| name | autospec-secaudit |
| description | Use when the user wants to scan generated code for security vulnerabilities, secret/credential leaks, IP/copyright/license violations, PII/data leaks, SQL injection, prompt injection, and backdoors. Runs as `/autospec-secaudit` (manual repo-wide sweep) or auto-fires after each autospec-run batch unless `~/.autospec/no-secaudit.flag` exists. Also powers the blocking Phase 4 per-PR gate. |
Self-update mode
Decide this purely from the request text the harness handed you. Do NOT
shell out to test the user's free-form request. Read the request, normalize
it in your reasoning (collapse whitespace, trim, lowercase), and if the result is
exactly update, this skill enters self-update mode and does NOT run the
normal pipeline.
- Detect harness by checking which install path exists for this skill:
- Claude Code:
~/.claude/skills/autospec-secaudit/SKILL.md
- OpenCode:
~/.config/opencode/agent/autospec-secaudit.md
- Codex CLI:
~/.codex/prompts/autospec-secaudit.md
- Re-install from
main by piping the canonical installer:
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/berlinguyinca/autospec/main/bootstrap.sh | bash -s -- --skill all --harness all --update
Run this one-liner once; it refreshes all autospec skills across all harnesses.
- Show the diff between the prior installed file(s) and the freshly fetched copy.
Stop mode
If the normalized request is exactly stop (or matches ^\s*stop(\s+--\w+)*\s*$),
do NOT run the pipeline. Write ~/.autospec/stop.flag so any running autospec
monitor halts after the current issue, then report that the stop sentinel was
written and exit.
Required capabilities & harness adapter
| Capability | Claude Code | OpenCode | Codex CLI | Fallback if missing |
|---|
| Subagent model tier | Tier A: opus + ultrathink | Tier A: top-tier task + max reasoning | Tier A: gpt-5.1-codex + reasoning_effort=high | Fall back UP on unavailability |
| Subagent dispatch policy | per AGENTS.md decision matrix | per AGENTS.md decision matrix | per AGENTS.md decision matrix | inline if subagents unavailable |
| Deterministic scanners | gitleaks, semgrep, trivy, license-checker via ensure-tool.sh | same | same | LLM-only fallback per missing scanner (loud WARN) |
Triage runs on the spec-work tier. Model tier: TIER_A — confirm/triage
findings with the top-tier reasoning model for the active harness (see row above).
Harness detection (run once at skill start, before the pipeline)
Detect your harness by checking available tools before scanning:
-
Claude Code — the Agent tool with a subagent_type parameter is available.
TIER_A = opus + ultrathink (model ID: claude-opus-4-7)TIER_B = sonnet (model ID: claude-sonnet-4-6)
-
OpenCode — a task tool with model/tier configuration is available (no subagent_type).
TIER_A = top-tier task model + high reasoningTIER_B = smaller-tier task model + medium reasoning
-
Codex CLI — neither Agent nor a configurable task tool is available; apply_patch is the primary edit tool.
TIER_A = current top GPT model + reasoning_effort=highTIER_B = gpt-5.1-codex-spark + reasoning_effort=medium
Fallback rule: If TIER_B is not available in your harness (model unknown, quota/capacity failure, authorization failure, or tool call returns an error for that model), silently retry the same dispatch with TIER_A. Preserve the parent context on retry; for Codex native subagents, fork/inherit the current conversation context and use the latest top GPT model instead of moving the work into the main session. Never ask the user.
Security triage runs on TIER_A. Hold TIER_A and TIER_B for the entire skill run.
When to invoke
- Manually:
/autospec-secaudit for a repo-wide sweep of the working tree.
- Automatically: auto-fires after each
/autospec-run batch unless
~/.autospec/no-secaudit.flag exists.
- As the Phase 4 gate engine (invoked by the implementer, not by a skill call).
Pipeline
- Ensure scanners —
ensure-tool.sh gitleaks semgrep trivy license-checker
(best-effort; a failed install degrades that concern to LLM-only with a loud
WARN — never silently skipped).
- Scan — run
security-scan.sh --tree (sweep) or --diff <base> (branch).
Findings are emitted as gap JSON objects:
{gap_id,dimension,severity,file,line,title,body,dedupe_key}.
- LLM triage (Tier A) — for each finding: confirm real vs false-positive;
ADD findings scanners miss (PII in logs, prompt-injection sinks where
untrusted input reaches an LLM call, contextual backdoors). Assign final
severity (must-fix / nice-to-have).
- Report — write
.autospec/secaudit.md summarizing findings by dimension
with file:line and remediation. Loudly list any scanner that fell back to
LLM-only.
- File survivors — must-fix survivors above threshold are filed as
auto-implement,security,priority:high issues via the gap-filing path so
they re-enter autospec. dedupe_key prevents re-filing across batches.
Enforcement defaults
| Concern | dimension | Phase 4 gate | Auto-fix |
|---|
| Secrets / credentials | secrets | block | redact + flag rotation |
| Vulns / SQLi / cmd-injection / backdoors | vuln | block | yes, re-scan |
| Prompt injection | injection | advisory (deterministic; LLM triage blocks) | yes, re-scan |
| PII / data leaks | pii | advisory (deterministic; LLM triage blocks) | yes, re-scan |
| IP / copyright / license | license | advisory (deterministic; LLM triage blocks) | advisory fix (human confirms) |
| Dependency CVEs | cve | advisory (block only critical+fixable) | bump if trivial |
Finalization
Print the report path and a one-line summary:
secaudit: must-fix=<N> advisory=<N> scanners-degraded=<list>.
