secure-coding

name	secure-coding
description	Comprehensive secure coding practices covering input validation, authentication, authorization, cryptography, secrets management, and error handling. Provides actionable code examples and checklists for building security into every stage of development.
metadata	{"author":"cosmicstack-labs","version":"1.0.0","category":"security","tags":["secure-coding","input-validation","authentication","authorization","cryptography","xss-prevention","secrets-management","owasp","rbac","jwt","oauth2"]}

Secure Coding Skill

Writing code that is resistant to attack requires intentional practices at every layer. This skill covers the fundamental security patterns every developer should implement: input validation, authentication, authorization, cryptography, secrets management, and error handling.

---

Core Principles

1. Never Trust User Input

All input is guilty until proven innocent. Validate, sanitize, and parameterize every piece of data that crosses a trust boundary — HTTP requests, file uploads, database queries, API calls, message queue payloads.

2. Fail Securely

When something goes wrong, the default behavior should be denial, not access. An error should reject the request, log the event, and return minimal information to the user.

3. Defense in Depth

No single control is sufficient. If input validation fails, parameterized queries should prevent injection. If authentication is bypassed, authorization should block access. Layer your defenses.

4. Keep Security Simple

Complex cryptography, custom authentication schemes, and convoluted permission models are more likely to have bugs. Use well-vetted libraries. Do not roll your own crypto.

5. Least Privilege

Every component, function, and user should have the minimum permissions required to do its job. Apply this to database accounts, API keys, file permissions, and cloud IAM roles.

6. Secure by Default

Features should be secure out of the box. Developers should have to explicitly weaken security, not opt into it. Default deny, not default allow.

7. Don't Expose Internals

Error messages, stack traces, debug endpoints, and internal IPs should never reach the client. What the user doesn't know, they can't exploit.

---

Secure Coding Checklist

Use this checklist during code review and development:

Pre-Commit

• All user input validated (type, length, format, range)
• SQL queries use parameterized statements (no string concatenation)
• No secrets in source code (API keys, passwords, tokens)
• Authentication tokens are not logged
• Output is encoded for the target context (HTML, JS, CSS, URL)
• File uploads validated: extension, MIME type, file size
• No debug endpoints or admin panels accessible without auth

Authentication

• Passwords hashed with bcrypt/argon2/scrypt (not MD5, SHA1, SHA256)
• Password policies enforced (minimum length > complexity)
• MFA available for sensitive operations
• Session tokens are cryptographically random and HTTP-only
• Session timeout enforced (idle + absolute)
• Login rate-limited (account lockout after N failures)
• JWTs signed with RS256/ES256 (not none algorithm, not HS256 with weak secret)

Authorization

• Every API endpoint verifies user permissions
• No IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) — users can't access others' data
• Role checks on server side, not just in the frontend
• Principle of least privilege applied to service accounts

Cryptography

• TLS 1.2+ enforced (no SSL, no TLS 1.0/1.1)
• HSTS header configured
• Data encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM or equivalent)
• Data encrypted in transit (TLS)
• Keys stored in a secrets manager, not in code or config files

Error Handling

• Generic error messages to users (no stack traces)
• Detailed errors logged server-side
• Unhandled exceptions don't leak system information

Dependencies

• SCA (Software Composition Analysis) run on dependencies
• No known vulnerable libraries (check against CVE database)
• Minimal dependency footprint — fewer deps = fewer attack vectors

---

Input Validation

Input validation is the first line of defense against injection, XSS, and data corruption attacks.

Allowlist vs. Denylist

Approach	Strategy	Example	Recommendation
Allowlist	Only permit known-good input	^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$	✅ Always preferred
Denylist	Block known-bad input	Block ', ", ;, --	❌ Easy to bypass

Why allowlist wins: Denylists are incomplete. Attackers constantly find new payloads. An allowlist says "you can only send what we expect" — everything else is rejected.

# ❌ Denylist (bad)
def validate_username(username):
    forbidden = ["'", "\"", ";", "--", "DROP", "SELECT"]
    for char in forbidden:
        if char in username:
            raise ValueError("Invalid characters")
    return username  # Still vulnerable to edge cases

# ✅ Allowlist (good)
import re

def validate_username(username):
    if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_]{3,32}$', username):
        raise ValueError("Username must be 3-32 alphanumeric characters or underscores")
    return username

Sanitization

Sanitize (clean) data when you must accept a broader range of input but still need to prevent injection.

# HTML sanitization (prevent stored XSS)
import bleach

def sanitize_comment(html_content):
    allowed_tags = ['b', 'i', 'em', 'strong', 'a']
    allowed_attrs = {'a': ['href', 'title']}
    return bleach.clean(
        html_content,
        tags=allowed_tags,
        attributes=allowed_attrs,
        strip=True
    )

Parameterized Queries

Never use string interpolation for SQL. Always use parameterized queries / prepared statements.

# ❌ Vulnerable to SQL injection
def get_user_bad(db, user_id):
    query = f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '{user_id}'"
    return db.execute(query)

# ✅ Safe with parameterized query
def get_user_good(db, user_id):
    query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = %s"
    return db.execute(query, (user_id,))

# ✅ Safe with ORM (SQLAlchemy)
def get_user_orm(session, user_id):
    return session.query(User).filter(User.id == user_id).first()

// ❌ Vulnerable (MongoDB NoSQL injection)
app.get('/user/:id', (req, res) => {
  db.collection('users').find({ username: req.params.id }).toArray(...)
  // Attacker sends: { "$ne": "" } → returns all users
})

// ✅ Safe (type check)
app.get('/user/:id', (req, res) => {
  if (typeof req.params.id !== 'string') throw new Error('Invalid input')
  db.collection('users').findOne({ username: req.params.id })
})

File Upload Validation

import os
import magic  # python-magic for MIME detection

ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS = {'.jpg', '.jpeg', '.png', '.pdf'}
MAX_FILE_SIZE = 5 * 1024 * 1024  # 5MB

def validate_file_upload(file):
    # 1. Check file extension
    ext = os.path.splitext(file.filename)[1].lower()
    if ext not in ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS:
        raise ValueError(f"Extension {ext} not allowed")

    # 2. Check MIME type (actual content, not just header)
    mime_type = magic.from_buffer(file.read(2048), mime=True)
    if mime_type not in ['image/jpeg', 'image/png', 'application/pdf']:
        raise ValueError(f"MIME type {mime_type} not allowed")

    # 3. Check file size
    file.seek(0, os.SEEK_END)
    size = file.tell()
    if size > MAX_FILE_SIZE:
        raise ValueError("File exceeds maximum size")

    file.seek(0)  # Reset for reading
    return file

---

Authentication

Password Hashing

Never store passwords in plaintext or with simple hashes. Use slow, salted algorithms.

import bcrypt

# Hashing
password = b"super_secret_password123"
salt = bcrypt.gensalt(rounds=12)  # Cost factor: 12 (adjust for performance)
hashed = bcrypt.hashpw(password, salt)

# Verification
if bcrypt.checkpw(password, hashed):
    print("Password matches")

// Node.js with bcrypt
const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');

async function hashPassword(password) {
  const salt = await bcrypt.genSalt(12);  // Cost factor
  return await bcrypt.hash(password, salt);
}

async function verifyPassword(password, hash) {
  return await bcrypt.compare(password, hash);
}

Algorithm	Recommended	Notes
bcrypt	✅ Yes	Industry standard. Cost factor ≥ 10.
argon2	✅ Yes	Winner of Password Hashing Competition. Best modern choice.
scrypt	✅ Yes	Memory-hard. Good for environments where argon2 not available.
PBKDF2	⚠️ Acceptable	Only with high iteration count (≥ 600k). No memory hardness.
SHA-256	❌ No	Fast — trivial to brute force.
MD5	❌ No	Broken. Do not use.

JWT (JSON Web Tokens)

import jwt
from datetime import datetime, timedelta

SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get("JWT_SECRET")  # Never hardcode!

def create_token(user_id, role):
    payload = {
        "sub": user_id,
        "role": role,
        "iat": datetime.utcnow(),
        "exp": datetime.utcnow() + timedelta(hours=1),
        "jti": os.urandom(16).hex()  # Unique token ID for revocation
    }
    return jwt.encode(payload, SECRET_KEY, algorithm="RS256")

def verify_token(token):
    try:
        payload = jwt.decode(
            token,
            PUBLIC_KEY,  # RS256 uses asymmetric keys
            algorithms=["RS256"],
            options={"require": ["exp", "iat", "jti"]}
        )
        return payload
    except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
        raise AuthError("Token expired")
    except jwt.InvalidTokenError:
        raise AuthError("Invalid token")

JWT security checklist:

• ✅ Use RS256 or ES256 (asymmetric). Avoid HS256 — if the secret leaks, all tokens are forgeable.
• ✅ Set short expiration (15-60 minutes). Use refresh tokens for long sessions.
• ✅ Validate exp, iat, nbf, iss, aud claims.
• ✅ Never accept the alg: "none" header.
• ❌ Don't store sensitive data in the payload (it's base64-encoded, not encrypted).

OAuth2

# OAuth2 Authorization Code Flow (recommended)
# Step 1: Redirect user to authorization URL
authorization_url = (
    f"https://provider.com/oauth2/authorize?"
    f"response_type=code&"
    f"client_id={CLIENT_ID}&"
    f"redirect_uri={REDIRECT_URI}&"
    f"scope=openid%20profile&"
    f"state={crypto_random_state}"
)

# Step 2: Exchange authorization code for tokens
def exchange_code_for_token(code):
    response = requests.post(
        "https://provider.com/oauth2/token",
        data={
            "grant_type": "authorization_code",
            "code": code,
            "redirect_uri": REDIRECT_URI,
            "client_id": CLIENT_ID,
            "client_secret": CLIENT_SECRET,
        }
    )
    return response.json()  # Contains access_token, refresh_token, id_token

# Step 3: Use access token
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {access_token}"}
response = requests.get("https://api.example.com/user", headers=headers)

OAuth2 best practices:

• ✅ Always use Authorization Code Flow (never Implicit Flow).
• ✅ Validate the state parameter to prevent CSRF.
• ✅ Use PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) for public clients.
• ✅ Validate aud (audience) and iss (issuer) in the ID token.
• ✅ Rotate refresh tokens.

Session Management

import secrets
import redis

class SessionManager:
    def __init__(self, redis_client):
        self.redis = redis_client

    def create_session(self, user_id, ttl=3600):
        session_id = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)  # Cryptographically random
        session_data = {
            "user_id": user_id,
            "created_at": time.time(),
            "ip_address": request.remote_addr,
            "user_agent": request.user_agent.string
        }
        self.redis.setex(
            f"session:{session_id}",
            ttl,
            json.dumps(session_data)
        )
        return session_id

    def get_session(self, session_id):
        data = self.redis.get(f"session:{session_id}")
        if data:
            return json.loads(data)
        return None

    def destroy_session(self, session_id):
        self.redis.delete(f"session:{session_id}")

    def rotate_session(self, old_session_id, user_id):
        self.destroy_session(old_session_id)
        return self.create_session(user_id)

Session security checklist:

• ✅ Generate session IDs with secrets.token_urlsafe() (at least 32 bytes).
• ✅ Set HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite=Lax (or Strict) on cookies.
• ✅ Implement absolute timeout (e.g., 24h) and idle timeout (e.g., 30min).
• ✅ Rotate session ID on login and privilege escalation.
• ✅ Provide a logout mechanism that destroys the server-side session.

---

Authorization

RBAC (Role-Based Access Control)

from functools import wraps

ROLES = {
    "admin": ["read", "write", "delete", "manage_users"],
    "editor": ["read", "write"],
    "viewer": ["read"],
}

def require_permission(permission):
    def decorator(func):
        @wraps(func)
        def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
            user_role = get_current_user().role
            if permission not in ROLES.get(user_role, []):
                raise PermissionError("Insufficient permissions")
            return func(*args, **kwargs)
        return wrapper
    return decorator

# Usage
@require_permission("delete")
def delete_post(post_id):
    # Only admins can reach here
    Post.delete(post_id)

ABAC (Attribute-Based Access Control)

ABAC evaluates policies based on user attributes, resource attributes, and environment attributes.

# Policy: A user can view a document if:
#   - They are the owner, OR
#   - They are in the same department AND document access level <= user's clearance

def can_access_document(user, document):
    # Attribute checks
    if user.id == document.owner_id:
        return True

    if user.department == document.department:
        if document.classification == "public":
            return True
        if document.classification == "internal" and user.clearance >= 1:
            return True
        if document.classification == "confidential" and user.clearance >= 2:
            return True

    return False

Principle of Least Privilege

# ❌ Over-privileged service account
database_user = "app_admin"  # Has full DDL/DML access
# If compromised, attacker can drop tables

# ✅ Least privilege service account
database_user = "app_worker"  # Only has SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE on specific tables
# GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE ON app.users TO 'app_worker';
# GRANT SELECT, INSERT ON app.orders TO 'app_worker';
# No DELETE, no DROP, no access to other databases

# ❌ Full admin API key
api_key = "sk-XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"  # Full access, no restrictions

# ✅ Scoped API key
# Create with restricted scope: only read access to users endpoint
# Rate limited, IP-restricted, no billing access

---

Output Encoding (XSS Prevention)

Context-aware encoding prevents Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) by ensuring user data is treated as data, not code.

HTML Context

import html

user_input = "<script>alert('xss')</script>"
safe_output = html.escape(user_input)
# Result: &lt;script&gt;alert(&#x27;xss&#x27;)&lt;/script&gt;

JavaScript Context

// ❌ Unsafe
element.innerHTML = userInput;

// ✅ Safe - text content
element.textContent = userInput;

// ✅ Safe - DOM API
const node = document.createTextNode(userInput);
element.appendChild(node);

// ❌ Never do this
const script = `const name = "${userInput}";`;  // Injection vector
eval(script);

URL Context

// ❌ Unsafe
const url = `https://example.com?redirect=${userInput}`;
window.location.href = url;  // XSS via javascript:alert(1)

// ✅ Safe - validate and encode
function safeRedirect(url) {
  const parsed = new URL(url);
  if (parsed.protocol !== 'https:') {
    throw new Error('Only HTTPS URLs allowed');
  }
  return encodeURI(url);
}

Template Engine Auto-Escaping

# Jinja2 (Python) - autoescaping enabled by default in Flask
# {{ user_input }} → automatically HTML-escaped
# {{ user_input | safe }} → DISABLES escaping (use with caution)
# {% autoescape false %} → NEVER do this

# React/JSX - auto-escaping built in
// {userInput} → React escapes by default
// dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: userInput }} → ONLY for trusted HTML

Content Security Policy (CSP)

# HTTP header: Content-Security-Policy
csp_header = (
    "default-src 'self'; "
    "script-src 'self' https://cdn.example.com; "
    "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; "
    "img-src 'self' data:; "
    "object-src 'none'; "
    "frame-ancestors 'none'; "
    "base-uri 'self'"
)

# This prevents:
# - Inline scripts (unless 'unsafe-inline' is set)
# - Loading scripts from unknown origins
# - Clickjacking (frame-ancestors)

---

Cryptography Basics

Hashing vs. Encryption

Property	Hashing	Encryption
Reversible	❌ One-way	✅ Two-way (with key)
Purpose	Integrity, password storage	Confidentiality
Output length	Fixed (e.g., SHA-256 = 256 bits)	Same as input length
Key needed	No	Yes
Example uses	Password hashing, checksums, digital signatures	TLS, file encryption, database encryption

Proper Algorithm Selection

Use Case	Algorithm	Notes
Password hashing	Argon2id or bcrypt	Slow, salted, memory-hard
General hashing (integrity)	SHA-256 or SHA-3	Not for passwords
Symmetric encryption	AES-256-GCM	Authenticated encryption (AEAD)
Asymmetric encryption	RSA-4096 or ECDH with Curve25519	Key exchange, signing
Digital signatures	ECDSA with P-256 or Ed25519	Smaller keys than RSA
TLS	TLS 1.3 (preferred) or 1.2	Configure with strong ciphersuites

# ❌ Bad: Weak/nonexistent cryptography
import hashlib
password_hash = hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()  # MD5 - broken

# ✅ Good: Modern authenticated encryption
from cryptography.fernet import Fernet

# Generate a key (do this once, store securely)
key = Fernet.generate_key()
cipher = Fernet(key)

# Encrypt
encrypted_data = cipher.encrypt(b"Sensitive data here")

# Decrypt
decrypted_data = cipher.decrypt(encrypted_data)
# Fernet uses AES-128-CBC with HMAC-SHA256 (authenticated)

Key Management

# ❌ Bad: Keys in code
API_KEY = "sk-live-abcdef123456"

# ✅ Good: Environment variable
import os
API_KEY = os.environ.get("API_KEY")
if not API_KEY:
    raise RuntimeError("API_KEY environment variable not set")

# ✅ Better: Secrets manager (AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault)
import boto3

def get_db_password():
    client = boto3.client("secretsmanager")
    response = client.get_secret_value(SecretId="prod/db/password")
    return response["SecretString"]

# ✅ Best: Rotate keys regularly, never log them
import logging

def use_api_key():
    api_key = get_api_key_from_vault()
    logging.info("Using API key")  # Don't log the key itself!
    # ... use key ...

---

Secrets Management

Rules for Secrets

1. Never hardcode — No API keys, passwords, tokens, or certificates in source code.
2. Never commit — Use .gitignore and pre-commit hooks to prevent accidental commits.
3. Use environment variables — For local development and simple deployments.
4. Use a secrets manager — For production (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, GCP Secret Manager).
5. Rotate regularly — Automate key rotation. Have a process for emergency rotation.
6. Audit access — Log every time a secret is accessed.

Git Leak Prevention

# .gitignore
.env
*.pem
*.key
service-account.json
credentials.json

# Pre-commit hook (truffleHog / Gitleaks)
# Install: brew install gitleaks
# Run: gitleaks detect --source . --pre-commit

# Scan entire git history
gitleaks detect --source . --report-path gitleaks-report.json --verbose

Environment-Specific Config

# config.py
import os

class Config:
    SECRET_KEY = os.environ.get("SECRET_KEY")
    DATABASE_URL = os.environ.get("DATABASE_URL")

class DevelopmentConfig(Config):
    DEBUG = True
    DATABASE_URL = os.environ.get("DEV_DATABASE_URL", "sqlite:///dev.db")

class ProductionConfig(Config):
    DEBUG = False
    # All secrets MUST come from environment or secrets manager
    assert Config.SECRET_KEY is not None, "SECRET_KEY must be set in production"

---

Error Handling (Information Leakage)

What NOT to Show to Users

# ❌ Bad: Exposes internals
try:
    result = process_payment(card_number, amount)
except Exception as e:
    return {"error": f"Payment failed: {str(e)} at line {e.__traceback__.tb_lineno}"}
    # Output: "Payment failed: 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'balance' at line 42"

# ✅ Good: Generic user-facing error, detailed server-side log
import logging
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

try:
    result = process_payment(card_number, amount)
except ValueError as e:
    # Expected error (invalid card) - give specific but safe message
    return {"error": "Payment declined. Please check your card details."}
except Exception as e:
    # Unexpected error - generic message, log details
    logger.error(f"Payment processing failed: {e}", exc_info=True)
    return {"error": "An unexpected error occurred. Our team has been notified."}

Don't Leak User Existence

# ❌ Bad: Leaks whether a user exists
if user_exists(email):
    return {"error": "User already registered"}
else:
    # Send verification email
    return {"message": "Verification email sent"}

# ✅ Good: Consistent response regardless
# Always say "If the email exists, a verification link was sent"
def register(email):
    # Same response regardless of outcome
    send_verification_email(email)  # Only sends if email not already verified
    return {"message": "If the account exists, a verification link has been sent."}

# Same for login:
def login(email, password):
    # Don't say "user not found" vs "wrong password"
    user = get_user_by_email(email)
    if not user or not verify_password(password, user.password_hash):
        return {"error": "Invalid email or password"}  # 🔒 Ambiguous
    return {"token": create_session(user)}

HTTP Status Code Hygiene

# ❌ Bad: Leaks information via status codes
# 200: Login successful
# 401: Wrong password
# 404: User not found

# ✅ Good: Consistent responses
# Always return 401 for failed authentication
LOGIN_FAILURE_RESPONSE = ({"error": "Invalid credentials"}, 401)

---

Common Mistakes

1. Client-Side Authorization Only

Checking roles in JavaScript doesn't prevent attackers from calling APIs directly. All authorization must be enforced server-side.

2. Using eval() or Dynamically Executing User Input

eval(request.body.expression) is a remote code execution vulnerability. Same for exec(), os.system(), and template engines with user-controlled templates.

3. Rolling Your Own Cryptography

Custom encryption algorithms, homemade password hashing schemes, and "I'll just XOR it" are guaranteed to be broken. Use standard libraries.

4. Ignoring Type Confusion

Accepting {"id": 5} when you expected a string, or {"role": "admin"} when the field should be read-only. Validate types and don't blindly deserialize user input into objects.

5. Logging Sensitive Data

Passwords, credit card numbers, API keys, and session tokens should never appear in logs. Use structured logging with sensitive field redaction.

6. No Rate Limiting on Auth Endpoints

Without rate limiting, an attacker can brute-force passwords, enumerate users, or exhaust server resources. Implement rate limiting on login, registration, and password reset endpoints.

7. Trusting Uploaded File Names

An attacker can upload ../../../etc/passwd or malware.exe as the filename. Never use the user-supplied filename without sanitization. Generate your own filenames serverside.

8. Skipping Input Validation on Internal APIs

"Internal" doesn't mean "safe." Internal services, microservices, and admin APIs must validate input just as strictly as public endpoints.

9. Storing Passwords in Plaintext

Despite decades of warnings, this still happens. Use bcrypt, argon2, or scrypt. There is no excuse for hashing with MD5 or storing plaintext.

10. Ignoring Dependency Vulnerabilities

A single outdated library can compromise your entire application. Run npm audit, pip-audit, or Trivy regularly. Subscribe to CVE alerts for your stack.

11. Hardcoded Secrets in CI/CD

CI/CD pipelines often contain tokens, API keys, or service account credentials. Store these in CI/CD secrets (GitHub Actions secrets, Jenkins credentials) — never in the .yml file.

12. Not Handling Race Conditions

Two concurrent requests can bypass a single check. Use database transactions, atomic operations, or distributed locks. Check-then-act patterns are vulnerable to TOCTOU (Time of Check, Time of Use).

13. JWT Algorithm Confusion

An attacker modifies the JWT header from RS256 to HS256 and signs it with the public key (which is... public). Always validate the algorithm server-side and reject unexpected algorithms.

14. Forgetting About CSRF

If your API uses cookie-based authentication, you need CSRF tokens or SameSite cookies. A user visiting evil.com should not be able to make requests to your API with the user's credentials.

15. Treating Security as an Afterthought

Security added post-development is more expensive, less effective, and harder to audit. Build security into the design from day one.