t1195-001-compromise-software-dependencies-and-development-tools

name	T1195.001_compromise-software-dependencies-and-development-tools
description	Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
category	input-validation
version	18.1
author	cyberstrike-official
tags	["mitre-attack","enterprise","t1195.001","initial-access","linux","macos","windows","sub-technique"]
technique_id	T1195.001
tactic	initial-access
all_tactics	["initial-access"]
platforms	["Linux","macOS","Windows"]
mitre_url	https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/001
tech_stack	["linux","macos","windows"]
cwe_ids	["CWE-20"]
chains_with	["T1195","T1195.002","T1195.003"]
prerequisites	["T1195"]
severity_boost	{"T1195":"Chain with T1195 for deeper attack path","T1195.002":"Chain with T1195.002 for deeper attack path","T1195.003":"Chain with T1195.003 for deeper attack path"}

T1195.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools

Sub-technique of: T1195

High-Level Description

Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications, such as pip and NPM packages, may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. This may also include abandoned packages, which in some cases could be re-registered by threat actors after being removed by adversaries. Adversaries may also employ "typosquatting" or name-confusion by choosing names similar to existing popular libraries or packages in order to deceive a user.

Additionally, CI/CD pipeline components, such as GitHub Actions, may be targeted in order to gain access to the building, testing, and deployment cycles of an application. By adding malicious code into a GitHub action, a threat actor may be able to collect runtime credentials (e.g., via Proc Filesystem) or insert further malicious components into the build pipelines for a second-order supply chain compromise. As GitHub Actions are often dependent on other GitHub Actions, threat actors may be able to infect a large number of repositories via the compromise of a single Action.

Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.

Kill Chain Phase

• Initial Access (TA0001)

Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows

What to Check

• Identify if Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools technique is applicable to target environment
• Check Linux systems for indicators of Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
• Check macOS systems for indicators of Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
• Check Windows systems for indicators of Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
• Verify mitigations are bypassed or absent (4 known mitigations)
• Assess detection coverage (1 detection strategies)

How to Test

Manual Testing

1. Identify Attack Surface: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools by examining the target platforms (Linux, macOS, Windows).