| name | user-investigation |
| description | Use this skill when asked to investigate a user account for security issues, suspicious activity, or compliance review. Triggers on keywords like "investigate user", "security investigation", "user investigation", "check user activity", "analyze sign-ins", or when a UPN/email is mentioned with investigation context. This skill provides comprehensive Entra ID user security analysis including sign-in anomalies, MFA status, device compliance, audit logs, security incidents, Identity Protection risk, and automated reports (HTML, markdown file, or inline chat). |
| threat_pulse_domains | ["identity"] |
| drill_down_prompt | Investigate user {entity} — sign-in anomalies, MFA, audit trail, Identity Protection risk |
User Security Investigation - Instructions
Purpose
This skill performs comprehensive security investigations on Entra ID user accounts, analyzing sign-in patterns, anomalies, MFA status, device compliance, audit logs, Office 365 activity, security incidents, and Identity Protection risk signals.
📑 TABLE OF CONTENTS
- Critical Workflow Rules - Start here!
- Investigation Types - Standard/Quick/Comprehensive
- Output Modes - Inline / Markdown file / HTML report
- Quick Start - 6-step investigation pattern
- Execution Workflow - Complete process
- Sample KQL Queries - Validated query patterns
- Microsoft Graph Queries - Identity Protection integration
- Markdown Report Template - Full markdown report structure
- JSON Export Structure - Required fields (HTML report)
- Error Handling - Troubleshooting guide
- SVG Dashboard Generation - Visual dashboard from report data
Investigation shortcuts:
- Risky user quick triage (TP Q3): Q6 (security incidents) → Q2 (anomalies) → Q12 (UEBA anomalies) → Q3d (sign-ins by IP) → Graph: MFA methods
- Compromised user forensics (TP Q3+Q9): Q3 (sign-in summary) → Q5 (OfficeActivity) → Q3d (IP breakdown) → Q1 (priority IPs for enrichment)
- Password spray target (TP Q4): Q3c (sign-in failures) → Q3d (IPs hitting this user) → Q6 (related incidents)
- Post-incident user timeline (TP Q1, incident follow-up): Q4 (audit logs) → Q5 (O365 activity) → Q10 (DLP events) → Q6 (all incidents)
- IP enrichment for user (TP Q3+Q4): Q1 (priority IP extraction) → Q11 (TI matches) →
enrich_ips.py
- UEBA behavioral context (TP Q3, portal UEBA anomalies): Q12 (Anomalies table) → Q6 (related incidents) → Q4 (audit trail)
⛔ Shortcut Default Rule: When a matching shortcut exists for the investigation context, use it — don't run the full workflow. Only run full Batch 1 + Batch 2 when the user explicitly requests "full investigation", "comprehensive", or "deep dive". Shortcuts render only the report sections relevant to their query chain (plus Executive Summary and Recommendations, always).
⚠️ CRITICAL WORKFLOW RULES - READ FIRST ⚠️
Before starting ANY user investigation:
- ALWAYS get User Object ID FIRST (required for SecurityIncident and Identity Protection queries)
- ALWAYS calculate date ranges correctly (use current date from context - see Date Range section)
- ALWAYS ask the user for output mode if not specified: inline chat summary, markdown file report, HTML report, or any combination (see Output Modes)
- ALWAYS track and report time after each major step (mandatory)
- ALWAYS run independent queries in parallel (drastically faster execution)
- ALWAYS use
create_file for JSON export and markdown reports (NEVER use PowerShell terminal commands)
- ⛔ ALWAYS enforce Sentinel workspace selection (see Workspace Selection section below)
⛔ MANDATORY: Sentinel Workspace Selection
This skill requires a Sentinel workspace to execute queries. Follow these rules STRICTLY:
When invoked from a parent skill (incident-investigation, threat-pulse, etc.):
- Inherit the workspace selection from the parent investigation context
- If no workspace was selected in parent context: STOP and ask user to select
- Use the
SELECTED_WORKSPACE_IDS passed from the parent skill
- Skip output mode prompts — default to inline chat (the parent skill controls the final output format)
When invoked standalone (direct user request):
- ALWAYS call
list_sentinel_workspaces MCP tool FIRST
- If 1 workspace exists: Auto-select, display to user, proceed
- If multiple workspaces exist:
- Display all workspaces with Name and ID
- ASK: "Which Sentinel workspace should I use for this investigation?"
- ⛔ STOP AND WAIT for user response
- ⛔ DO NOT proceed until user explicitly selects
- If a query fails on the selected workspace:
- ⛔ DO NOT automatically try another workspace
- STOP and report the error
- Display available workspaces
- ASK user to select a different workspace
- WAIT for user response
Workspace Failure Handling
IF query returns "Failed to resolve table" or similar error:
- STOP IMMEDIATELY
- Report: "⚠️ Query failed on workspace [NAME] ([ID]). Error: [ERROR_MESSAGE]"
- Display: "Available workspaces: [LIST_ALL_WORKSPACES]"
- ASK: "Which workspace should I use instead?"
- WAIT for explicit user response
- DO NOT retry with a different workspace automatically
🔴 PROHIBITED ACTIONS:
- ❌ Selecting a workspace without user consent when multiple exist
- ❌ Switching to another workspace after a failure without asking
- ❌ Proceeding with investigation if workspace selection is ambiguous
- ❌ Assuming a workspace based on previous sessions
Date Range Rules:
- Real-time/recent searches: Add +2 days to current date for end range
- Historical ranges: Add +1 day to user's specified end date
- Example: Current date = Nov 25; "Last 7 days" →
datetime(2025-11-18) to datetime(2025-11-27)
Available Investigation Types
Standard Investigation (7 days)
When to use: General security reviews, routine investigations
Example prompts:
Quick Investigation (1 day)
When to use: Urgent cases, recent suspicious activity
Example prompts:
Comprehensive Investigation (30 days)
When to use: Deep-dive analysis, compliance reviews, thorough forensics
Example prompts:
All types include: Anomaly detection, sign-in analysis, IP enrichment, Graph identity data, device compliance, audit logs, Office 365 activity, security alerts, threat intelligence, risk assessment, and automated recommendations.
Output Modes
This skill supports three output modes. ASK the user which they prefer if not explicitly specified. Multiple modes may be selected simultaneously.
Mode 1: Inline Chat Summary (Default)
- Render the full investigation analysis directly in the chat response
- Includes key metrics, risk assessment, anomalies, IP intelligence, sign-in patterns, and recommendations
- Best for quick review and interactive follow-up questions
- No file output — results stay in the chat context
Mode 2: Markdown File Report
- Save a comprehensive investigation report to
reports/user-investigations/user_investigation_<username>_<YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS>.md
- All sections from inline mode plus additional detail (full IP tables, query appendix, complete audit trail)
- Uses the Markdown Report Template defined below
- Use
create_file tool — NEVER use terminal commands for file output
- Filename pattern:
user_investigation_<username>_YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS.md (extract username from UPN, e.g., jdoe from jdoe@contoso.com)
Mode 3: HTML Report (Legacy)
- Export investigation data to JSON, then generate a styled HTML report via
generate_report_from_json.py
- Interactive IP cards, paginated tables, copy-KQL buttons, and risk-colored visualizations
- Best for sharing with stakeholders who prefer a polished visual report
- Requires the Python report generator pipeline (JSON export → IP enrichment → HTML generation)
Markdown Rendering Notes
- ✅ ASCII tables, box-drawing characters, and bar charts render perfectly in markdown code blocks
- ✅ Unicode block characters (
█ full block, ─ box-drawing horizontal) display correctly in monospaced fonts
- ✅ Emoji indicators (🔴🟢🟡⚠️✅) render natively in GitHub-flavored markdown
- ✅ Standard markdown tables (
| col |) render as formatted tables
- Tip: Wrap all ASCII art in triple-backtick code fences for consistent rendering
Mode Selection Examples
Quick Start (TL;DR)
When a user requests a security investigation:
-
Get User ID:
mcp_microsoft_mcp_microsoft_graph_suggest_queries("get user by email")
mcp_microsoft_mcp_microsoft_graph_get("/v1.0/users/<UPN>?$select=id,onPremisesSecurityIdentifier")
-
Determine Output Mode:
- If user specified: use that mode (inline / markdown / HTML / combination)
- If not specified: ASK user — "Which output format? Inline chat summary, markdown file report, HTML report, or a combination?"
-
Run Parallel Queries:
- Batch 1: 10 Sentinel queries (anomalies, IP extraction, sign-ins, IP counts, audit logs, incidents, etc.)
- Batch 2: 6 Graph queries (profile, MFA, devices, Identity Protection)
- Batch 3: Threat intel enrichment (after extracting IPs from batch 1)
-
Generate Output (based on selected mode):
Mode 1 — Inline: Render analysis directly in chat (no file output)
Mode 2 — Markdown file:
create_file("reports/user-investigations/user_investigation_<username>_<timestamp>.md", markdown_content)
Mode 3 — HTML report:
create_file("temp/investigation_<upn_prefix>_<timestamp>.json", json_content)
$env:PYTHONPATH = "<WORKSPACE_ROOT>"
.venv\Scripts\python.exe scripts/generate_report_from_json.py temp/investigation_<upn_prefix>_<timestamp>.json
-
IP Enrichment (Modes 2 & 3):
- Mode 2 (Markdown): Run
python enrich_ips.py <ip1> <ip2> ... for top IPs extracted from queries, then include enrichment results in the markdown report
- Mode 3 (HTML): IP enrichment is handled automatically by
generate_report_from_json.py
-
Track time after each major step and report to user
Execution Workflow
🚨 MANDATORY: Time Tracking Pattern
YOU MUST TRACK AND REPORT TIME AFTER EVERY MAJOR STEP:
[MM:SS] ✓ Step description (XX seconds)
Required Reporting Points:
- After User ID retrieval
- After parallel data collection
- After JSON file creation
- After report generation
- Final: Total elapsed time
Phase 1: Get User ID and SID (REQUIRED FIRST)
- Get user Object ID (Entra ID) and onPremisesSecurityIdentifier (Windows SID) from Microsoft Graph
- Query: /v1.0/users/<UPN>?$select=id,onPremisesSecurityIdentifier
Why this is required:
- User ID needed for SecurityIncident queries (alerts use User ID, not UPN)
- User ID needed for Identity Protection queries
- Windows SID needed for on-premises incident matching
- Missing User ID = missed incidents (e.g., "Device Code Authentication Flow Detected")
Phase 2: Parallel Data Collection
CRITICAL: Use create_file tool to create JSON - NEVER use PowerShell terminal commands!
Batch 1: Sentinel Queries (Run ALL in parallel)
- IP selection query (Query 1) - Returns up to 15 prioritized IPs
- Anomalies query (Query 2)
- UEBA anomaly summary (Query 12) - Sentinel Anomalies table: scored behavioral detections
- Sign-in by application (Query 3)
- Sign-in by location (Query 3b)
- Sign-in failures (Query 3c)
- Audit logs (Query 4)
- Office 365 activity (Query 5)
- DLP events (Query 10)
- Security incidents (Query 6)
After Batch 1 completes: Extract IP Array from Query 1 Results
- Extract IPAddress column into array:
["ip1", "ip2", "ip3", ...]
- Build dynamic array for next batch:
let target_ips = dynamic(["ip1", "ip2", "ip3", ...]);
Batch 2: IP Enrichment + Graph Queries (Run ALL in parallel)
- Threat Intel query (Query 11) - Uses IPs from Query 1
- IP frequency query (Query 3d) - Uses IPs from Query 1
- User profile (Graph)
- MFA methods (Graph)
- Registered devices (Graph)
- User risk profile (Graph)
- Risk detections (Graph)
- Risky sign-ins (Graph)
IP Selection Strategy (Query 1 - Deterministic KQL with Risky IPs):
- Priority 1: Anomaly IPs (from Signinlogs_Anomalies_KQL_CL where AnomalyType endswith "IP") - 8 slots
- Priority 2: Risky IPs (from AADUserRiskEvents - Identity Protection flagged IPs) - 4 slots
- Priority 3: Frequent IPs (top sign-in count for baseline context) - 3 slots
- Deduplication: Anomaly IPs exclude from risky; Anomaly+Risky exclude from frequent (no duplicates)
- Result: Up to 15 unique IPs (8 anomaly + 4 risky-only + 3 frequent-only)
Phase 3: Export & Generate Report (Mode-Dependent)
Mode 1 — Inline Chat Summary
- No file export needed
- Render the full investigation analysis directly in chat using the section structure from the Markdown Report Template as a guide
- Include: Executive Summary, Key Metrics, Anomalies, IP Intelligence summary, Sign-in Patterns, Risk Assessment, Recommendations
- Use emoji-coded tables for risk factors and mitigating factors
Mode 2 — Markdown File Report
-
Assess IP enrichment needs:
- Extract the top priority IPs from Query 1 results
- Run
python enrich_ips.py <ip1> <ip2> ... for threat intelligence enrichment
- Parse the output to populate IP Intelligence tables in the report
-
Build the markdown report using the Markdown Report Template below
- Populate ALL sections with actual query data
- For sections with no data: use the explicit absence confirmation pattern (e.g., "✅ No anomalies detected...")
- Calculate risk score and assessment dynamically (same logic as HTML report — see
generate_report_from_json.py)
-
Save the report:
create_file("reports/user-investigations/user_investigation_<username>_YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS.md", markdown_content)
- Use
create_file tool — NEVER use terminal commands for file output
- Extract username from UPN (e.g.,
jdoe from jdoe@contoso.com)
Mode 3 — HTML Report (Legacy)
-
Export to JSON:
Create single JSON file: temp/investigation_{upn_prefix}_{timestamp}.json
Merge all results into one dict structure (see JSON Export Structure section below).
-
Generate HTML report:
$env:PYTHONPATH = "<WORKSPACE_ROOT>"
cd "<WORKSPACE_ROOT>"
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe scripts/generate_report_from_json.py temp/investigation_<upn_prefix>_<timestamp>.json
The HTML report generator handles:
- Dataclass transformation logic
- IP enrichment (prioritized: anomaly IPs first, then frequent sign-in IPs, cap at 10)
- Dynamic risk assessment (NO hardcoded text - all metrics calculated from data)
- KQL query template population
- Result counts calculation
- HTML report generation with modern, streamlined design
Combining Modes
When multiple modes are selected (e.g., "markdown and HTML"):
- Run the data collection once (Phase 2)
- Generate each output format in sequence
- For Mode 2 + Mode 3: the JSON export from Mode 3 can reuse the same data; generate markdown first, then JSON + HTML
Required Field Specifications
User Profile Query
/v1.0/users/<UPN>?$select=id,displayName,userPrincipalName,mail,userType,jobTitle,department,officeLocation,accountEnabled,onPremisesSecurityIdentifier
- All fields REQUIRED for report generation
- Default null values:
department="Unknown", officeLocation="Unknown"
onPremisesSecurityIdentifier returns Windows SID (format: S-1-5-21-...) - REQUIRED for on-premises incident matching
Device Query
/v1.0/users/<USER_ID>/ownedDevices?$select=id,deviceId,displayName,operatingSystem,operatingSystemVersion,registrationDateTime,isCompliant,isManaged,trustType,approximateLastSignInDateTime&$orderby=approximateLastSignInDateTime desc&$top=5&$count=true
- All fields REQUIRED for report generation
- Default null values:
trustType="Workplace", approximateLastSignInDateTime="2025-01-01T00:00:00Z"
MFA Methods Query
/v1.0/users/<USER_ID>/authentication/methods?$top=5
Sample KQL Queries
Replace <UPN>, <StartDate>, <EndDate> in these patterns.
⚠️ CRITICAL: START WITH THESE EXACT QUERY PATTERNS
These queries have been tested and validated. Use them as your PRIMARY reference.
Tool Selection for This Skill
Follow the global tool selection rule from copilot-instructions.md:
| Investigation Lookback | Tool | Reason |
|---|
| ≤ 30 days (Quick, Standard, Comprehensive) | RunAdvancedHuntingQuery | Free for Analytics-tier tables; covers all connected workspace tables |
| > 30 days (custom range) | mcp_sentinel-data_query_lake | AH only retains 30 days |
| AH query blocked by safety filter | mcp_sentinel-data_query_lake | Fallback |
| AH returns "table not found" | mcp_sentinel-data_query_lake | Fallback |
Default: Use RunAdvancedHuntingQuery for all standard investigations. All three investigation types (1d, 7d, 30d) fit within AH's 30-day retention window. Only fall back to Data Lake when the lookback exceeds 30 days or AH fails.
Timestamp column: All tables used in this skill (SigninLogs, AuditLogs, SecurityAlert, SecurityIncident, OfficeActivity, CloudAppEvents, AADUserRiskEvents, Signinlogs_Anomalies_KQL_CL, ThreatIntelIndicators) use TimeGenerated in both tools — no adaptation needed when switching.
📅 Date Range Quick Reference
🔴 STEP 0: GET CURRENT DATE FIRST (MANDATORY) 🔴
- ALWAYS check the current date from the context header BEFORE calculating date ranges
- NEVER use hardcoded years - the year changes and you WILL query the wrong timeframe
RULE 1: Real-Time/Recent Searches (Current Activity)
- Add +2 days to current date for end range
- Why +2? +1 for timezone offset (PST behind UTC) + +1 for inclusive end-of-day
- Pattern: Today is Nov 25 (PST) → Use
datetime(2025-11-27) as end date
RULE 2: Historical Searches (User-Specified Dates)
- Add +1 day to user's specified end date
- Why +1? To include all 24 hours of the final day
Examples Table (Assuming Current Date = November 27, 2025):
| User Request | <StartDate> | <EndDate> | Rule Applied |
|---|
| "Last 7 days" | 2025-11-20 | 2025-11-29 | Rule 1 (+2) |
| "Last 30 days" | 2025-10-28 | 2025-11-29 | Rule 1 (+2) |
| "Nov 21 to Nov 23" | 2025-11-21 | 2025-11-24 | Rule 2 (+1) |
🚨 CRITICAL - SIGN-IN QUERIES REQUIREMENT 🚨
You MUST run ALL THREE sign-in queries (3, 3b, 3c) to populate the signin_events dict!
1. Extract Top Priority IPs (Deterministic IP Selection with Risky IPs)
let start = datetime(<StartDate>);
let end = datetime(<EndDate>);
let upn = '<UPN>';
// Priority 1: Anomaly IPs (top 8 by anomaly count)
let anomaly_ips =
Signinlogs_Anomalies_KQL_CL
| where DetectedDateTime between (start .. end)
| where UserPrincipalName =~ upn
| where AnomalyType endswith "IP"
| summarize AnomalyCount = count(), FirstSeen = min(DetectedDateTime) by IPAddress = Value
| order by AnomalyCount desc, FirstSeen asc
| take 8
| extend Priority = 1, Source = "Anomaly";
// Priority 2: Risky IPs from Identity Protection (top 10 for selection pool)
let risky_ips_pool =
AADUserRiskEvents
| where ActivityDateTime between (start .. end)
| where UserPrincipalName =~ upn
| where isnotempty(IpAddress)
| summarize RiskCount = count(), FirstSeen = min(ActivityDateTime) by IPAddress = IpAddress
| order by RiskCount desc, FirstSeen asc
| take 10
| extend Priority = 2, Source = "RiskyIP";
// Priority 3: Frequent Sign-in IPs (top 10 for selection pool)
let frequent_ips_pool =
union isfuzzy=true SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated between (start .. end)
| where UserPrincipalName =~ upn
| summarize SignInCount = count(), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated) by IPAddress
| order by SignInCount desc, FirstSeen asc
| take 10
| extend Priority = 3, Source = "Frequent";
// Get anomaly IP list for exclusion from risky slot
let anomaly_ip_list = anomaly_ips | project IPAddress;
// Get anomaly + risky IP list for exclusion from frequent slot
let priority_ip_list =
union anomaly_ips, risky_ips_pool
| project IPAddress;
// Reserve slots with deduplication: 8 anomaly + 4 risky + 3 frequent
let anomaly_slot = anomaly_ips | extend Count = AnomalyCount;
let risky_slot = risky_ips_pool
| join kind=anti anomaly_ip_list on IPAddress
| order by RiskCount desc, FirstSeen asc
| take 4
| extend Count = RiskCount;
let frequent_slot = frequent_ips_pool
| join kind=anti priority_ip_list on IPAddress
| order by SignInCount desc, FirstSeen asc
| take 3
| extend Count = SignInCount;
union anomaly_slot, risky_slot, frequent_slot
| project IPAddress, Priority, Count, Source
| order by Priority asc, Count desc
| project IPAddress
2. Anomalies (Signinlogs_Anomalies_KQL_CL)
Signinlogs_Anomalies_KQL_CL
| where DetectedDateTime between (datetime(<StartDate>) .. datetime(<EndDate>))
| where UserPrincipalName =~ '<UPN>'
| extend Severity = case(
BaselineSize < 3, "Informational",
CountryNovelty and CityNovelty and ArtifactHits >= 20, "High",
ArtifactHits >= 10, "Medium",
(CountryNovelty or CityNovelty or StateNovelty), "Medium",
ArtifactHits >= 5, "Low",
"Informational")
| extend SeverityOrder = case(Severity == 'High', 1, Severity == 'Medium', 2, Severity == 'Low', 3, 4)
| project
DetectedDateTime,
UserPrincipalName,
AnomalyType,
Value,
Severity,
SeverityOrder,
Country,
City,
State,
CountryNovelty,
CityNovelty,
StateNovelty,
ArtifactHits,
FirstSeenRecent,
BaselineSize,
OS,
BrowserFamily,
RawBrowser
| order by SeverityOrder asc, DetectedDateTime desc
| take 10
3. Interactive & Non-Interactive Sign-ins (Summary by Application)
let start = datetime(<StartDate>);
let end = datetime(<EndDate>);
union isfuzzy=true SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated between (start .. end)
| where UserPrincipalName =~ '<UPN>'
| summarize
SignInCount=count(),
SuccessCount=countif(ResultType == '0'),
FailureCount=countif(ResultType != '0'),
FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated),
LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated),
IPAddresses=make_set(IPAddress),
UniqueLocations=dcount(Location)
by AppDisplayName
| order by SignInCount desc
| take 5
3b. Sign-ins Summary by Location
let start = datetime(<StartDate>);
let end = datetime(<EndDate>);
union isfuzzy=true SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated between (start .. end)
| where UserPrincipalName =~ '<UPN>'
| where isnotempty(Location)
| summarize
SignInCount=count(),
SuccessCount=countif(ResultType == '0'),
FailureCount=countif(ResultType != '0'),
FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated),
LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated),
IPAddresses=make_set(IPAddress),
Applications=make_set(AppDisplayName, 5)
by Location
| order by SignInCount desc
| take 5
3c. Sign-in Failures (Detailed)
let start = datetime(<StartDate>);
let end = datetime(<EndDate>);
union isfuzzy=true SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated between (start .. end)
| where UserPrincipalName =~ '<UPN>'
| where ResultType != '0'
| summarize
FailureCount=count(),
FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated),
LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated),
Applications=make_set(AppDisplayName, 3),
Locations=make_set(Location, 3)
by ResultType, ResultDescription
| order by FailureCount desc
| take 5
3d. Sign-in Counts by IP Address
let target_ips = dynamic(["<IP_1>", "<IP_2>", "<IP_3>", ...]);
let start = datetime(<StartDate>);
let end = datetime(<EndDate>);
let most_recent_signins = union isfuzzy=true SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated between (start .. end)
| where UserPrincipalName =~ '<UPN>'
| where IPAddress in (target_ips)
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by IPAddress;
most_recent_signins
| extend AuthDetails = parse_json(AuthenticationDetails)
| extend HasAuthDetails = array_length(AuthDetails) > 0
| extend AuthDetailsToExpand = iif(HasAuthDetails, AuthDetails, dynamic([{"authenticationStepResultDetail": ""}]))
| mv-expand AuthDetailsToExpand
| extend AuthStepResultDetail = tostring(AuthDetailsToExpand.authenticationStepResultDetail)
| extend AuthPriority = case(
AuthStepResultDetail has "MFA requirement satisfied", 1,
AuthStepResultDetail has "Correct password", 2,
AuthStepResultDetail has "Passkey", 2,
AuthStepResultDetail has "Phone sign-in", 2,
AuthStepResultDetail has "SMS verification", 2,
AuthStepResultDetail has "First factor requirement satisfied", 3,
AuthStepResultDetail has "MFA required", 4,
999)
| summarize
MostRecentTime = any(TimeGenerated),
MostRecentResultType = any(ResultType),
HasAuthDetails = any(HasAuthDetails),
MinPriority = min(AuthPriority),
AllAuthDetails = make_set(AuthStepResultDetail)
by IPAddress
| extend LastAuthResultDetail = case(
MostRecentResultType != "0", "Authentication failed",
not(HasAuthDetails) and MostRecentResultType == "0", "Token",
MinPriority == 1 and AllAuthDetails has "MFA requirement satisfied", "MFA requirement satisfied by claim in the token",
MinPriority == 2 and AllAuthDetails has "Correct password", "Correct password",
MinPriority == 2 and AllAuthDetails has "Passkey (device-bound)", "Passkey (device-bound)",
MinPriority == 3 and AllAuthDetails has "First factor requirement satisfied by claim in the token", "First factor requirement satisfied by claim in the token",
MinPriority == 4 and AllAuthDetails has "MFA required in Entra ID", "MFA required in Entra ID",
tostring(AllAuthDetails[0]))
| join kind=inner (
union isfuzzy=true SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated between (start .. end)
| where UserPrincipalName =~ '<UPN>'
| where IPAddress in (target_ips)
| summarize
SignInCount = count(),
SuccessCount = countif(ResultType == '0'),
FailureCount = countif(ResultType != '0'),
FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated),
LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated)
by IPAddress
) on IPAddress
| project IPAddress, SignInCount, SuccessCount, FailureCount, FirstSeen, LastSeen, LastAuthResultDetail
| order by SignInCount desc
4. Entra ID Audit Log Activity (Aggregated Summary)
Tool: RunAdvancedHuntingQuery (≤30d) | mcp_sentinel-data_query_lake (>30d fallback)
AH parsing note: InitiatedBy is dynamic in AH — use tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName) for direct field access. For TargetResources, use tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName). Do NOT double-wrap with parse_json(tostring(parse_json(tostring(...)))) — that Data Lake pattern can cause errors in AH.
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated between (datetime(<StartDate>) .. datetime(<EndDate>))
| where Identity =~ '<UPN>' or tostring(InitiatedBy) has '<UPN>'
| summarize
Count=count(),
FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated),
LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated),
Operations=make_set(OperationName, 10)
by Category, Result
| order by Count desc
| take 10
Ad-hoc drill-down pattern (AH-safe): When you need detailed audit entries beyond the summary above:
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated between (datetime(<StartDate>) .. datetime(<EndDate>))
| where Identity =~ '<UPN>' or tostring(InitiatedBy) has '<UPN>'
| extend Actor = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| extend Target = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| project TimeGenerated, OperationName, Actor, Target, Result, Category
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| take 30
5. Office 365 (Email / Teams / SharePoint) Activity Distribution
OfficeActivity
| where TimeGenerated between (datetime(<StartDate>) .. datetime(<EndDate>))
| where UserId =~ '<UPN>'
| summarize ActivityCount = count() by RecordType, Operation
| order by ActivityCount desc
| take 5
6. Security Incidents with Alerts Correlated to User
let targetUPN = "<UPN>";
let targetUserId = "<USER_OBJECT_ID>"; // REQUIRED: Get from Microsoft Graph API
let targetSid = "<WINDOWS_SID>"; // REQUIRED: Get from Microsoft Graph API
let start = datetime(<StartDate>);
let end = datetime(<EndDate>);
let relevantAlerts = SecurityAlert
| where TimeGenerated between (start .. end)
| where Entities has targetUPN or Entities has targetUserId or Entities has targetSid
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by SystemAlertId
| project SystemAlertId, AlertName, AlertSeverity, ProviderName, Tactics;
SecurityIncident
| where CreatedTime between (start .. end)
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by IncidentNumber
| where not(tostring(Labels) has "Redirected")
| mv-expand AlertId = AlertIds
| extend AlertId = tostring(AlertId)
| join kind=inner relevantAlerts on $left.AlertId == $right.SystemAlertId
| extend ProviderIncidentUrl = tostring(AdditionalData.providerIncidentUrl)
| extend OwnerUPN = tostring(Owner.userPrincipalName)
| extend LastModifiedTime = todatetime(LastModifiedTime)
| summarize
Title = any(Title),
Severity = any(Severity),
Status = any(Status),
Classification = any(Classification),
CreatedTime = any(CreatedTime),
LastModifiedTime = any(LastModifiedTime),
OwnerUPN = any(OwnerUPN),
ProviderIncidentUrl = any(ProviderIncidentUrl),
AlertCount = count()
by ProviderIncidentId
| order by LastModifiedTime desc
| take 10
CRITICAL: ALL THREE identifiers are REQUIRED (targetUPN, targetUserId, targetSid) - different alert types use different entity formats.
10. DLP Events (Data Loss Prevention)
let upn = '<UPN>';
let start = datetime(<StartDate>);
let end = datetime(<EndDate>);
CloudAppEvents
| where TimeGenerated between (start .. end)
| where ActionType in ("FileCopiedToRemovableMedia", "FileUploadedToCloud", "FileCopiedToNetworkShare")
| extend ParsedData = parse_json(RawEventData)
| extend DlpAudit = ParsedData["DlpAuditEventMetadata"]
| extend File = ParsedData["ObjectId"]
| extend UserId = ParsedData["UserId"]
| extend DeviceName = ParsedData["DeviceName"]
| extend ClientIP = ParsedData["ClientIP"]
| extend RuleName = ParsedData["PolicyMatchInfo"]["RuleName"]
| extend Operation = ParsedData["Operation"]
| extend TargetDomain = ParsedData["TargetDomain"]
| extend TargetFilePath = ParsedData["TargetFilePath"]
| where isnotnull(DlpAudit)
| where UserId == upn
| summarize by TimeGenerated, tostring(UserId), tostring(DeviceName), tostring(ClientIP), tostring(RuleName), tostring(File), tostring(Operation), tostring(TargetDomain), tostring(TargetFilePath)
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| take 5
11. Threat Intelligence IP Enrichment (Bulk IP Query)
Performance notes: Filter IsActive/ValidUntil before transformations per KQL best practices. The triple replace_string was replaced with direct array indexing split(...)[0].
let target_ips = dynamic(["<IP_1>", "<IP_2>", "<IP_3>"]);
ThreatIntelIndicators
| where IsActive and (ValidUntil > now() or isempty(ValidUntil))
| where tostring(split(ObservableKey, ":")[0]) in ("ipv4-addr", "ipv6-addr", "network-traffic")
| where ObservableValue in (target_ips)
| extend Description = tostring(parse_json(Data).description)
| where Description !contains_cs "State: inactive;" and Description !contains_cs "State: falsepos;"
| extend TrafficLightProtocolLevel = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).TLPLevel)
| extend ActivityGroupNames = extract(@"ActivityGroup:(\S+)", 1, tostring(parse_json(Data).labels))
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by ObservableValue
| project
TimeGenerated,
IPAddress = ObservableValue,
ThreatDescription = Description,
ActivityGroupNames,
Confidence,
ValidUntil,
TrafficLightProtocolLevel,
IsActive
| order by Confidence desc, TimeGenerated desc
12. UEBA Anomaly Summary (Sentinel Anomalies Table)
Purpose: Retrieves scored behavioral anomaly detections from Sentinel's built-in UEBA anomaly rules. Aggregates by anomaly type — collapses high-volume rows (e.g., 50 "Anomalous Role Assignment" events) into a single summary row per template. Extracts only the anomalous flags (IsAnomalous == true) and flattens MITRE arrays. Score range: 0.0–1.0 (≥0.7 = High, 0.3–0.7 = Medium, <0.3 = Low).
Data source: The Anomalies table is the KQL source behind the portal's "UEBA anomalies" section. It is distinct from BehaviorInfo (MCAS, AH-only) and BehaviorAnalytics (raw UEBA events, Data Lake-only). Available in both Advanced Hunting and Data Lake.
Tool: RunAdvancedHuntingQuery (default) or mcp_sentinel-data_query_lake (>30d fallback)
⚠️ TI False Positive: DeviceInsights.ThreatIntelIndicatorType frequently shows BruteForce on corporate/Azure egress IPs (TITAN dynamic reputation). Weight the Score and AnomalyFlags over the TI match — a 0.2-score anomaly with a BruteForce TI hit on a known corporate IP is noise.
let targetUPN = '<UPN>';
let lookback = 30d;
Anomalies
| where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
| where UserPrincipalName =~ targetUPN
| extend TI_Type = tostring(DeviceInsights.ThreatIntelIndicatorType)
| mv-apply reason = AnomalyReasons on (
where tobool(reason.IsAnomalous) == true
| project FlagName = tostring(reason.Name))
| summarize
Occurrences = dcount(Id),
MaxScore = max(Score),
AvgScore = round(avg(Score), 2),
Tactics = make_set(parse_json(Tactics)),
Techniques = make_set(parse_json(Techniques)),
SourceIPs = make_set(SourceIpAddress, 5),
AnomalyFlags = make_set(FlagName),
TI_Flags = make_set_if(TI_Type, isnotempty(TI_Type)),
FirstSeen = min(StartTime),
LastSeen = max(EndTime),
SampleDescription = take_any(Description)
by AnomalyTemplateName
| mv-apply t = Tactics to typeof(string) on (summarize Tactics = make_set(t))
| mv-apply t = Techniques to typeof(string) on (summarize Techniques = make_set(t))
| extend Tactics = set_difference(Tactics, dynamic([""]))
| extend Techniques = set_difference(Techniques, dynamic([""]))
| order by MaxScore desc, Occurrences desc
Output columns: AnomalyTemplateName, Occurrences (unique anomaly IDs), MaxScore, AvgScore, Tactics, Techniques, SourceIPs, AnomalyFlags (flat set of anomalous reasons), TI_Flags, FirstSeen, LastSeen, SampleDescription (one example description for context).
Verdict guidance:
- 🔴 Escalate: MaxScore ≥ 0.7 with multiple occurrences, or anomaly type involves credential access / account manipulation
- 🟠 Investigate: MaxScore ≥ 0.3, or flags include
CountryUncommonlyConnectedFromByUser combined with ActionUncommonlyPerformedByUser
- 🟡 Monitor: Low scores (<0.3) with explainable flags (e.g., first-time admin operations, CTF/lab accounts in target entities)
- ✅ Clear: 0 results — no UEBA anomalies detected
Zero results note: Unlike Q2 (custom Signinlogs_Anomalies_KQL_CL), Q12 queries the built-in Sentinel UEBA Anomalies table. Zero results means no built-in anomaly rules fired — not that UEBA is disabled. If UEBA is not enabled in the workspace, the table may not exist (handle gracefully).
Microsoft Graph Identity Protection Queries
CRITICAL: Always query Identity Protection data in Phase 2 (Batch 2) of investigation workflow
Step 1: Get User Object ID and Windows SID
mcp_microsoft_mcp_microsoft_graph_get("/v1.0/users/<UPN>?$select=id,displayName,userPrincipalName,onPremisesSecurityIdentifier")
Step 2: Get User Risk Profile
mcp_microsoft_mcp_microsoft_graph_get("/v1.0/identityProtection/riskyUsers/<USER_ID>")
Returns: riskLevel (low/medium/high/none), riskState (atRisk/confirmedCompromised/dismissed/remediated)
Step 3: Get Risk Detections
mcp_microsoft_mcp_microsoft_graph_get("/v1.0/identityProtection/riskDetections?$filter=userId eq '<USER_ID>'&$select=id,detectedDateTime,riskEventType,riskLevel,riskState,riskDetail,ipAddress,location,activity,activityDateTime&$orderby=detectedDateTime desc&$top=10")
Returns: Array of risk events with riskEventType (unlikelyTravel, unfamiliarFeatures, anonymizedIPAddress, etc.)
Step 4: Get Risky Sign-ins
mcp_microsoft_mcp_microsoft_graph_get("/beta/auditLogs/signIns?$filter=userId eq '<USER_ID>' and (riskState eq 'atRisk' or riskState eq 'confirmedCompromised')&$select=id,createdDateTime,userPrincipalName,appDisplayName,ipAddress,location,riskState,riskLevelDuringSignIn,riskEventTypes_v2,riskDetail,status&$orderby=createdDateTime desc&$top=5")
NOTE: Risky sign-ins are ONLY available in /beta endpoint, not /v1.0
Common Risk Event Types
- unlikelyTravel: User traveled impossible distance between sign-ins
- unfamiliarFeatures: Sign-in from unfamiliar location/device/IP
- anonymizedIPAddress: Sign-in from Tor, VPN, or proxy
- maliciousIPAddress: Sign-in from known malicious IP
- leakedCredentials: User credentials found in leak databases
Markdown Report Template
When outputting to markdown file (Mode 2), use this template. Populate ALL sections with actual query data. For sections with no data, use the explicit absence confirmation pattern.
Filename pattern: reports/user-investigations/user_investigation_<username>_YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS.md
# User Security Investigation Report
**Generated:** YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM UTC
**Workspace:** <workspace_name>
**User:** <display_name> (`<UPN>`)
**Department:** <department> | **Title:** <job_title> | **Location:** <office_location>
**Account Status:** <Enabled/Disabled> | **User Type:** <Member/Guest>
**Investigation Period:** <start_date> → <end_date> (<N> days)
**Investigation Type:** <Standard (7d) / Quick (1d) / Comprehensive (30d)>
**Data Sources:** SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs, AuditLogs, SecurityAlert, SecurityIncident, OfficeActivity, CloudAppEvents, AADUserRiskEvents, Signinlogs_Anomalies_KQL_CL, Identity Protection (Graph API), ThreatIntelIndicators
---
## Executive Summary
<2-4 sentence summary: overall risk level, key findings, most significant anomalies or concerns, and primary recommendation. Ground every claim in evidence from query results.>
**Overall Risk Level:** 🔴 HIGH / 🟠 MEDIUM / 🟡 LOW / 🟢 INFORMATIONAL
---
## Key Metrics
| Metric | Value |
|--------|-------|
| **Total Sign-ins** | <count> |
| **Successful** | <count> (<percentage>%) |
| **Failed** | <count> (<percentage>%) |
| **Unique IPs** | <count> |
| **Unique Locations** | <count> |
| **Anomalies Detected** | <count> (High: <n>, Medium: <n>, Low: <n>) |
| **Security Incidents** | <count> (Open: <n>, Closed: <n>) |
| **Risk Detections** | <count> (atRisk: <n>, remediated: <n>) |
| **DLP Events** | <count> |
| **MFA Methods** | <count> methods |
---
## MFA & Authentication Status
| Factor | Status |
|--------|--------|
| **MFA Enabled** | 🟢 Yes / 🔴 No |
| **Methods** | <list of methods: Authenticator, FIDO2, Phone, etc.> |
| **FIDO2/Passkey** | 🟢 Enrolled / 🟡 Not enrolled |
| **Authenticator App** | 🟢 Enrolled / 🟡 Not enrolled |
| **Phishing-Resistant** | 🟢 Yes (passkey/FIDO2) / 🟡 No |
---
## Identity Protection
### User Risk Profile
| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| **Risk Level** | 🔴/🟠/🟡/🟢 <high/medium/low/none> |
| **Risk State** | <atRisk / confirmedCompromised / remediated / dismissed / none> |
| **Risk Detail** | <detail text> |
| **Last Updated** | <datetime> |
### Risk Detections
<If risk detections found:>
| Detected | Risk Type | Level | State | IP Address | Location | Activity |
|----------|-----------|-------|-------|------------|----------|----------|
| <datetime> | <riskEventType> | <level> | <state> | <ip> | <city, country> | <signin/user> |
<If no risk detections:>
✅ No Identity Protection risk detections for this user in the investigation period.
### Risky Sign-ins
<If risky sign-ins found:>
| Time | Application | IP Address | Location | Risk Level | Risk State | Detail |
|------|-------------|------------|----------|------------|------------|--------|
| <datetime> | <app> | <ip> | <city, country> | <level> | <state> | <detail> |
<If no risky sign-ins:>
✅ No risky sign-ins detected for this user in the investigation period.
---
## Anomalies (Signinlogs_Anomalies_KQL_CL)
<If anomalies found:>
| Detected | Type | Value | Severity | Location | Hits | Geo Novelty |
|----------|------|-------|----------|----------|------|-------------|
| <datetime> | <NewInteractiveIP / NewInteractiveDeviceCombo / etc.> | <IP or OS\|Browser> | 🔴/🟠/🟡 <severity> | <country, city> | <count> | <Country: Y/N, City: Y/N> |
**Anomaly Summary:**
- <X> new IP addresses detected (Y with geographic novelty)
- <X> new device combinations detected
- Highest severity: <level> — <brief description of most critical anomaly>
<If no anomalies:>
✅ No sign-in anomalies detected in the investigation period.
- Checked: Signinlogs_Anomalies_KQL_CL (0 records)
---
## IP Intelligence
<Table of up to 15 prioritized IPs with enrichment data. Run `enrich_ips.py` for top IPs.>
| IP Address | Source | Location | ISP/Org | VPN | Abuse Score | Reports | Risk | Sign-ins | Auth Method |
|------------|--------|----------|---------|-----|-------------|---------|------|----------|-------------|
| <ip> | 🔴 Anomaly / 🟠 Risky / 🔵 Frequent | <city, country> | <org> | 🟢 No / 🔴 Yes | <score>% | <count> | HIGH/MED/LOW | <count> (✓<success>/✗<fail>) | <MFA/Password/Token/Passkey> |
### Threat Intelligence Matches
<If TI matches found:>
| IP Address | Threat Description | Confidence | Activity Groups | Valid Until |
|------------|-------------------|------------|-----------------|------------|
| <ip> | <description> | <score> | <groups> | <date> |
<If no TI matches:>
✅ No threat intelligence matches found for investigated IPs.
---
## Sign-in Activity
### Top Applications
| Application | Sign-ins | Success | Failures | Unique Locations | IP Addresses | First Seen | Last Seen |
|-------------|----------|---------|----------|------------------|--------------|------------|-----------|
| <app> | <count> | <count> | <count> | <count> | <ip_list> | <date> | <date> |
### Top Locations
| Location | Sign-ins | Success | Failures | IP Addresses | Applications | First Seen | Last Seen |
|----------|----------|---------|----------|--------------|--------------|------------|-----------|
| <location> | <count> | <count> | <count> | <ip_list> | <app_list> | <date> | <date> |
### Sign-in Failures
<If failures found:>
| Error Code | Description | Count | Applications | Locations | First Seen | Last Seen |
|------------|-------------|-------|--------------|-----------|------------|-----------|
| <code> | <description> | <count> | <app_list> | <loc_list> | <date> | <date> |
**Failure Analysis:**
- <Brief analysis of failure patterns — device compliance (53000), MFA required (50074), blocked by CA (530032), etc.>
<If no failures:>
✅ No sign-in failures detected in the investigation period.
---
## Registered Devices
<If devices found:>
| Device Name | OS | Trust Type | Compliant | Managed | Last Sign-in |
|-------------|-----|------------|-----------|---------|--------------|
| <name> | <os> <version> | <AzureAd/Hybrid/Workplace> | 🟢 Yes / 🔴 No | 🟢 Yes / 🔴 No | <date> |
<If no devices:>
✅ No registered devices found for this user.
---
## Audit Log Activity
<If audit events found:>
| Category | Result | Count | Operations | First Seen | Last Seen |
|----------|--------|-------|------------|------------|-----------|
| <category> | <Success/Failure> | <count> | <operation_list> | <date> | <date> |
**Notable Operations:**
- <Brief summary of significant audit events — password changes, role assignments, MFA modifications, app consent, etc.>
<If no audit events:>
✅ No audit log activity detected for this user in the investigation period.
---
## Office 365 Activity
<If O365 events found:>
| Record Type | Operation | Count |
|-------------|-----------|-------|
| <type> | <operation> | <count> |
<If no O365 events:>
✅ No Office 365 activity detected for this user in the investigation period.
---
## DLP Events
<If DLP events found:>
| Time | Device | Operation | File | Target | Rule |
|------|--------|-----------|------|--------|------|
| <datetime> | <device> | <operation> | <filename> | <domain/path> | <rule_name> |
**DLP Summary:**
- ⚠️ <X> sensitive file operations detected
- Operations: <network share copy, cloud upload, removable media, etc.>
- Rules triggered: <list of DLP rule names>
<If no DLP events:>
✅ No DLP events detected for this user in the investigation period.
---
## Security Incidents
<If incidents found:>
| ID | Title | Severity | Status | Classification | Created | Owner | Alerts | Link |
|----|-------|----------|--------|----------------|---------|-------|--------|------|
| <id> | <title> | 🔴/🟠/🟡 <severity> | <New/Active/Closed> | <TP/FP/BP/—> | <date> | <owner_upn> | <count> | [View](<url>) |
**Incident Summary:**
- <X> total incidents (<Y> open, <Z> closed)
- Highest severity: <level>
- <Brief description of most critical incident>
<If no incidents:>
✅ No security incidents involving this user in the investigation period.
- Checked: SecurityAlert → SecurityIncident join on UPN, User Object ID, and Windows SID (0 matches)
---
## Risk Assessment
### Risk Score: <XX>/100 — 🔴 HIGH / 🟠 MEDIUM / 🟡 LOW / 🟢 INFORMATIONAL
### Risk Factors
| Factor | Finding |
|--------|---------|
| 🔴/🟠/🟡 **<Factor Name>** | <Evidence-grounded finding with specific numbers> |
### Mitigating Factors
| Factor | Finding |
|--------|---------|
| 🟢 **<Factor Name>** | <Evidence-grounded finding with specific numbers> |
---
## Recommendations
### Critical Actions
<Numbered list of critical actions with evidence. Only include if critical findings exist.>
### High Priority Actions
<Numbered list of high-priority actions with evidence.>
### Monitoring Actions (14-Day Follow-Up)
<Bulleted list of ongoing monitoring recommendations.>
---
## Appendix: Query Details
| # | Query | Table(s) | Records | Execution |
|---|-------|----------|--------:|----------:|
| 1 | IP Selection (Priority IPs) | Signinlogs_Anomalies_KQL_CL, AADUserRiskEvents, SigninLogs | <count> | <time> |
| 2 | Anomaly Detection | Signinlogs_Anomalies_KQL_CL | <count> | <time> |
| 3 | Sign-ins by Application | SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs | <count> | <time> |
| 3b | Sign-ins by Location | SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs | <count> | <time> |
| 3c | Sign-in Failures | SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs | <count> | <time> |
| 3d | IP Sign-in Counts | SigninLogs, AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs | <count> | <time> |
| 4 | Audit Log Activity | AuditLogs | <count> | <time> |
| 5 | Office 365 Activity | OfficeActivity | <count> | <time> |
| 6 | Security Incidents | SecurityAlert, SecurityIncident | <count> | <time> |
| 10 | DLP Events | CloudAppEvents | <count> | <time> |
| 11 | Threat Intelligence | ThreatIntelIndicators | <count> | <time> |
| — | User Profile | Microsoft Graph API | 1 | <time> |
| — | MFA Methods | Microsoft Graph API | <count> | <time> |
| — | Registered Devices | Microsoft Graph API | <count> | <time> |
| — | Risk Profile | Microsoft Graph API | 1 | <time> |
| — | Risk Detections | Microsoft Graph API | <count> | <time> |
| — | Risky Sign-ins | Microsoft Graph API (beta) | <count> | <time> |
*Query definitions: see the Sample KQL Queries section in this SKILL.md file.*
**Do NOT include full KQL text in the appendix** — the canonical queries are already documented in this SKILL.md file. The appendix serves as an audit trail only.
---
**Investigation Timeline:**
- [MM:SS] ✓ Phase 1: User ID retrieval (<X>s)
- [MM:SS] ✓ Phase 2: Parallel data collection (<X>s)
- [MM:SS] ✓ IP Enrichment (<X>s)
- [MM:SS] ✓ Phase 3: Report generation (<X>s)
- **Total Investigation Time:** <duration>
Markdown Report Authoring Guidelines
- Populate every section — even if data is empty. Use the
✅ No <X> detected... pattern for empty sections.
- Never invent data — follow the Evidence-Based Analysis global rule strictly. Every number in the report must come from a query result.
- Risk assessment is dynamic — calculate risk score using the same weighted logic as
generate_report_from_json.py (risk factors × 10 − mitigating factors × 5 + baseline 30, capped 0–100).
- IP enrichment — run
enrich_ips.py for IP intelligence data. If enrich_ips.py is unavailable, use Sentinel ThreatIntelIndicators and Signinlogs_Anomalies_KQL_CL data as fallback.
- PII-Free — the report file is saved to
reports/ which is gitignored. However, exercise caution with any files that may be shared externally.
- Emoji consistency — follow the Emoji Formatting table from
copilot-instructions.md for all risk/status indicators.
- Query appendix — include record counts and execution times but NOT full KQL text. Reference the SKILL.md query numbers.
JSON Export Structure (Mode 3 — HTML Report)
Export MCP query results to a single JSON file with these required keys:
{
"upn": "user@domain.com",
"user_id": "<USER_OBJECT_ID>",
"user_sid": "<WINDOWS_SID>",
"investigation_date": "2025-11-23",
"start_date": "2025-11-15",
"end_date": "2025-11-24",
"timestamp": "20251123_164532",
"anomalies": [...],
"signin_apps": [...],
"signin_locations": [...],
"signin_failures": [...],
"signin_ip_counts": [...],
"audit_events": [...],
"office_events": [...],
"dlp_events": [...],
"incidents": [...],
"user_profile": {
"id": "...",
"displayName": "...",
"userPrincipalName": "...",
"mail": "...",
"userType": "...",
"jobTitle": "...",
"department": "...",
"officeLocation": "...",
"accountEnabled": true
},
"mfa_methods": {...},
"devices": [...],
"risk_profile": {...},
"risk_detections": [...],
"risky_signins": [...],
"threat_intel_ips": [...]
}
Error Handling
Common Issues and Solutions
| Issue | Solution |
|---|
Missing department or officeLocation | Use "Unknown" as default value |
| No anomalies found | Export empty array: "anomalies": [] |
| Graph API returns 404 for user | Verify UPN is correct |
| Sentinel query timeout | Reduce date range or add ` |
Missing trustType in device query | Use default: "Workplace" |
| No results from SecurityIncident query | Ensure using ALL THREE identifiers (UPN, UserID, SID) |
| Risky sign-ins query fails | Must use /beta endpoint |
Required Field Defaults
{
"department": "Unknown",
"officeLocation": "Unknown",
"trustType": "Workplace",
"approximateLastSignInDateTime": "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z"
}
Empty Result Handling
{
"anomalies": [],
"signin_apps": [],
"signin_locations": [],
"signin_failures": [],
"audit_events": [],
"office_events": [],
"dlp_events": [],
"incidents": [],
"risk_detections": [],
"risky_signins": [],
"threat_intel_ips": []
}
Integration with Main Copilot Instructions
This skill follows all patterns from the main copilot-instructions.md:
- Date range handling: Uses +2 day rule for real-time searches
- Parallel execution: Runs independent queries simultaneously
- Time tracking: Mandatory reporting after each phase
- Token management: Uses
create_file for all output
- Follow-up analysis: Reference
copilot-instructions.md for authentication tracing workflows
Example invocations:
SVG Dashboard Generation
After generating a user investigation report (markdown file output), an SVG dashboard can be created using the shared SVG rendering skill.
Trigger: User asks "generate an SVG dashboard from the report" or "visualize this report"
Workflow:
- Read this skill's
svg-widgets.yaml (widget manifest — defines layout, colors, field mapping)
- Read
.github/skills/svg-dashboard/SKILL.md (rendering rules — component library, quality standards)
- Extract data from the completed report using
data_sources.field_mapping_notes
- Render SVG → save as
{report_basename}_dashboard.svg in the same directory
Layout: 5 rows — title banner, risk score card + KPI cards (sign-ins/success rate/IPs/incidents/anomalies), top apps bar chart + failure codes bar chart, incidents table + risk/mitigating factors table, assessment banner + recommendations.
Last Updated: March 24, 2026
