examples (pointer-only; full envelope lives in template)

good — normal staff-engineer review

Structure: ok envelope, findings[] with category: structure, note in caveman-ultra ("rename ok. circular import via session → auth."), reported_by: ["staff-engineer"], fix verbatim.

good — security finding

Structure: blocked envelope with category: authn, note in full clarity prose, secret value replaced by <REDACTED:SESSION_TOKEN> with artifact ref, forced-normal clarity per rule §5.2.

bad — prose outside fence

Model writes a paragraph of explanation AFTER the closing ```. Parent parse step 1 rejects via "non-whitespace content after closing fence" and issues a single reformat-only retry.

bad — secret leak via caveman abbreviation

Model writes summary: "rotate AKIA...14 chars...; fix logger". Parent parse step 5 (fuzzy redaction) matches the AWS key pattern, quarantines the raw response, and rewrites to status: malformed, degraded_reason: "suspected_secret_in_output".

When this skill applies

• You are spawning a subagent via the Task tool → the contract is injected by the pre-hook (subagent-protocol-inject.sh); you do not need to duplicate it.
• You are a subagent responding to a parent → emit exactly the envelope, no more.
• You are a parent (cto, code-reviewer, tech-lead) synthesizing child output → follow the 8-step parent parse contract in the rule body (detect → validate → retry → stub → fuzzy-redact → strip _marker → aggregate → synthesize). Never forward _marker or raw child YAML to the user.