Dependency and supply-chain security - lockfiles and reproducible installs, version pinning, vulnerability auditing, minimizing and vetting third-party packages, vendoring obscure code instead of fragile remote dependencies, and SBOM/provenance. Use when adding, upgrading, removing, or auditing dependencies, or editing package manifests, lockfiles, or build/CI dependency steps.
インストール
Codex または Claude でインストール この Prompt をコピーして Codex、Claude、または他のアシスタントに貼り付けると、Skill ページを確認してインストールできます。
Dependency and supply-chain security - lockfiles and reproducible installs, version pinning, vulnerability auditing, minimizing and vetting third-party packages, vendoring obscure code instead of fragile remote dependencies, and SBOM/provenance. Use when adding, upgrading, removing, or auditing dependencies, or editing package manifests, lockfiles, or build/CI dependency steps.
Dependency & Supply-Chain Policy
Activation Scope
Apply whenever a dependency is added, upgraded, removed, or audited, and when editing package manifests, lockfiles, or CI/build steps that fetch dependencies.
This skill owns third-party dependency and supply-chain risk. Runtime application security is owned by security-policy; commit/PR mechanics by git-policy.
Add Dependencies Deliberately
Prefer the standard library or existing project utilities before adding a dependency.
Justify every new dependency: real need, active maintenance, healthy adoption, compatible license, and acceptable transitive footprint.
Avoid trivial micro-packages that add supply-chain surface for little value; a small amount of owned code can beat a risky dependency.
Watch for typosquatting and confusable names; verify the exact package name, owner, and repository before installing.
Pin & Reproduce
Always commit the lockfile (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, poetry.lock, etc.); it is the source of truth for what actually installs.
Use reproducible, locked installs in CI and release (e.g. npm ci, not npm install), so builds are deterministic.
Pin versions deliberately; avoid loose ranges for anything security-sensitive. Upgrade intentionally, not implicitly.
Keep one package manager per project; do not mix lockfiles from different managers.
No Fragile Remote Dependencies
Do not depend on code fetched from arbitrary remote URLs or CDNs at build or runtime (aligns with ciphera-style-policy).
For obscure or unmaintained libraries, vendor the needed code into the project (with attribution and license) instead of taking a live dependency, so the supply chain stays under your control.
Pin and verify any external artifact you must fetch (checksums/integrity hashes); never trust mutable remote sources.
Audit & Patch
Run a vulnerability audit (npm audit, pip-audit, osv-scanner, or equivalent) as part of CI; fail the build on high/critical advisories.
Triage findings promptly: patch, upgrade, or document an accepted risk with justification and an expiry; do not silently ignore.
Keep dependencies reasonably current; large version gaps make security patches harder to adopt.
Prefer automated dependency-update tooling (Dependabot/Renovate) with CI gating so updates are reviewed and tested, not blind-merged.
Provenance & SBOM
For enterprise/release builds, generate an SBOM (e.g. CycloneDX or SPDX) so shipped components are inventoried and auditable.
Prefer packages and registries that support provenance/signing; verify integrity where the ecosystem allows.
Review licenses for compatibility and obligations before shipping; treat license compliance as a release gate.
Verification (Make It Mechanical)
Enforce these rules deterministically in CI: locked install, audit gate, license check, and (for releases) SBOM generation.
A dependency change is not done until the audit and license gates pass; a failing gate blocks merge.
