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performing-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass Bypasses SSL/TLS certificate pinning implementations in Android and iOS applications to enable traffic interception during authorized security assessments. Covers OkHttp, TrustManager, NSURLSession, and third-party pinning library bypass techniques using Frida, Objection, and custom scripts. Activates for requests involving certificate pinning bypass, SSL pinning defeat, mobile TLS interception, or proxy-resistant app testing.
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name performing-mobile-app-certificate-pinning-bypass description Bypasses SSL/TLS certificate pinning implementations in Android and iOS applications to enable traffic interception during authorized security assessments. Covers OkHttp, TrustManager, NSURLSession, and third-party pinning library bypass techniques using Frida, Objection, and custom scripts. Activates for requests involving certificate pinning bypass, SSL pinning defeat, mobile TLS interception, or proxy-resistant app testing.
domain cybersecurity subdomain mobile-security author mahipal tags ["mobile-security","android","ios","certificate-pinning","frida","penetration-testing"] version 1.0.0 license Apache-2.0 nist_csf ["PR.PS-01","PR.AA-05","ID.RA-01","DE.CM-09"] mitre_attack ["T1059","T1056","T1036","T1078","T1027"]
Performing Mobile App Certificate Pinning Bypass
When to Use
Use this skill when:
Mobile app refuses connections through a proxy due to certificate pinning
Performing authorized security testing requiring HTTPS traffic interception
Assessing the strength and bypass difficulty of pinning implementations
Evaluating defense-in-depth of mobile app network security
Do not use to bypass pinning on apps without explicit testing authorization.
Prerequisites
Burp Suite configured as proxy with listener on all interfaces
Rooted Android device or jailbroken iOS device
Frida server running on target device
Objection installed (pip install objection)
Target app installed and reproducing the pinning behavior
Workflow
Step 1: Identify Pinning Implementation
Android pinning methods to identify:
1. Network Security Config (res/xml/network_security_config.xml)
<pin-set> with certificate hash pins
2. OkHttp CertificatePinner
CertificatePinner.Builder().add("api.target.com", "sha256/...")
3. Custom TrustManager
X509TrustManager overrides in code
4. Third-party libraries
- TrustKit
- Certificate Transparency checks
iOS pinning methods:
1. NSURLSession delegate (URLSession:didReceiveChallenge:)
2. ATS (App Transport Security) with custom trust evaluation
3. TrustKit framework
4. Alamofire ServerTrustPolicy
5. Custom SecTrust evaluation
Step 2: Bypass with Objection (Quickest Approach)
objection --gadget com.target.app explore
android sslpinning disable
objection --gadget com.target.app explore
ios sslpinning disable
Objection hooks common pinning implementations including OkHttp CertificatePinner, TrustManagerImpl, NSURLSession delegate methods, and SecTrust evaluation.
Step 3: Bypass with Custom Frida Scripts
Android - Universal SSL Pinning Bypass:
Java .perform (function ( ) {
= . ( );
. . = ( ) {
. ( + host);
untrustedChain;
};
{
= . ( );
. . ( , ). =
( ) {
. ( + hostname);
;
};
} (e) {}
X509TrustManager = . ( );
= . ({
: ,
: [X509TrustManager],
: {
: ( ) {},
: ( ) {},
: ( ) { []; }
}
});
= . ( );
. . ( ,
, ). =
( ) {
. ( );
. (km, [ .$new()], sr);
};
{
= . (
);
. . = ( ) {
;
};
} (e) {}
. ( );
});
var
TrustManagerImpl
Java
use
"com.android.org.conscrypt.TrustManagerImpl"
TrustManagerImpl
verifyChain
implementation
function
untrustedChain, trustAnchorChain,
host, clientAuth, ocspData, tlsSctData
console
log
"[+] Bypassing TrustManagerImpl for: "
return
try
var
CertificatePinner
Java
use
"okhttp3.CertificatePinner"
CertificatePinner
check
overload
"java.lang.String"
"java.util.List"
implementation
function
hostname, peerCertificates
console
log
"[+] Bypassing OkHttp3 pinning for: "
return
catch
var
Java
use
"javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager"
var
TrustManager
Java
registerClass
name
"com.bypass.TrustManager"
implements
methods
checkClientTrusted
function
chain, authType
checkServerTrusted
function
chain, authType
getAcceptedIssuers
function
return
var
SSLContext
Java
use
"javax.net.ssl.SSLContext"
SSLContext
init
overload
"[Ljavax.net.ssl.KeyManager;"
"[Ljavax.net.ssl.TrustManager;"
"java.security.SecureRandom"
implementation
function
km, tm, sr
console
log
"[+] Replacing TrustManagers in SSLContext.init"
this
init
TrustManager
try
var
NetworkSecurityConfig
Java
use
"android.security.net.config.NetworkSecurityConfig"
NetworkSecurityConfig
isCleartextTrafficPermitted
implementation
function
return
true
catch
console
log
"[*] SSL pinning bypass loaded"
frida -U -f com.target.app -l android_ssl_bypass.js --no-pause
iOS - Universal SSL Pinning Bypass:
if (ObjC .available ) {
var resolver = new ApiResolver ("objc" );
resolver.enumerateMatches (
"-[* URLSession:didReceiveChallenge:completionHandler:]" , {
onMatch : function (match ) {
Interceptor .attach (match.address , {
onEnter : function (args ) {
var completionHandler = new ObjC .Block (args[4 ]);
var NSURLSessionAuthChallengeUseCredential = 0 ;
var trust = new ObjC .Object (args[3 ])
.protectionSpace ().serverTrust ();
var credential = ObjC .classes .NSURLCredential
.credentialForTrust_ (trust);
completionHandler.invoke (NSURLSessionAuthChallengeUseCredential ,
credential);
}
});
},
onComplete : function ( ) {}
});
var SecTrustEvaluateWithError = Module .findExportByName (
"Security" , "SecTrustEvaluateWithError" );
if (SecTrustEvaluateWithError ) {
Interceptor .replace (SecTrustEvaluateWithError , new NativeCallback (
function (trust, error ) {
return 1 ;
}, "bool" , ["pointer" , "pointer" ]
));
}
console .log ("[*] iOS SSL pinning bypass loaded" );
}
Step 4: Handle Advanced Pinning For apps using advanced pinning (TrustKit, custom binary checks):
frida-trace -U -n TargetApp -m "*[*Trust*]" -m "*[*Pin*]" -m "*[*SSL*]" -m "*[*Certificate*]"
Step 5: Verify Bypass Success After applying the bypass:
Configure device proxy to Burp Suite
Open target app and navigate through authenticated flows
Verify HTTPS traffic appears in Burp Suite HTTP History
Check for any remaining pinned connections that are not captured
Key Concepts Term Definition Certificate Pinning Restricting accepted server certificates to a known set, preventing MITM via rogue CA certificates Public Key Pinning Pinning the server's public key hash rather than the full certificate, surviving certificate rotation Network Security Config Android XML configuration for declaring trust anchors, pins, and cleartext policy per-domain TrustKit Open-source library implementing certificate pinning with reporting for both Android and iOS HPKP Deprecation HTTP Public Key Pinning header was deprecated in browsers but concept persists in mobile apps
Tools & Systems
Objection : Pre-built pinning bypass for common libraries (OkHttp, NSURLSession, TrustKit)
Frida : Custom JavaScript hooks targeting specific pinning implementations
apktool : APK decompilation for identifying pinning in Network Security Config
SSLUnpinning (Xposed) : Xposed framework module for system-wide pinning bypass on Android
ssl-kill-switch2 : iOS tweak for disabling SSL pinning system-wide on jailbroken devices
Common Pitfalls
Certificate transparency : Some apps check CT logs in addition to pinning. May need to bypass CT verification separately.
Multi-layer pinning : Apps may implement pinning at multiple levels (OkHttp + custom TrustManager). Bypass all layers.
Binary-level pinning : Some apps validate certificates in native C/C++ code, which requires Interceptor.attach at native function addresses rather than Java/ObjC hooks.
Dynamic pinning updates : Apps using TrustKit or similar may fetch updated pins from a server. Monitor for pin rotation during testing.