macos-security-bypass

name	macos-security-bypass
description	macOS security bypass playbook. Use when targeting macOS endpoints and need to bypass TCC, Gatekeeper, SIP, sandbox, code signing, or entitlement-based protections during authorized red team or pentest engagements.

SKILL: macOS Security Bypass — Expert Attack Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert macOS security bypass techniques. Covers TCC bypass, Gatekeeper evasion, SIP restrictions, sandbox escape, and entitlement abuse. Base models miss version-specific bypass nuances and protection interaction effects.

0. RELATED ROUTING

Before going deep, consider loading:

• macos-process-injection when you need dylib injection, XPC exploitation, or Electron abuse after achieving initial access
• linux-privilege-escalation for Unix-layer privesc techniques that also apply to macOS (SUID, cron, writable paths)
• linux-security-bypass for shared Unix security bypass concepts

Advanced Reference

Also load TCC_BYPASS_MATRIX.md when you need:

• Per-macOS-version TCC bypass mapping
• Protection-type-specific techniques (Camera, Microphone, FDA, Automation)
• MDM/configuration profile abuse patterns

---

1. TCC (TRANSPARENCY, CONSENT, CONTROL) OVERVIEW

TCC is macOS's permission framework controlling access to sensitive resources (camera, microphone, contacts, full disk access, etc.).

1.1 TCC Database Locations

Database	Path	Controls	Protection
User-level	~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db	Per-user consent decisions	SIP-protected since Catalina
System-level	/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db	System-wide consent decisions	SIP-protected
MDM-managed	Via configuration profiles	Push PPPC (Privacy Preferences Policy Control)	Device management

-- Query TCC database (requires FDA or SIP off)
sqlite3 ~/Library/Application\ Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db \
  "SELECT service, client, allowed FROM access;"

1.2 TCC Bypass Categories

Category	Mechanism	Typical Prerequisite
FDA app exploitation	Piggyback on apps already granted Full Disk Access	Write access to FDA app's bundle or plugin dir
Direct DB modification	Edit TCC.db to grant consent	SIP disabled or FDA
Inherited permissions	Child process inherits parent's TCC grants	Code execution in context of FDA-granted app
Automation abuse	Apple Events / osascript to control TCC-granted app	Automation permission (lower bar than direct TCC)
Mounting tricks	Mount a crafted disk image containing modified TCC.db	Local access, pre-Ventura
SQL injection in TCC	Malformed bundle IDs triggering SQL injection in TCC subsystem	CVE-2023-32364 and similar

1.3 Known TCC Bypass Patterns

Terminal / iTerm FDA inheritance: Terminal.app granted FDA → any command run inherits FDA → read any file.

# If Terminal has FDA, this reads protected files directly
cat ~/Library/Mail/V*/MailData/Envelope\ Index
cat ~/Library/Messages/chat.db

Finder automation: Automate Finder (lower permission bar) to access files in protected locations.

tell application "Finder"
  set f to POSIX file "/Users/target/Library/Mail/V9/MailData/Envelope Index"
  duplicate f to desktop
end tell

System Preferences / System Settings injection: Inject into a process that already has TCC permissions by writing to its Application Scripts folder.

MDM profile abuse: PPPC profiles can pre-approve TCC permissions. Rogue MDM enrollment or compromised MDM server → push PPPC payload.

---

2. GATEKEEPER BYPASS

Gatekeeper blocks unsigned or unnotarized apps from executing. Core enforcement depends on the com.apple.quarantine extended attribute.

2.1 Quarantine Attribute Removal

# Check quarantine attribute
xattr -l /path/to/app
# Output: com.apple.quarantine: 0083;...

# Remove quarantine (requires write access)
xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/app
# Recursive for app bundles
xattr -rd com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app

2.2 Bypass Techniques

Technique	How It Works	macOS Version
xattr -d removal	Remove quarantine before execution	All (requires local access)
App translocation bypass	Apps in certain locations skip translocation	Pre-Catalina
Archive tools that strip quarantine	Some unarchiver apps don't propagate quarantine	Varies by tool
Unsigned code in signed bundle	Notarized app bundles with unsigned nested helpers	Pre-Ventura (CVE-2022-42821)
Safari auto-extract + open	Downloaded ZIP auto-extracted, app opened before quarantine fully applied	Safari-specific, patched
ACL abuse	com.apple.quarantine can be blocked by ACLs set before download	Requires pre-positioning
Disk image (DMG) tricks	DMG mounted from network share may not carry quarantine	Network share context
BOM (Bill of Materials) bypass	Crafted BOM in pkg skips quarantine for extracted files	CVE-2022-22616

2.3 Gatekeeper Check Flow

App launched
│
├── com.apple.quarantine attribute present?
│   ├── No → execute (no Gatekeeper check)
│   └── Yes ↓
│
├── Code signature valid?
│   ├── No → block
│   └── Yes ↓
│
├── Notarized (stapled ticket or online check)?
│   ├── No → block (Catalina+)
│   └── Yes → execute
│
└── User override? (right-click → Open → confirm)
    └── Bypasses Gatekeeper once for this app

---

3. SIP (SYSTEM INTEGRITY PROTECTION)

SIP restricts root from modifying protected system locations, loading unsigned kernel extensions, and debugging system processes.

3.1 SIP-Protected Locations

/System/
/usr/ (except /usr/local/)
/bin/
/sbin/
/var/ (selected subdirs)
/Applications/ (pre-installed Apple apps)

3.2 SIP Status & Configuration

csrutil status              # Check SIP status
csrutil disable             # Recovery Mode only
csrutil enable --without fs # Partial disable (risky)

3.3 Entitlements That Bypass SIP

Entitlement	Effect
com.apple.rootless.install	Write to SIP-protected paths
com.apple.rootless.install.heritable	Child processes inherit SIP bypass
com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory	JIT/unsigned code in memory
com.apple.private.security.clear-library-validation	Load unsigned libraries

3.4 Historical SIP Bypasses

CVE	macOS	Technique
CVE-2021-30892 (Shrootless)	Monterey pre-12.0.1	system_installd + post-install script in signed pkg
CVE-2022-22583	Monterey pre-12.2	packagekit + mount point manipulation
CVE-2022-46689 (MacDirtyCow)	Ventura pre-13.1	Race condition on copy-on-write, overwrite SIP files
CVE-2023-32369 (Migraine)	Ventura pre-13.4	Migration Assistant TCC/SIP bypass via systemmigrationd
CVE-2024-44243	Sequoia pre-15.2	StorageKit daemon exploitation

---

4. SANDBOX ESCAPE

macOS sandboxing (App Sandbox, via sandbox-exec or entitlements) restricts app access to filesystem, network, and IPC.

4.1 Office Sandbox Escape Patterns

Vector	Description
Open/Save dialog abuse	User grants file access via dialog → macro reads/writes beyond sandbox
~/Library/LaunchAgents/ persistence	Some sandbox profiles allow writing LaunchAgent plists
Login Items manipulation	Add login item pointing to payload outside sandbox
Shared container exploitation	Multiple apps sharing the same App Group container

4.2 IPC-Based Escape

IPC Mechanism	Escape Vector
XPC Services	Connect to privileged XPC service with insufficient client validation
Mach Ports	Obtain send right to privileged task port
Apple Events	Automate unsandboxed app to perform actions
Distributed Notifications	Signal unsandboxed helper to execute payload
Pasteboard	Write payload to pasteboard, have unsandboxed app consume it

4.3 Browser Sandbox

• Chromium: Multi-process model, renderer is sandboxed, browser process is not
• Safari: WebContent process sandboxed, parent Safari process has more privileges
• Exploit chain: renderer RCE → sandbox escape (via IPC bug to browser process) → system access

---

5. CODE SIGNING & ENTITLEMENTS

5.1 Inspecting Signatures and Entitlements

codesign -dv --verbose=4 /path/to/app       # Signature details
codesign -d --entitlements :- /path/to/app   # Dump entitlements
security cms -D -i /path/to/mobileprovision  # Provisioning profile

# Verify signature validity
codesign --verify --deep --strict /path/to/app
spctl --assess --type execute /path/to/app   # Gatekeeper assessment

5.2 Entitlement Abuse for Privilege Escalation

Entitlement	Abuse Scenario
com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation	Load attacker dylib into entitled process
com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables	DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES injection
com.apple.security.get-task-allow	Attach debugger, inject code
com.apple.security.cs.debugger	Debug any process
com.apple.private.apfs.revert-to-snapshot	Revert APFS snapshots, bypass modifications

5.3 Hardened Runtime Bypass

Hardened Runtime prevents: DYLD env vars, debugging, unsigned memory execution. Bypasses:

• Find entitled apps that weaken Hardened Runtime (disable-library-validation)
• Exploit JIT-entitled apps (browsers, VMs) for unsigned code execution
• Use get-task-allow entitled debug builds left in production

5.4 Library Validation Bypass

Library validation ensures only Apple-signed or same-team-signed dylibs load.

# Find apps with library validation disabled
codesign -d --entitlements :- /Applications/*.app/Contents/MacOS/* 2>/dev/null | \
  grep -l "disable-library-validation"

---

6. PERSISTENCE AFTER BYPASS

Method	Location	Survives Reboot	Notes
LaunchAgent	~/Library/LaunchAgents/	Yes	User-level, runs at login
LaunchDaemon	/Library/LaunchDaemons/	Yes	Root-level, runs at boot
Login Items	~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/	Yes	Visible in System Settings
Cron	crontab -e	Yes	Often overlooked by defenders
Dylib hijack	Writable dylib search path	Yes	Triggered when target app launches
Folder Action	~/Library/Scripts/Folder Action Scripts/	Yes	Triggers on folder events

---

7. macOS SECURITY BYPASS DECISION TREE

Target is macOS endpoint
│
├── Need to execute untrusted binary?
│   ├── Quarantine attribute present?
│   │   ├── Yes → xattr -d com.apple.quarantine (§2.1)
│   │   └── No → execute directly
│   └── Gatekeeper still blocks?
│       ├── Signed but not notarized → right-click → Open override
│       └── Unsigned → embed in signed bundle or use archive tricks (§2.2)
│
├── Need access to TCC-protected resources?
│   ├── FDA-granted app available?
│   │   ├── Yes → exploit FDA app context (§1.3)
│   │   └── No ↓
│   ├── Automation permission obtainable?
│   │   ├── Yes → Apple Events to TCC-granted app (§1.3)
│   │   └── No ↓
│   ├── SIP disabled?
│   │   ├── Yes → direct TCC.db modification (§1.2)
│   │   └── No → check version-specific TCC bypass (→ TCC_BYPASS_MATRIX.md)
│   └── MDM present?
│       └── Compromised MDM → push PPPC profile (§1.3)
│
├── Need to bypass SIP?
│   ├── Check macOS version → historical SIP CVE? (§3.4)
│   ├── Find entitled Apple binary → piggyback SIP-bypass entitlement (§3.3)
│   └── Recovery Mode access? → csrutil disable (§3.2)
│
├── Need sandbox escape?
│   ├── Office macro context → dialog/LaunchAgent tricks (§4.1)
│   ├── XPC service with weak validation → IPC escape (§4.2)
│   └── Browser context → renderer → sandbox escape chain (§4.3)
│
├── Need to inject into signed process?
│   ├── disable-library-validation entitlement? → dylib injection
│   ├── allow-dyld-environment-variables? → DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES
│   ├── get-task-allow? → debugger attach
│   └── None → check macos-process-injection SKILL.md
│
└── Need persistence?
    └── Choose method by access level (§6)

---

8. QUICK REFERENCE: TOOL COMMANDS

# Enumerate TCC permissions
tccutil reset All                              # Reset all TCC (admin)
sqlite3 TCC.db "SELECT * FROM access;"         # Read TCC DB

# Gatekeeper status
spctl --status                                 # Gatekeeper enabled?
spctl --assess -v /path/to/app                 # Check app assessment

# SIP status
csrutil status

# Find interesting entitlements across system
find /System/Applications /Applications -name "*.app" -exec sh -c \
  'codesign -d --entitlements :- "$1" 2>/dev/null | grep -q "disable-library-validation" && echo "$1"' _ {} \;

# List loaded kexts (kernel extensions)
kextstat | grep -v com.apple

# Sandbox profile inspection
sandbox-exec -p "(version 1)(allow default)" /bin/ls  # Test sandbox rules