mdsmith-security-review

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更新日2026年7月1日 21:47

Security-review methodology specialized for mdsmith - the Go Markdown linter/formatter and its surfaces (CLI binary, the mdsmith lsp language server, the VS Code extension, the Obsidian plugin, the npm/PyPI/Homebrew/Flatpak distribution wrappers, and the Git merge-driver/pre-merge-commit hooks). Use this skill whenever the user asks for a security review, threat assessment, vulnerability audit, or PR security sign-off on mdsmith or any of its components - even when they name only one surface (e.g. review the VS Code extension, audit the LSP server, check this PR for security problems). Also use when reviewing code that parses untrusted Markdown, resolves the include and catalog path directives, statically lints the build recipe directive, or wires mdsmith into an editor or CI pipeline. Prefer this over a generic code review for anything mdsmith-related: it encodes the project's attack surface and current defenses so reviews stay consistent and accurate.

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jeduden

jeduden/mdsmith

GitHub リポジトリを開く Creator のリポジトリを見る

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関連職種SOC

SOC 職業分類に基づく

情報セキュリティアナリストコンピュータ・数学職·SOC 15-1212

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10 ファイル

SKILL.md

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このリポジトリの他の Skills

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name

mdsmith-security-review

description

mdsmith Security Review

A repeatable methodology for finding real security defects in mdsmith. mdsmith is unusual for a linter:

it resolves file paths from document content (<?include?>, <?catalog?>);
it statically lints shell recipes declared in config (<?build?> / MDS040);
it runs the same engine inside editors and Git hooks.

So a hostile Markdown file or repository — not just hostile network input — is a real threat actor. Most interesting bugs live at those trust boundaries, not in the lint rules.

Note up front — and verify, don't trust. In current mdsmith, recipes are not executed by the tool. <?build?> renders a body template, and MDS040 only lints the recipe string. The actual build runs in external tooling.

The review's job is to confirm that the §0 baseline defenses in references/threat-model.md still hold. Look for regressions or gaps — do not presume an RCE that the design currently prevents.

When to use which mode

This skill runs in two modes. Decide first; if unclear, ask.

Repo audit — review the whole codebase (or a named surface). Broad, methodical, every threat area in scope. Use for "audit mdsmith", "review the Obsidian plugin", a release sign-off.
PR / diff review — review only what changed. Map the diff to the threat areas it touches, then review those in depth plus their blast radius. Use for "is this PR safe to merge?".

Workflow

Establish scope and get the code. Confirm mode. For a PR, get the diff (git diff <base>...<head> or the PR files); for an audit, list the tree (git ls-files). Never review from the README alone — read the actual source.

Map scope to surfaces. Identify which of the surfaces below are in scope. For a PR, map each changed file to a surface; a one-line change in recipe-execution code outweighs a thousand lines of rule tweaks.

Surface	Where it lives (verify, don't assume)	Primary concern
Directive engine	`internal/` (directive/include/build/catalog handling)	Recipe-execution regression, path traversal, SSRF-via-include
CLI core & parser	`cmd/`, `internal/`, `pkg/`	Panic/DoS, ReDoS, OOM, path handling
LSP server	`mdsmith lsp` impl in `internal/`/`pkg/`	Trust-on-open, fix-on-save side effects
VS Code extension	`editors/` (TypeScript)	Workspace Trust, binary spawn, arg/setting injection
Obsidian plugin	`editors/` (TS, full Node access)	Vault trust, command spawn, network
Distribution wrappers	`npm/`, `python/`, Homebrew/Flatpak, `.github/`	Supply chain, postinstall, signing/verification
Git integration	`merge-driver`, `pre-merge-commit`, `.gitattributes`	Hostile-repo delivery of recipe execution

Walk the threat model. Read references/threat-model.md and work through every threat area that touches your scope. It lists the concrete questions to answer and the code patterns to grep for, per surface. Read this file before forming conclusions — it is the core of the skill.
Record findings in the structured model. Pick the review's directory first: docs/security/<YYYY-MM-DD-slug>/ (today's date plus a short scope slug, e.g. docs/security/2026-06-09-full-repo-audit/). Author the findings as <dir>/findings.json per the schema in references/output-formats.md. One finding = one defect. Assign severity using the rubric below and record confidence accurately (confirmed only if you traced the code path or built a repro; otherwise likely / tentative).
Emit the three outputs. From the single findings file, render the report, the SARIF, and the inline annotations into the same directory. Use the script — do not hand-write SARIF:
```
go run ./cmd/mdsmith-secreview render \
  docs/security/<stem>/findings.json \
  --out-dir docs/security/<stem>/
```
It writes report.md, findings.sarif, and inline-annotations.json beside the findings.json input. The schema and the purpose of each output live in references/output-formats.md. The per-audit directory keeps every review's files apart, so a later review never overwrites an earlier one. SECURITY.md's catalog indexes the new report.md on the next fix pass.

Then make the report pass the linter: add the front matter docs/security/proto.md requires (date, scope, method, title, summary), keep the H1 directly after the closing ---, and run mdsmith fix on it. Regenerate SECURITY.md's catalog with mdsmith fix SECURITY.md.
Schedule the fixes as plans. A review that finds defects but leaves no track record of how they get fixed is half a review. Turn the actionable findings into plan/ files so the fix work is queued like any other task. Group by the fix, not by the finding: one plan covers one coherent change even when it closes several findings (the 83_security-hardening-batch plan is the canonical multi-finding batch).

File one plan per Critical/High/Medium finding (or per shared fix). Batch the Low/informational/hardening items into a single "security hardening batch — <date>" plan rather than one file each.
Use the next free numeric prefix in plan/ and follow plan/proto.md: front-matter id, title, status: "🔲", a summary, and a model suggestion; body sections Goal, Tasks (red/green TDD steps), and Acceptance Criteria.
In the Goal, name each finding it closes by id and link the review's report.md, so the plan and the audit cross-reference.
Run mdsmith fix PLAN.md to refresh the index, then mdsmith check plan/ so the new files pass.
In PR-review mode, prefer fixing a finding in the PR itself; file a plan only for follow-up work that is out of the PR's scope. In audit mode, file plans for every actionable finding.

Summarize plainly. Lead with the highest-severity confirmed findings. Separate confirmed defects from hardening suggestions. List the plan files you filed. If you could not reach a conclusion on an in-scope area (e.g. you couldn't find the recipe-execution code), say so explicitly rather than implying it's clean.

Severity rubric

Anchor severity to mdsmith's real-world trust boundaries, not to abstract CVSS alone.

Critical — code execution or equivalent with zero or near-zero interaction, e.g. if a regression introduced recipe/command execution reachable from editor fix-on-save on opening an untrusted repo/vault without a trust prompt, or from the merge driver during a routine git merge. (Current code executes no recipes — a finding here means that property broke.)
High — code execution requiring a normal action the user wouldn't see as dangerous (e.g. a regression making mdsmith fix execute something on a freshly cloned repo); arbitrary file read/write outside the workspace via include/catalog traversal or a symlink escape that gets past the default-deny.
Medium — denial of service (parser panic, ReDoS, unbounded memory) on attacker-supplied Markdown; information disclosure of in-workspace data the user didn't intend to expose; weakened supply-chain verification.
Low — issues needing unusual config or yielding limited impact; missing defense-in-depth on an already-guarded path.
Informational — hardening, missing tests around a security control, unsafe-by-default options that are documented.

When unsure between two levels, state both and explain the deciding factor (interaction required, trust prompt present, escape confirmed).

Reference files

references/threat-model.md — the mdsmith-specific attack surface, organized by surface, with concrete review questions and grep targets. Always read before concluding.
references/output-formats.md — finding JSON schema, severity→SARIF mapping, report layout, and inline-annotation format.

Operating principle

Be a careful auditor, not a vibes-based one. Trace the actual code path before calling something exploitable; mark confidence accordingly. A precise "here is the call chain from fix to exec.Command, with no trust gate" is worth more than a list of speculative worries. And never write a working exploit for distribution — a short repro sketch sufficient to prove the defect is the goal.