| name | 1claw |
| version | 1.0.8 |
| description | HSM-backed secret management for AI agents — store, retrieve, rotate, and share secrets via the 1Claw vault without exposing them in context. |
| homepage | https://1claw.xyz |
| repository | https://github.com/1clawAI/1claw |
| metadata | {"openclaw":{"requires":{"env":["ONECLAW_AGENT_ID","ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY","ONECLAW_VAULT_ID"],"bins":[]},"primaryEnv":"ONECLAW_AGENT_ID","install":[{"id":"npm","kind":"node","package":"@1claw/mcp","bins":["1claw-mcp"],"label":"1Claw MCP Server"}],"credentials":["ONECLAW_AGENT_ID","ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY","ONECLAW_VAULT_ID"],"permissions":["vault:read","vault:write","vault:delete","secret:read","secret:write","secret:delete","policy:create","share:create","tx:sign","tx:simulate"]}} |
1Claw — HSM-Backed Secret Management for AI Agents
1Claw is a cloud HSM-backed secrets manager. Agents access API keys, passwords, and credentials at runtime without them ever entering the conversation context. Secrets are encrypted with keys that never leave the HSM.
API base URL: https://api.1claw.xyz
MCP endpoint: https://mcp.1claw.xyz/mcp
Dashboard: https://1claw.xyz
Docs: https://docs.1claw.xyz
When to use this skill
- You need an API key, password, or credential to complete a task
- You want to store a newly generated credential securely
- You need to share a secret with a user or another agent
- You need to rotate a credential after regenerating it
- You want to check what secrets are available before using one
- You need to sign or simulate an EVM transaction without exposing private keys
Setup
Option 1: MCP server (recommended for AI agents)
Add to your MCP client configuration. The server auto-refreshes JWT tokens.
{
"mcpServers": {
"1claw": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@1claw/mcp"],
"env": {
"ONECLAW_AGENT_ID": "<agent-uuid>",
"ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY": "<agent-api-key>",
"ONECLAW_VAULT_ID": "<vault-uuid>"
}
}
}
}
Hosted HTTP streaming mode:
URL: https://mcp.1claw.xyz/mcp
Headers:
Authorization: Bearer <agent-jwt>
X-Vault-ID: <vault-uuid>
Option 2: TypeScript SDK
npm install @1claw/sdk
import { createClient } from "@1claw/sdk";
const client = createClient({
baseUrl: "https://api.1claw.xyz",
agentId: process.env.ONECLAW_AGENT_ID,
apiKey: process.env.ONECLAW_AGENT_API_KEY,
});
Option 3: Direct REST API
Authenticate, then pass the Bearer token on every request.
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST https://api.1claw.xyz/v1/auth/agent-token \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"agent_id":"<uuid>","api_key":"<key>"}' | jq -r .access_token)
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://api.1claw.xyz/v1/vaults
Alternative: 1ck_ API keys (personal or agent) can be used directly as Bearer tokens — no JWT exchange needed.
Authentication
Agent auth flow
- Human registers an agent in the dashboard or via
POST /v1/agents with an auth_method (api_key default, mtls, or oidc_client_credentials). For api_key agents → receives agent_id + api_key (prefix ocv_). For mTLS/OIDC agents → receives agent_id only (no API key).
- All agents auto-receive an Ed25519 SSH keypair (public key on agent record, private key in
__agent-keys vault).
- API key agents exchange credentials:
POST /v1/auth/agent-token with { "agent_id": "<uuid>", "api_key": "<key>" } → returns { "access_token": "<jwt>", "token_type": "bearer", "expires_in": 3600 }.
- Agent uses
Authorization: Bearer <jwt> on all subsequent requests.
- JWT scopes derive from the agent's access policies (path patterns). If no policies exist, scopes are empty (zero access). The agent's
vault_ids are also included in the JWT — requests to unlisted vaults are rejected.
- Token TTL defaults to ~1 hour but can be set per-agent via
token_ttl_seconds. The MCP server auto-refreshes 60s before expiry.
API key auth
Tokens starting with 1ck_ (human personal API keys) or ocv_ (agent API keys) can be used as Bearer tokens directly on any authenticated endpoint.
MCP Tools Reference
list_secrets
List all secrets in the vault. Returns paths, types, and versions — never values.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|
prefix | string | no | Path prefix to filter (e.g. api-keys/) |
get_secret
Fetch the decrypted value of a secret. Use immediately before the API call that needs it. Never store the value or include it in summaries.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|
path | string | yes | Secret path (e.g. api-keys/stripe) |
put_secret
Store a new secret or update an existing one. Each call creates a new version.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|---|
path | string | yes | | Secret path |
value | string | yes | | The secret value |
type | string | no | api_key | One of: api_key, password, private_key, certificate, file, note, ssh_key, env_bundle |
metadata | object | no | | Arbitrary JSON metadata |
expires_at | string | no | | ISO 8601 expiry datetime |
max_access_count | number | no | | Max reads before auto-expiry (0 = unlimited) |
delete_secret
Soft-delete a secret. Reversible by an admin.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|
path | string | yes | Secret path to delete |
describe_secret
Get metadata (type, version, expiry) without fetching the value. Use to check existence.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|
path | string | yes | Secret path |
rotate_and_store
Store a new value for an existing secret, creating a new version. Use after regenerating a key.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|
path | string | yes | Secret path |
value | string | yes | New secret value |
get_env_bundle
Fetch an env_bundle secret and parse its KEY=VALUE lines as JSON.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|
path | string | yes | Path to an env_bundle secret |
create_vault
Create a new vault for organizing secrets.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|
name | string | yes | Vault name (1–255 chars) |
description | string | no | Short description |
list_vaults
List all vaults accessible to you. No parameters.
grant_access
Grant a user or agent access to a vault path pattern.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|---|
vault_id | string (UUID) | yes | | Vault ID |
principal_type | user | agent | yes | | Who to grant access to |
principal_id | string (UUID) | yes | | The user or agent UUID |
permissions | string[] | no | ["read"] | ["read"], ["write"], or ["read","write"] |
secret_path_pattern | string | no | ** | Glob pattern for secret paths |
share_secret
Share a secret via link, with your creator, or with a specific user/agent.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|
secret_id | string (UUID) | yes | The secret's UUID |
recipient_type | user | agent | anyone_with_link | creator | yes | creator shares with the human who registered this agent — no ID needed |
recipient_id | string (UUID) | conditional | Required for user and agent types |
expires_at | string | yes | ISO 8601 expiry |
max_access_count | number | no (default 5) | Max reads (0 = unlimited) |
Targeted shares (creator/user/agent) require the recipient to explicitly accept before access.
simulate_transaction
Simulate an EVM transaction via Tenderly without signing. Returns balance changes, gas estimates, success/revert status.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|---|
to | string | yes | | Destination address (0x-prefixed) |
value | string | yes | | Value in ETH (e.g. "0.01") |
chain | string | yes | | Chain name or chain ID (see Supported Chains) |
data | string | no | | Hex-encoded calldata |
signing_key_path | string | no | keys/{chain}-signer | Vault path to signing key |
gas_limit | number | no | 21000 | Gas limit |
submit_transaction
Submit an EVM transaction for signing and optional broadcast. Requires crypto_proxy_enabled.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Default | Description |
|---|
to | string | yes | | Destination address |
value | string | yes | | Value in ETH |
chain | string | yes | | Chain name or chain ID |
data | string | no | | Hex-encoded calldata |
signing_key_path | string | no | keys/{chain}-signer | Vault path to signing key |
nonce | number | no | auto-resolved | Transaction nonce |
gas_price | string | no | | Gas price in wei (legacy mode) |
gas_limit | number | no | 21000 | Gas limit |
max_fee_per_gas | string | no | | EIP-1559 max fee in wei (triggers Type 2) |
max_priority_fee_per_gas | string | no | | EIP-1559 priority fee in wei |
simulate_first | boolean | no | true | Run Tenderly simulation before signing |
REST API Quick Reference
Base URL: https://api.1claw.xyz. All authenticated endpoints require Authorization: Bearer <token>.
Auth (public — no token required)
| Method | Path | Description |
|---|
POST | /v1/auth/token | Login (email + password) → { access_token } |
POST | /v1/auth/agent-token | Agent login (agent_id + api_key) → { access_token } |
POST | /v1/auth/google | Google OAuth |
POST | /v1/auth/signup | Create account → sends verification email |
POST | /v1/auth/verify-email | Verify email token → creates user |
POST | /v1/auth/mfa/verify | Verify MFA code during login |
Auth (authenticated)
| Method | Path | Description |
|---|
GET | /v1/auth/me | Get current user profile |
PATCH | /v1/auth/me | Update profile (display_name, marketing_emails) |
DELETE | /v1/auth/me | Delete account (body: { "confirmation": "DELETE MY ACCOUNT" }) |
DELETE | /v1/auth/token | Revoke current token |
POST | /v1/auth/change-password | Change password |
Vaults
| Method | Path | Description |
|---|
POST | /v1/vaults | Create vault ({ name, description? }) → 201 |
GET | /v1/vaults | List vaults → { vaults: [...] } |
GET | /v1/vaults/{id} | Get vault details |
DELETE | /v1/vaults/{id} | Delete vault → 204 |
POST | /v1/vaults/{id}/cmek | Enable CMEK ({ fingerprint }) |
DELETE | /v1/vaults/{id}/cmek | Disable CMEK |
POST | /v1/vaults/{id}/cmek-rotate | Start CMEK key rotation (headers: X-CMEK-Old-Key, X-CMEK-New-Key) |
GET | /v1/vaults/{id}/cmek-rotate/{job_id} | Get rotation job status |
Secrets
| Method | Path | Description |
|---|
PUT | /v1/vaults/{id}/secrets/{path} | Store/update secret ({ type, value, metadata?, expires_at?, max_access_count? }) → 201 |
GET | /v1/vaults/{id}/secrets/{path} | Read secret → { path, type, value, version, metadata } |
DELETE | /v1/vaults/{id}/secrets/{path} | Delete secret → 204 |
GET | /v1/vaults/{id}/secrets?prefix=... | List secrets (metadata only, no values) |
Agents
| Method | Path | Description |
|---|
POST | /v1/agents | Create agent → { agent: {...}, api_key: "ocv_..." } |
GET | /v1/agents | List agents → { agents: [...] } |
GET | /v1/agents/{id} | Get agent |
GET | /v1/agents/me | Get current agent (self) |
PATCH | /v1/agents/{id} | Update agent (is_active, scopes, crypto_proxy_enabled, guardrails) |
DELETE | /v1/agents/{id} | Delete agent → 204 |
POST | /v1/agents/{id}/rotate-key | Rotate agent API key → { api_key: "ocv_..." } |
Policies (Access Control)
| Method | Path | Description |
|---|
POST | /v1/vaults/{id}/policies | Create policy ({ principal_type, principal_id, secret_path_pattern, permissions, conditions?, expires_at? }) |
GET | /v1/vaults/{id}/policies | List policies for vault |
PUT | /v1/vaults/{id}/policies/{pid} | Update policy (permissions, conditions, expires_at only) |
DELETE | /v1/vaults/{id}/policies/{pid} | Delete policy → 204 |
Sharing
| Method | Path | Description |
|---|
POST | /v1/secrets/{id}/share | Create share link |
GET | /v1/shares/outbound | List shares you created |
GET | /v1/shares/inbound | List shares sent to you |
POST | /v1/shares/{id}/accept | Accept an inbound share |
POST | /v1/shares/{id}/decline | Decline an inbound share |
DELETE | /v1/share/{id} | Revoke a share |
GET | /v1/share/{id} | Access a share (public, may require passphrase) |
Crypto Proxy (requires crypto_proxy_enabled)
| Method | Path | Description |
|---|
POST | /v1/agents/{id}/transactions | Submit transaction for signing |
GET | /v1/agents/{id}/transactions | List agent's transactions |
GET | /v1/agents/{id}/transactions/{txid} | Get transaction details |
POST | /v1/agents/{id}/transactions/simulate | Simulate single transaction |
POST | /v1/agents/{id}/transactions/simulate-bundle | Simulate transaction bundle |
Audit
| Method | Path | Description |
|---|
GET | /v1/audit/events?limit=N&action=...&from=...&to=... | Query audit events |
Billing
| Method | Path | Description |
|---|
GET | /v1/billing/subscription | Subscription status, usage, credit balance |
GET | /v1/billing/credits/balance | Credit balance + expiring credits |
GET | /v1/billing/credits/transactions | Credit transaction ledger |
PATCH | /v1/billing/overage-method | Set overage method (credits or x402) |
GET | /v1/billing/usage | Usage summary (current month) |
GET | /v1/billing/history | Usage event history |
Chains
| Method | Path | Description |
|---|
GET | /v1/chains | List supported chains |
GET | /v1/chains/{name_or_id} | Get chain details |
Other
| Method | Path | Description |
|---|
GET | /v1/health | Health check → { status, service, version } |
GET | /v1/health/hsm | HSM health → { status, hsm_provider, connected } |
POST/GET/DELETE | /v1/auth/api-keys[/{id}] | Manage personal API keys |
GET/POST/DELETE | /v1/security/ip-rules[/{id}] | Manage IP allowlist/blocklist |
GET/PATCH/DELETE | /v1/org/members[/{id}] | Manage org members |
SDK Method Reference
All methods return Promise<OneclawResponse<T>>. Access via client.<resource>.<method>(...).
| Resource | Method | Description |
|---|
vaults | create({ name, description? }) | Create vault |
vaults | get(vaultId) | Get vault |
vaults | list() | List vaults |
vaults | delete(vaultId) | Delete vault |
secrets | set(vaultId, key, value, { type?, metadata?, expires_at?, max_access_count? }) | Store/update secret |
secrets | get(vaultId, key) | Read secret (decrypted) |
secrets | list(vaultId, prefix?) | List secret metadata |
secrets | delete(vaultId, key) | Delete secret |
secrets | rotate(vaultId, key, newValue) | Rotate secret to new version |
agents | create({ name, description?, scopes?, expires_at?, crypto_proxy_enabled?, token_ttl_seconds?, vault_ids? }) | Create agent → returns agent + api_key |
agents | get(agentId) | Get agent |
agents | list() | List agents |
agents | update(agentId, { is_active?, scopes?, crypto_proxy_enabled?, tx_*? }) | Update agent |
agents | delete(agentId) | Delete agent |
agents | rotateKey(agentId) | Rotate agent API key |
agents | submitTransaction(agentId, { to, value, chain, ... }) | Submit EVM transaction |
agents | simulateTransaction(agentId, { to, value, chain, ... }) | Simulate transaction |
agents | simulateBundle(agentId, bundle) | Simulate transaction bundle |
agents | getTransaction(agentId, txId) | Get transaction |
agents | listTransactions(agentId) | List agent transactions |
access | grantAgent(vaultId, agentId, permissions, { path?, conditions?, expires_at? }) | Grant agent access |
access | grantHuman(vaultId, userId, permissions, { path?, conditions?, expires_at? }) | Grant user access |
access | listGrants(vaultId) | List policies |
access | update(vaultId, policyId, { permissions?, conditions?, expires_at? }) | Update policy |
access | revoke(vaultId, policyId) | Revoke policy |
sharing | create(secretId, { recipient_type, recipient_id?, expires_at, max_access_count? }) | Create share |
sharing | access(shareId) | Access shared secret |
sharing | listOutbound() | Shares you created |
sharing | listInbound() | Shares sent to you |
sharing | accept(shareId) | Accept inbound share |
sharing | decline(shareId) | Decline inbound share |
sharing | revoke(shareId) | Revoke outbound share |
audit | query({ action?, actor_id?, from?, to?, limit?, offset? }) | Query audit events |
billing | usage() | Current month usage |
billing | history(limit?) | Usage event history |
auth | login({ email, password }) | Human login |
auth | agentToken({ agent_id, api_key }) | Agent JWT exchange |
auth | logout() | Revoke token |
apiKeys | create({ name, scopes?, expires_at? }) | Create personal API key |
apiKeys | list() | List API keys |
apiKeys | revoke(keyId) | Revoke key |
chains | list() | List supported chains |
chains | get(identifier) | Get chain by name or ID |
org | listMembers() | List org members |
org | updateMemberRole(userId, role) | Update member role |
org | removeMember(userId) | Remove member |
OpenAPI spec for custom SDKs
The API spec is published as an npm package for generating clients in any language:
npm install @1claw/openapi-spec
Ships openapi.yaml and openapi.json. Use with any OpenAPI 3.1 codegen tool:
npx openapi-typescript node_modules/@1claw/openapi-spec/openapi.yaml -o ./types.ts
openapi-generator generate -i node_modules/@1claw/openapi-spec/openapi.yaml -g python -o ./oneclaw-py
oapi-codegen -package oneclaw node_modules/@1claw/openapi-spec/openapi.yaml > oneclaw.go
SDK also re-exports generated types: import type { ApiSchemas } from "@1claw/sdk".
Supported Chains
Default chain registry (query GET /v1/chains for live list):
| Name | Chain ID | Testnet |
|---|
| ethereum | 1 | no |
| base | 8453 | no |
| optimism | 10 | no |
| arbitrum-one | 42161 | no |
| polygon | 137 | no |
| sepolia | 11155111 | yes |
| base-sepolia | 84532 | yes |
Use chain names (e.g. "base", "sepolia") or numeric chain IDs in transaction requests.
Access Control Model
Agents do not get blanket access. A human must create a policy to grant an agent access to specific secret paths.
- Path patterns: Glob syntax —
api-keys/*, db/**, ** (all)
- Permissions:
read, write (delete requires write)
- Conditions: IP allowlist, time windows (JSON)
- Expiry: Optional ISO 8601 date
If no policy matches → 403 Forbidden. Vault creators always have full access (owner bypass).
Vault binding and token scoping
Agents can be restricted beyond policies:
vault_ids: Restrict the agent to specific vaults. If non-empty, any request to a vault not in the list returns 403.
token_ttl_seconds: Custom JWT expiry per agent (e.g., 300 for 5-minute tokens).
- Scopes from policies: JWT scopes are derived from the agent's access policies. If an agent has no policies and no explicit scopes, it has zero access.
Set via dashboard, CLI (--token-ttl, --vault-ids), SDK, or API.
Customer-Managed Encryption Keys (CMEK)
Enterprise opt-in feature (Business tier and above). A human generates a 256-bit AES key in the dashboard — the key never leaves their device. Only its SHA-256 fingerprint is stored on the server.
- Enable:
POST /v1/vaults/{id}/cmek with { fingerprint }
- Disable:
DELETE /v1/vaults/{id}/cmek
- Rotate:
POST /v1/vaults/{id}/cmek-rotate (server-assisted, batched in 100s)
- Secrets stored in a CMEK vault have
cmek_encrypted: true in responses
Agents reading from a CMEK vault receive the encrypted blob. The CMEK key is required to decrypt client-side. This is designed for organizations with compliance requirements — the default HSM encryption is already strong.
Crypto transaction proxy
When crypto_proxy_enabled = true (set by a human):
- Agent gains transaction signing via the crypto proxy (keys stay in HSM)
- Agent is blocked from reading
private_key and ssh_key secrets directly (403)
Default signing key path: keys/{chain}-signer. Override with signing_key_path.
Transaction guardrails
Human-configured, server-enforced limits on what the crypto proxy allows:
| Guardrail | Field | Effect |
|---|
| Allowed destinations | tx_to_allowlist | Only listed addresses permitted. Empty = unrestricted |
| Max value per tx | tx_max_value_eth | Single-tx cap in ETH. NULL = unlimited |
| Daily spend limit | tx_daily_limit_eth | Rolling 24h cumulative cap. NULL = unlimited |
| Allowed chains | tx_allowed_chains | Chain names. Empty = all chains |
Agents cannot modify their own guardrails. Violations return 403 with a descriptive error.
Security Model
- Credentials are configured by the human, not the agent. The MCP server reads them from env vars.
- The agent never sees its own credentials. The MCP server authenticates on the agent's behalf.
- Access is deny-by-default. Even with valid credentials, only policy-allowed secrets are accessible.
- Secret values are fetched just-in-time and must never be stored, echoed, or included in summaries.
- Agents cannot create email-based shares (prevents phishing).
- Crypto proxy is opt-in. When enabled, raw key reads are blocked.
- Transaction guardrails are human-controlled and server-enforced.
Error Handling
| Code | Meaning | Action |
|---|
| 400 | Bad request | Check request body format |
| 401 | Not authenticated | Token expired — re-authenticate |
| 402 | Quota exhausted / payment required | Inform user to top up credits or upgrade at 1claw.xyz/settings/billing |
| 403 | No permission | Ask user to grant access via a policy. Or: guardrail violation (check error detail) |
| 403 | Resource limit reached (type: "resource_limit_exceeded") | Tier limit on vaults/secrets/agents hit — ask user to upgrade at 1claw.xyz/settings/billing |
| 404 | Not found | Check path with list_secrets |
| 405 | Method not allowed | Wrong HTTP verb for this endpoint |
| 409 | Conflict | Resource already exists (e.g. duplicate vault name) |
| 410 | Gone | Secret expired or max access count reached — ask user to store a new version |
| 422 | Validation error or simulation reverted | Check input. For simulate_first: transaction would revert |
| 429 | Rate limited | Wait and retry. Share creation: 10/min/org |
All error responses include a detail field with a human-readable message.
Best Practices
- Fetch secrets just-in-time. Call
get_secret immediately before the API call that needs the credential.
- Never echo secret values. Say "I retrieved the API key and used it" — never include raw values in responses.
- Use
describe_secret first to check existence or validity before fetching the full value.
- Use
list_secrets to discover available credentials before guessing paths.
- Rotate after regeneration. If you regenerate an API key at a provider, immediately
rotate_and_store the new value.
- Use
grant_access for vault-level sharing — creates a fine-grained policy with path patterns.
- Use
share_secret for one-off sharing — creates a time-limited, access-counted share link.
- Simulate before signing. Always use
simulate_first: true (default) or call simulate_transaction before submit_transaction.
- Check
list_vaults before creating. Avoid creating duplicate vaults.
- Handle 402 gracefully. Billing/quota errors should be surfaced to the user, not retried.
Billing Tiers
| Tier | Requests/mo | Vaults | Secrets | Agents | Price |
|---|
| Free | 1,000 | 3 | 50 | 2 | $0 |
| Pro | 25,000 | 25 | 500 | 10 | $29/mo |
| Business | 100,000 | 100 | 5,000 | 50 | $149/mo (+ CMEK) |
| Enterprise | Custom | Unlimited | Unlimited | Unlimited | Contact (+ CMEK + KMS delegation) |
Overage methods: prepaid credits (top up via Stripe, deducted per request) or x402 micropayments (per-query on-chain payments on Base).
Audit, org, security, chain, billing, and auth endpoints are free and never consume quota.
Links