cti-skills

Use when documenting a named campaign across time and victims, the user asks to start or update a campaign record, or another skill identified a multi-incident cluster that warrants formal tracking. Provides the template (timeline, attribution, victimology, attack chain, Diamond Model mapping, IOC clusters) and the lifecycle from active to historical.

Use as the default entry point for any CTI request that doesn't name a specific skill. Activates when a user asks to investigate an indicator, profile a threat actor, write an assessment, enrich IOCs, or build detection rules. Routes to the right investigation or analysis skill, then auto-applies rigor skills (source rating, TLP, confidence, likelihood) on the output.

Use when the user wants to configure API keys for the CTI skills pack, asks "how do I set up keys", "configure VirusTotal", "add my Shodan key", or runs /cti-setup. Walks through API key configuration inside Claude Code without needing to run a shell script. Also handles re-running setup, adding individual keys, and verifying that configured keys work.

Use when a user asks to investigate, check, or characterize a domain or hostname. Chains VirusTotal, URLScan (search existing scans), Shodan (DNS resolve + host), OTX, ransomware.live (victim-status sweep), and optionally Censys. Returns reputation, resolution, hosting fingerprint, ransomware-claim status, and pivot candidates. Invoked by /cti-orchestrator when the target is a domain.

Use when a user asks to check, identify, or characterize a file hash (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256). Chains VirusTotal and OTX, optionally triggers /malware-analysis for deeper behavioral review. Returns detection signals, malware family, behavioral tags, and pivot candidates (communicating IPs, dropped files). Invoked by /cti-orchestrator when the target is a hash.

Indicator pivoting methodology — how to use one known indicator to discover related infrastructure across the IOC graph. Decision tree by indicator type with concrete `/lookup-*` commands per pivot, a worked multi-hop example, pivot-quality scoring, and routing into the rigor pipeline. Use when the user asks "what else is connected to this IP / domain / hash / cert / actor?", needs to expand a single seed IOC into a campaign cluster, or wants the canonical reference for graph-walking IOCs.

Workflow for enriching raw IOCs. Routes each IOC type to the appropriate /lookup-* skills, optionally correlates against MISP, and synthesises a single enrichment record per indicator. Use when the user has a batch of raw IOCs to process before triage or before pushing into a sharing platform.

Use when a user asks to investigate, check, enrich, or characterize an IP address (IPv4 or IPv6). Chains VirusTotal, Shodan, AbuseIPDB, GreyNoise, OTX, and optionally Censys in parallel, then consolidates findings and prioritizes follow-up IOCs. Invoked by /cti-orchestrator when the target is an IP.

Use when you need to query a MISP instance for existing events/attributes/objects, or push new intel into MISP — adding attributes to an event, creating an event, or uploading a STIX 2 bundle as one or more events. Two-way integration. Commonly invoked by /ip-investigation and friends to check whether an indicator is already known to your CTI sharing community, and by analytical skills that want to publish their findings back to MISP. Reads $MISP_URL and $MISP_API_KEY.

Use when you need to query an OpenCTI instance — is this IOC already known, what entities/reports/campaigns exist for an actor — or push new intel into it — creating indicators/observables, labelling, TLP markings, relationships, or importing a STIX 2.1 bundle. Two-way integration. Commonly invoked by /ip-investigation and friends to check whether an indicator is already in your knowledge base, and by analytical skills that want to publish their findings back to OpenCTI. Reads $OPENCTI_URL and $OPENCTI_TOKEN.

Use when characterising a malware sample, the user asks "what does this binary do?" / "analyse this hash deeply", or `/hash-investigation` flags a novel sample warranting deeper review. Static + dynamic methodology, behavioural indicators, sandbox interpretation.

STIX 2.1 bundle creation reference. Object types, relationships, and JSON templates for structured threat intelligence sharing.

Use when the user asks to build or update a threat-actor profile, "tell me about actor X" / "profile actor Y", or another skill needs the canonical profile template (attribution, TTPs, campaigns, infrastructure patterns, intelligence gaps).

Use when a user asks to scan, investigate, or characterize a URL. Submits to URLScan (unlisted by default), cross-references with VirusTotal and OTX, extracts the parent domain and resolved IP for follow-up investigation. Returns verdict, redirect chain, contacted infrastructure, and screenshot. Invoked by /cti-orchestrator when the target is a URL.

Use when the user asks about Chinese state-sponsored cyber operations or specific PRC-aligned actors (APT41, Volt Typhoon, Mustang Panda, APT10, APT31, Salt Typhoon, etc.), MSS/PLA-attributed campaigns, or PRC sector targeting. Self-updating knowledge cell.

CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence (Intel API) reference. OAuth2 auth, Falcon Query Language, indicator (IOC) lookups, threat-actor entities, intel reports, MITRE ATT&CK mappings, malware families, vulnerabilities, rule sets.

Use when the user asks about North Korean state-sponsored cyber operations or specific DPRK actors (Lazarus, APT38, BlueNoroff, Andariel, Kimsuky, etc.), revenue-generation campaigns, IT-worker schemes, or DPRK targeting of cryptocurrency / supply chain. Self-updating knowledge cell.

Use when the user asks about Iranian state-sponsored cyber operations or specific IRGC/MOIS-aligned actors (APT35/Charming Kitten, APT34/OilRig, MuddyWater, Imperial Kitten, etc.), wiper campaigns, or front-group hacktivist clusters (Predatory Sparrow, Handala). Self-updating knowledge cell.

Use when you need CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence on an indicator (IOC reputation for an IP, domain, hash, or URL — malicious confidence, linked actors, malware families, reports) OR on an adversary (threat-actor profile, origin/target search, MITRE ATT&CK TTPs, finished intel reports). Answers questions like "look up 1.1.1.1", "what TTPs does Charming Kitten use?", "which threat actors operate from Russia?", and "latest report on Mustang Panda". Commonly invoked by the four /*-investigation skills, /ioc-enrichment-workflow, /threat-actor-profiling, and the regional espionage cells. Other agents/skills can chain this for vendor-authoritative actor and finished-intel context. Requires a Falcon Intelligence subscription.

Use when the user asks about Russian state-sponsored cyber operations or specific actors (APT28/Fancy Bear, Sandworm, Cozy Bear/APT29, Turla, GRU-affiliated hacktivist fronts like CARR/NoName057), wartime ICS/OT campaigns, or pro-RU information operations. Self-updating knowledge cell.

Use when the user asks for a YARA rule, "write YARA for this sample/family", or `/hash-investigation` / `/malware-analysis` surfaces a sample worth a static-content rule. Pattern-matching rules for identifying malicious files.

Use when you need authoritative classification, threat-name, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, dynamic-analysis or sandbox results on a file hash, or when you need network threat intelligence for a URL/domain/IP from ReversingLabs Spectra Analyze (A1000). Returns verdict, risk score, AV detection ratio, threat name, behavioural tags, and pivot candidates (parent containers, extracted files, related samples by family). Commonly invoked by /hash-investigation and /malware-analysis. Other agents/skills can chain this for deeper malware enrichment beyond VirusTotal.

ReversingLabs Spectra Analyze (A1000) API reference. File hash classification, detailed reports, dynamic analysis, network indicator reputation, advanced search, YARA, container relationships.

Use when the user asks about carding, BIN attacks, payment-card breach markets, fullz/CVV2 trade, autoshops (BidenCash, Brian's Club, Russianmarket, B1ack's Stash), or financial-fraud TTPs. Self-updating knowledge cell.

Use when assigning a confidence level to an analytical judgment, the user asks "how confident are we?" / "what is the confidence on X?", or the orchestrator's tradecraft pipeline calls for a confidence level before publishing. Provides the MISP 0-100 scale and qualitative-band mapping.

Use when the user asks about the CTI Hyperloop framework, the intelligence lifecycle as a high-tempo loop, or how to map intelligence work across strategic / operational / tactical levels with bidirectional feedback. Liberty91's operational doctrine.

Use when the user asks about hacktivist activity (Killnet, NoName057(16), IT Army of Ukraine, Anonymous Sudan, RipperSec, CARR, etc.), DDoS-claiming groups, politically-motivated cyber operations, or wartime cyber-ops chatter. Self-updating knowledge cell.

Use when the user asks "what is coming next?", wants strategic forecasting, or is hunting weak signals of emerging threats before they materialise. Covers signal identification, trend analysis, and scenario development.

Use when the user asks about infostealer families (LummaC2, RedLine, Vidar, Stealc, Raccoon, Rhadamanthys, etc.), log marketplaces (Russian Market, Genesis successors, BidenCash, Hudson Rock corpus), or stealer-driven incidents and credential exposure. Self-updating knowledge cell.

Use when the user asks about initial access brokers (IABs), the access-listing market, ransomware-feeding-IAB pipelines, specific broker handles, or how access is priced and packaged. Self-updating knowledge cell.

Use when the user asks about ISAC participation, TAXII feeds, MISP communities, FIRST, STIX-based sharing, or how to publish intelligence externally. Covers sharing models, standards, communities, and TLP-governed dissemination.

Use when writing a finished intelligence product, the user asks for a flash-report / threat-assessment / briefing / FINTEL template, or wants the BLUF + active-voice + clear-sourcing conventions. Covers all product types.

Use when surfacing the assumptions underlying an analytical judgment, the user asks "what are we assuming?" / "are these assumptions still valid?", or before publishing a high-impact assessment. Standard SAT applied during major assessments.

Use when the user asks for a KQL query, a Microsoft Sentinel / Defender / Azure Log Analytics detection or hunt, or wants to translate a finding from `/hash-investigation` / `/malware-analysis` into KQL. Format spec + writing guide.

Use when phrasing a forward-looking statement, the user asks "how likely is X?" / "what's the likelihood?", or the tradecraft pipeline applies a probability yardstick to a finished product. Standardised likelihood language across all products.

Use when assessing the maturity of a CTI programme, the user asks "how mature is our CTI?" / "what should we improve next?", or wants a benchmark against the five-level model across six dimensions.

Use when the user asks about phishing campaigns, social-engineering techniques, BEC (business email compromise), pretexting, AiTM (adversary-in-the-middle) kits, or specific phishing-kit families. Self-updating knowledge cell.

Use when the user asks to create, review, retire, or refine Priority Intelligence Requirements, or wants to align collection and analysis to the current PIR set. Covers the PIR lifecycle end-to-end.

Use when the user asks about the ransomware ecosystem, RaaS dynamics, affiliate markets, attribution between groups, leak-site behaviour, or recent group activity (LockBit lineage, ALPHV/BlackCat, RansomHub, Akira, Play, Qilin, Cl0p, Medusa, etc.). Self-updating knowledge cell.

Use when challenging a prevailing analytical judgment, the user asks "what is the opposing case?" / "argue the other side", or wants a devil's-advocate review of an assessment. Deliberately argues the opposite position to expose weaknesses.