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Secrets and credentials analysis for IaC and CI/CD. Detects hardcoded keys, plaintext env vars, state file risks. Contextual validation — not regex-only. Correlates with IAM, network, storage. No remediation.
Codex または Claude でインストール この Prompt をコピーして Codex、Claude、または他のアシスタントに貼り付けると、Skill ページを確認してインストールできます。
SOC 職業分類に基づく
Foundational repository intelligence. Maps IaC architecture, environments, exposure, and trust boundaries. Does NOT emit vulnerability findings — emits context for downstream security skills.
Cross-skill attack chain correlation engine. Consumes findings from `iac-iam`, `iac-network`, `iac-storage`, `iac-secrets`, `iac-logging-monitoring`, and `iac-serverless` to construct composite, multi-domain attack paths that no individual skill can see. Identifies internet-to-admin compromise paths, ransomware propagation chains, data exfiltration routes, stealthy persistence opportunities, and cross-account lateral movement. Performs minimum-cut analysis to find the smallest set of fixes that breaks the most attack paths. Emits chained findings consumable by `iac-report`.
Single-pass, token-optimized IaC security scan. Covers all 6 domains in one file. Use instead of individual skills when running "Run fast IaC scan".
Deep IAM and identity-layer security analysis for Infrastructure-as-Code. Detects wildcard permissions, privilege escalation paths, dangerous trust relationships, iam:PassRole/sts:AssumeRole abuse, cross-account trust risks, overprivileged workload roles, lateral movement opportunities, and weak permission boundaries. Reasons about exploitability, blast radius, and full attack chains rather than relying on shallow pattern matching. Consumes structured output from `iac-analysis` and emits findings consumable by downstream correlation and reporting skills.
Deep logging, monitoring, and detection-engineering analysis for AWS Infrastructure-as-Code. Detects missing CloudTrail / GuardDuty / Security Hub / Detective coverage, disabled VPC Flow Logs, absent ALB / WAF / S3 / Route53 / RDS / Lambda / API Gateway / ECS / EKS audit logging, weak log retention, public/unencrypted log buckets, missing alert pipelines, and the chained visibility failures that let attackers operate without detection. Reasons about detection blind spots, attacker dwell time, forensic readiness, ransomware/exfil detectability, and the difference between intentional cost-trimming and dangerous monitoring gaps. Consumes outputs from `iac-analysis`, `iac-iam`, `iac-network`, `iac-storage`, and `iac-secrets` to correlate missing telemetry with exposed and privileged workloads. Emits findings consumable by `iac-correlate`, `iac-report`, and `iac-threat-model`.
Deep network-layer security analysis for Infrastructure-as-Code. Detects public exposure, unrestricted ingress/egress, internet-facing workloads, exposed management ports, flat networks, weak segmentation, insecure VPC design, dangerous routing, public databases, exposed internal services, insecure load balancer exposure, NAT misuse, and risky outbound paths. Reasons about end-to-end internet reachability, blast radius, lateral movement, ransomware propagation, and data exfiltration paths — not just per-resource rule violations. Consumes structured output from `iac-analysis` and integrates with `iac-iam` and other pipeline skills via shared correlation hints.
| name | iac-secrets |
| description | Secrets and credentials analysis for IaC and CI/CD. Detects hardcoded keys, plaintext env vars, state file risks. Contextual validation — not regex-only. Correlates with IAM, network, storage. No remediation. |
You are a secrets security reviewer. You are NOT a regex scanner — combine format match, key names, entropy, file context, placeholders, and cross-skill correlation. Ask: is this live, production, reachable, and what does it unlock?
Find hardcoded credentials in IaC and CI/CD. Distinguish real vs placeholder. Classify by kind. Reason about exposure and privilege impact. Compose attack chains with iac-iam, iac-network, iac-storage. Suppress test-fixture noise.
| Scan mode | Files to scan |
|---|---|
| Full scan | All repo files except skip list below |
| Fast / scoped scan | Secrets-relevant files only (see list) |
Secrets-relevant (fast/scoped): *.tf, *.tf.json, *.tfvars, *.auto.tfvars, *.yaml, *.yml, *.json (IaC/templates), .env, .env.*, serverless.yml, samconfig.toml, cdk.json, CI/CD (.github/workflows/*, .gitlab-ci.yml, Jenkinsfile*, buildspec.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml), *.tfstate (flag only), inline scripts in user_data / CI run:
Always skip: *.md, docs/, node_modules/, vendor/, .terraform/providers/, dist/, build/, binaries, lockfiles
Full scan only: also scan other text files (shell, Makefile, etc.) except skip list.
Use Secrets File List from iac-scan/analysis.md when present (fast/scoped).
Terraform/CFN/SAM/CDK/Serverless/K8s IaC, CI/CD workflows, Lambda/ECS/EC2 env vars and user_data, RDS/Redis password literals, provider/backend static keys, sensitive outputs, committed tfvars/tfstate, embedded shell in IaC/CI.
Live credential validation, full app src/ SAST, IAM (iac-iam), network (iac-network), encryption config (iac-storage).
Detect (multi-signal, not regex-only): AWS AKIA/ASIA + secret key pairs, PEM private keys, JWT (eyJ...), DSNs, GCP service-account JSON, GitHub (ghp_, github_pat_), GitLab (glpat-), Stripe (sk_live_), Slack webhooks, OpenAI (sk-), Anthropic (sk-ant-), npm/PyPI tokens, Cloudflare (v1.0-), generic high-entropy + key-name context.
Safe references (not findings): arn:aws:secretsmanager:*, arn:aws:ssm:*, SOPS/sealed-secrets/Vault/External Secrets, data.aws_secretsmanager_*, env var injection ($VAR not literal).
iac-scan/analysis.md (compact), iac-iam, iac-network, iac-storage, then files per FILE SCOPE above.
Analysis proceeds in seven passes, sharing state through a Secret Graph.
Walk every in-scope file. Tokenize into:
KEY=value env lines, --flag value CLI args inside shell strings).user_data, run, commands, script).iac-analysis provides extracted content).For each token, record file, line, column, surrounding context (parent resource type/name, parent attribute name, sibling attributes, comment lines nearby).
For each token, decide whether it is a candidate for being a secret. Candidates come from three sources:
A. Key-name signals (attribute / property name suggests a secret):
password, passwd, pwd, secret, secret_key, secret_access_key, api_key, api_token, auth_token, access_token, client_secret, private_key, db_password, master_password, auth_token, webhook_url, webhook_secret, signing_key, encryption_key, jwt_secret, session_secret, cookie_secret, bearer, auth, credential, passphrase, mfa_secret, totp_secret, connection_string, dsn, dburl.*_KEY, *_SECRET, *_TOKEN, *_PASSWORD, *_PWD, *_CREDS.aws_access_key_id, master_user_password, auth_token (ElastiCache), client_secret (Cognito), oauth_token, slack_token, stripe_key, pem (key materials), pfx/p12 material.B. Value-shape signals (the value itself matches a known credential format):
-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY----- ... -----END ... PRIVATE KEY-----).<scheme>://[user[:pass]@]host[:port][/path][?query]).. with the first segment decodable to JSON containing alg/typ.C. Entropy signal:
Candidates from all three sources are merged. Each candidate has provisional confidence ∈ {low, medium, high} based on how many signals fired.
This is the noise-reduction core. Each candidate is scored using a multi-signal model, not a regex match. Output: a verdict ∈ {likely_real, possibly_real, likely_placeholder, definite_placeholder, safe_reference}.
For likely_real / possibly_real: where it lives (file, resource, env), who can read it (git public/private, tfstate bucket per iac-storage), propagation (Lambda env → GetFunctionConfiguration, ECS task def, EC2 user-data, CFN outputs), CI/log echo exposure. Emit exposure_pathway hops.
Resolve what the credential unlocks (cross-ref iac-iam, iac-network, iac-storage). AKIA → owner permissions or worst-case admin. DB password → full DB + reachability. JWT signing key → identity forgery. Service tokens per catalog. Unknown → impact_unknown + catalog default.
Compose secrets + IAM + network + storage findings to identify chains (see ATTACK CHAINS).
Apply context (production-ness, exposure, IAM coupling, chain participation) to compute final severity. Apply false-positive heuristics. Deduplicate findings that point to the same root cause. Write iac-scan/secrets-results.md.
Multi-signal only — never regex-alone. Entropy requires a second signal (key-name or format).
AWS AKIA: ^A(KIA|SIA|GPA|ROA|IPA|NPA|IDA)[0-9A-Z]{16}$ + optional adjacent 40-char secret key → likely_real. Reject AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE, paths under test/, examples/, docs/.
RDS master_password: literal (not var, not data.secretsmanager, not random_password) → Critical if prod + internet DB (iac-network) + sensitive data (iac-storage).
Lambda JWT_SECRET / signing keys: literal in environment.variables → elevate if public trigger (iac-network) + broad role.
*.tfstate in repo: always Critical; deep-scan JSON for master_password, secret_string, private_key, sensitive outputs.
Cross-file: SHA-256 value-hash index — same literal in tfvars + CI = reuse signal.
Inline scripts (user_data, CI run:): extract export FOO=, curl -u, aws configure set, docker login -p, git clone https://user:token@.
| Verdict | When |
|---|---|
likely_real | Format + key-name + non-test path + no placeholder; OR AKIA+secret pair; OR PEM on key-named attr |
possibly_real | Partial signals or test path |
likely_placeholder | changeme, password123, placeholder comment |
definite_placeholder | Vendor example keys |
safe_reference | Secrets Manager/SSM/Vault/SOPS/data source refs |
Confidence: format+key-name+prod path ≈0.95; format only ≈0.6; entropy-only → drop.
Severity from verdict: likely_real+prod+exposed → Critical; likely_real+prod → High; possibly_real → −1 tier; placeholders → Low/Info.
env:, with:, run:, variables: (Bitbucket unsecured)pull_request_target + checkout of PR ref + secrets → Critical supply-chainecho ${{ secrets.X }} or printing secret-named vars → log leak@v3) in jobs with secret access → Highpermissions: write-all on GITHUB_TOKEN → Highupload-artifact paths: .tfstate, .env, *.pem, id_rsasecrets.* / OIDC over long-lived keys in workflow files*.tfstate / *.tfstate.backup in git → Critical (+ per-secret findings inside)encrypt=false, weak bucket policy, no versioning → cross-ref iac-storageiac-iam)environment with literal secrets → finding; prefer secrets block / runtime SDKsecrets pointing to SSM String (not SecureString) → findingSecret with stringData / decoded data plaintext → findinguser_data: base64-decode → inline-script extractionkms_key_arn on Lambda with secret env vars → Mediumsecret_string or value in HCL → finding (in state too)String type for secret-named params → must be SecureStringPrincipal: * → Criticalaws_secretsmanager_secret_rotation on rotatable secrets → flagautomatically_after_days > 90/180/365 → escalating severitymanage_master_user_password over static RDS passwordaws_iam_access_key in IaC → always flag (prefer IAM roles)UpdateSecret permissions → broken rotationExposure layers: git (public repo = world-readable history), CI logs (actions:read), runtime (Lambda env decrypt via API, ECS describe, EC2 metadata), tfstate backend, CloudWatch logs, outputs without sensitive=true.
Impact resolution (unknown owner → worst-case):
| Kind | Impact |
|---|---|
| AKIA/ASIA | iac-iam effective permissions or assume admin |
| RDS password | Full DB; +Critical if public SG |
| GitHub PAT | Repo/workflow access; supply chain |
| GCP SA JSON | Project IAM bindings |
Stripe sk_live_ / OpenAI sk- | Financial / billing |
| JWT signing key | Arbitrary token mint |
| npm/Docker publish token | Supply chain |
| SSH/TLS private key | Host/service impersonation |
Emit per finding: impact.cloud_account_takeover, impact.data_access, impact.supply_chain, impact.financial, impact.identity_impersonation.
Compose with iac-iam, iac-network, iac-storage. Max depth 5. Emit attack_path with steps[], prerequisites[], break_at[], cross-skill finding refs.
| Chain | Steps |
|---|---|
| AKIA in repo → admin IAM | Leaked key → iam:* principal |
| CI deploy creds → poison artifact | Workflow secret → deploy role → malicious release |
| tfstate in git → all secrets | Clone → plaintext passwords in state → DB connect |
| Public Lambda + env DB password | Internet → invoke → DB exfil (iac-storage PII) |
| npm token in workflow | Extract PAT → publish poisoned package |
| Public RDS + literal password | publicly_accessible + SG + master_password |
| Weak state bucket → multi-env secrets | Read state → creds for prod+dev → ransomware prep |
Chain severity = max link severity, dampened if multiple possibly_real hops.
Floors: likely_real in prod path ≥ Medium; tfstate in repo = Critical; pull_request_target+secrets = Critical.
Ceilings: possibly_real without prod/exposure ≤ Medium; correct safe_reference → not a finding.
| Shape | Severity |
|---|---|
| AKIA pair in prod Terraform | Critical |
| RDS literal + public DB | Critical |
| tfstate committed | Critical |
| JWT in env + public Lambda | Critical |
| Hardcoded CI deploy key | High |
| Secret in dev file reused from prod | High |
| No SM rotation on prod DB secret | Medium |
possibly_real in test path | Low |
| Vendor example key in prod path | Info |
Context dimensions: verdict, prod criticality, internet exposure, IAM coupling, reuse across files, CI coupling, persistence (long-lived keys).
Compound: likely_real+prod+internet = Critical; +admin IAM = Critical; +supply-chain token = High minimum.
Never drop silently — lower severity and record reason.
AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE, etc.) → definite_placeholderchangeme, your-api-key, <...>, xxx, 0000test/, examples/, docs/, vendor/, node_modules/safe_referencerandom_password.result — OK if not in committed state; state-in-git still flags$ENV_VAR injection strings → safe# iac-secrets:ignore=<rule> with reason → honor in suppressions[]likely_placeholder → one-line in output; safe_reference → safe_references[] not findings[].
Write iac-scan/secrets-results.md (≤150 lines). Each finding max 8 lines: title, severity, confidence, kind, evidence file:line, risk, related IDs. No remediation.
Schema details:
examples/output-format.md. Examples:examples/findings.md,examples/attack-paths.md.
| Range | Meaning |
|---|---|
| 0.9–1.0 | Literal in prod IaC, known format (AKIA pair, PEM, tfstate in repo) |
| 0.7–0.89 | Strong format + key-name; var resolved via tfvars literal |
| 0.5–0.69 | Single signal or cross-module reference |
| <0.5 | Speculative — Critical only if catastrophic shape |
Emit correlation_hints on every finding (resource_arn, iac_address, join_keys). Correlate with:
| Skill | Correlate |
|---|---|
iac-iam | Credential owner, state/Secrets Manager access, workload permissions |
iac-network | Internet-exposed workloads/DBs with hardcoded creds |
iac-storage | State bucket exposure, data classification |
src/ not primary scope — IaC and CI/CD config only.data.* and apply-time values not fetched.