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Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery.
デフォルトでは、最初にソースを確認する Prompt が選択されています。直接コマンドに切り替えるか、ローカルコピーをダウンロードすることもできます。
インストールを決める前に、SKILL.md と SkillsMP に表示されている付属ファイルをお読みください。
Codex または Claude でインストール この Prompt をコピーして Codex、Claude、または他のアシスタントに貼り付けると、Skill ページを確認してインストールできます。
直接コマンドでは確認用 Prompt が省略されます。実行前にソースを確認してください。
npx skills add https://github.com/CyberStrikeus/CyberStrike --skill t1490-inhibit-system-recoveryコマンドは1行のまま表示されます。コピー前に横へスクロールして全体を確認してください。
ローカルで確認しますか？SkillsMP が現在取得できるファイルをダウンロードできます。
macOS post-exploitation for credential harvesting, DTrace monitoring, TCC bypass, and stealth operations via native tools
Windows userland post-exploitation for credential harvesting, monitoring, AMSI/ETW bypass, and stealth operations
Kubernetes post-exploitation for container escape, secret extraction, RBAC abuse, and cluster persistence
SOC 職業分類に基づく
SKILL.md を表示中
| name | T1490_inhibit-system-recovery |
| description | Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. |
| category | business-logic |
| version | 18.1 |
| author | cyberstrike-official |
| tags | ["mitre-attack","enterprise","t1490","impact","containers","esxi","iaas","linux","macos","network-devices","windows"] |
| technique_id | T1490 |
| tactic | impact |
| all_tactics | ["impact"] |
| platforms | ["Containers","ESXi","IaaS","Linux","macOS","Network Devices","Windows"] |
| mitre_url | https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490 |
| tech_stack | ["containers","esxi","cloud","linux","macos","network devices","windows"] |
| cwe_ids | ["CWE-400"] |
| chains_with | [] |
| prerequisites | [] |
| severity_boost | {} |
Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.
Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of Data Destruction and Data Encrypted for Impact. Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups.
A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:
vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quietwmic shadowcopy deletewbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quietbcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled noREAgentC.exe can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected systemdiskshadow.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - diskshadow delete shadows allOn network devices, adversaries may leverage Disk Wipe to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then System Shutdown/Reboot to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.
On ESXi servers, adversaries may delete or encrypt snapshots of virtual machines to support Data Encrypted for Impact, preventing them from being leveraged as backups (e.g., via vim-cmd vmsvc/snapshot.removeall).
Adversaries may also delete “online” backups that are connected to their network – whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services. In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, database backups, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.
Platforms: Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network Devices, Windows
The following tests are from Atomic Red Team and provide actionable ways to test this technique:
Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. Upon execution, if no shadow volumes exist the message "No items found that satisfy the query." will be displayed. If shadow volumes are present, it will delete them without printing output to the screen. This is because the /quiet parameter was passed which also suppresses the y/n confirmation prompt. Shadow copies can only be created on Windows server or Windows 8.
Supported Platforms: windows Elevation Required: Yes
vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
Dependencies:
Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies via WMI. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer.
Supported Platforms: windows Elevation Required: Yes
wmic.exe shadowcopy delete
Dependencies:
Deletes Windows Backup Catalog. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. Upon execution, "The backup catalog has been successfully deleted." will be displayed in the PowerShell session.
Supported Platforms: windows Elevation Required: Yes
wbadmin delete catalog -quiet
Disables repair by the Windows Recovery Console on boot. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and APT malware such as Olympic Destroyer. Upon execution, "The operation completed successfully." will be displayed in the powershell session.
Supported Platforms: windows Elevation Required: Yes
bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled no
Deletes Windows Volume Shadow Copies with PowerShell code and Get-WMIObject. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families such as Sodinokibi/REvil. Executes Get-WMIObject. Shadow copies can only be created on Windows server or Windows 8, so upon execution there may be no output displayed.
Supported Platforms: windows Elevation Required: Yes
Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | ForEach-Object {$_.Delete();}
If Atomic Red Team tests are not applicable, manually verify the technique by:
Identify Attack Surface: Determine if the target environment is susceptible to Inhibit System Recovery by examining the target platforms (Containers, ESXi, IaaS).
Assess Existing Defenses: Review whether mitigations for T1490 are in place. If defenses are absent or misconfigured, this technique may be exploitable.
Execute Test: Use tools and methods described in the MITRE ATT&CK page and external references below.
Consider using application control configured to block execution of utilities such as diskshadow.exe that may not be required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries.
Consider technical controls to prevent the disabling of services or deletion of files involved in system recovery. Additionally, ensure that WinRE is enabled using the following command: reagentc /enable.
Limit the user accounts that have access to backups to only those required. In AWS environments, consider using Service Control Policies to restrict API calls to delete backups, snapshots, and images.
Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data. Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery. In cloud environments, enable versioning on storage objects where possible, and copy backups to other accounts or regions to isolate them from the original copies. On ESXi servers, ensure that disk images and snapshots of virtual machines are regularly taken, with copies stored off system.
| Finding | Severity | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Inhibit System Recovery technique applicable | Low | Impact |
| CWE ID | Title |
|---|---|
| CWE-400 | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption |