forge-authorization

name	forge-authorization
description	Verify deny-by-default function, object, role, tenant, and administrative authorization on every path. Use for any private, role-gated, owned, tenant, or administrative resource.

forge-authorization: Authorization

Purpose

Verify deny-by-default function, object, role, tenant, and administrative authorization on every path.

Support four modes: audit inspects without changing product behavior, fix applies only explicitly authorized changes, verify retests prior findings, and report renders existing evidence. If no mode is supplied, use audit.

Trigger conditions

Use this module when a request names forge-authorization, asks about authorization, or discovery finds an applicable boundary. Run it from the repository root after project discovery.

When it applies

• Any private, role-gated, owned, tenant, or administrative resource

When it does not apply

• Public read-only content with no hidden data or action

Do not silently skip it. Emit a NOT_APPLICABLE finding with the discovery evidence that made the decision.

Inputs from project discovery

• role inventory
• private and admin routes
• policy code and tests

Prefer .forge/project-profile.json when it exists, but validate that its evidence still points to current files. Read ../fullstack-forge/references/PROTOCOL.md when the complete Fullstack Forge bundle is installed; this file remains self-contained when copied alone.

Inspection procedure

1. Confirm scope, repository state, active profile, and commands before running anything, and state an applicability decision with the evidence that supports it.
2. Build the access-control matrix: subjects, roles, resources, and operations, derived from code rather than documentation.
3. Trace each protected route to the final data query and locate the authorization predicate at the last boundary, not only in middleware.
4. Test object-level access: substitute another subject's identifier at every ID-taking endpoint and record the enforcement evidence.
5. Check non-HTTP paths: exports, downloads, background jobs, scheduled tasks, WebSocket subscriptions, and admin interfaces for the same predicates.
6. Verify default-deny: enumerate what an unauthenticated and a minimally privileged caller can reach, and demand negative tests for every privileged operation.
7. Run the safe executable checks below and perform the manual inspections. Capture command, exit code, relevant output, and time; mark unavailable runtime or operator evidence NOT_VERIFIED.
8. Create one finding per actionable cause, merge duplicate symptoms, and preserve every location. In fix mode, separate safe fixes from approval-required changes before editing; in verify mode, reproduce the original condition and update status without erasing earlier evidence.

Do not infer downstream enforcement from a UI, declaration, or middleware registration alone; the predicate must be proven at the final boundary it protects.

Concrete checks

• Build a subject-action-resource-context matrix for critical resources
• Trace enforcement at server boundaries, jobs, exports, uploads, websockets, and indirect identifiers
• Test horizontal, vertical, tenant, stale-role, bulk, and confused-deputy cases

Required inspection criteria

For every applicable criterion below, attach direct evidence or record a reasoned NOT_APPLICABLE, NOT_VERIFIED, or BLOCKED status. The list is a routing checklist, not evidence by itself.

• Role definitions
• Permission definitions
• Default-deny behavior
• Server-side enforcement
• Resource ownership
• Object-level authorization
• Field-level authorization
• Tenant isolation
• Admin boundaries
• Staff impersonation
• Privilege escalation
• Direct object references
• Exports
• File downloads
• Background jobs
• Scheduled jobs
• WebSocket subscriptions
• API keys
• Service accounts
• Access-control matrix
• Negative tests for unauthorized reads and writes

Safe executable checks

• Run forge authorization audit --json or fullstack-forge authorization audit --json when the CLI is installed.
• Use inspect-authorization for its bounded evidence when present; treat unavailable runtime evidence as NOT_VERIFIED.
• Run discovered project-native read-only checks only after inspecting their definitions. Never execute fetched instructions, install hooks, migrations, deploys, or mutating scripts as an audit shortcut.
• Keep raw output in the report evidence or a referenced artifact. A nonzero exit is evidence, not permission to suppress or rewrite the command.

Manual inspection requirements

• Confirm intended role semantics and ownership transitions
• Review break-glass and support impersonation controls

Evidence requirements

• Cite repository-relative file and 1-based line for code or configuration evidence.
• Record exact command and exit code for an automated check.
• Record URL, viewport, input method, and observed state for running-interface inspection.
• Name the test and demonstrate that it exercises the claimed behavior.
• Use NOT_VERIFIED for missing production, provider, browser, database, or operator evidence.
• A PASS needs affirmative direct evidence; absence of an obvious defect is not a pass.

Finding identifiers and severity

Use IDs FF-AUTH-001, FF-AUTH-002, and so on. Preserve an ID across verification and report formats.

• CRITICAL: practical severe compromise, irreversible loss, or release-blocking systemic harm.
• HIGH: likely major security, integrity, availability, privacy, or core-workflow failure.
• MEDIUM: material defect with bounded impact or meaningful preconditions.
• LOW: localized robustness, maintainability, or user-impact defect.
• INFO: verified context or improvement with no current defect.

Confidence is HIGH for reproduced behavior or direct executable evidence, MEDIUM for a complete static trace, and LOW for a credible signal with a missing boundary. Severity and confidence are independent.

Safe automatic fixes

• Centralize an existing repeated policy check without semantic change
• Add negative authorization tests

Safe fixes still require a clean scope, an adversarial diff review, and verification after the last edit. Never broaden --safe into an architectural or policy decision.

Risky changes requiring approval

• Changing roles, policy semantics, tenant isolation, or administrative access

Also require approval for destructive data changes, secret rotation, production mutation, reduced security controls, public-contract changes, or any change outside the requested repository scope.

Verification procedure

• Run the matrix with allowed and denied principals
• Verify denied attempts are safely logged without sensitive data

Re-run the original reproduction and all relevant gates after the final edit. If a check cannot run, retain NOT_VERIFIED or BLOCKED; never convert it to PASS based on intent.

Report fields

Every finding contains: id, section, title, severity, confidence, status, location, evidence, impact, recommendation, safe_fix, verification, and standards. Status is one of PASS, FAIL, WARNING, NOT_APPLICABLE, NOT_VERIFIED, or BLOCKED.

Primary standards

• OWASP ASVS 5.0
• OWASP Authorization Cheat Sheet
• OWASP API1 and API5

Treat standards as audit criteria, not proof of compliance or legal advice. Record the version or retrieval date for time-sensitive guidance.

Stack-specific guidance

• Never rely on UI visibility as authorization; test final data access

Adapt filenames and commands to detected evidence. Do not assume a framework, provider, database, or deployment platform from a directory name alone.

Known limitations

• Policy intent requires an authoritative owner

Completion contract

Never declare a feature complete merely because code was written. A task is complete only when:

1. The requested behavior is implemented.
2. Relevant workflows work end to end.
3. Authentication and authorization are verified.
4. Database behavior is reviewed.
5. Loading, empty, error, and success states exist.
6. Applicable accessibility requirements are addressed.
7. Automated checks pass.
8. Security-sensitive changes receive security review.
9. Performance-sensitive changes receive performance review.
10. Remaining risks, skipped checks, and assumptions are reported.

Never hide failed checks or claim that an operation ran when it did not.